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A TRIBUTE TO MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
VED P. NANDA
The first issue of this Journal was dedicated to my teacher, Myres S. McDou-
gal. He was and remains the most influential person in my professional career,
who not only taught me the majesty of international law but also gave me an in-
sight into human relationships. No matter how busy he was and no matter how
many commitments he had, he always had time for his students.
There is no dearth of brilliant minds in our profession. As a revered teacher,
as a most creative and prolific scholar, and as one of the most influential interna-
tional lawyers of his time, Professor Myres McDougal stands as a giant. But it is
that human touch that really matters, and set him apart from others.
My study at Yale was not coincidental. As a student at the University of
Delhi Faculty of Law, I was familiar with Professor McDougal's work and was
hoping one day to study with him. It was, however, at Northwestern University,
where I was completing my L.L.M., when I finally made up my mind. My advi-
sor, Professor Brunson MacChesney, was most gracious in wanting me to pursue
my J.S.D. at Northwestern University and offered me a handsome fellowship to do
so. But when I asked him about Yale and Professor McDougal, he was most gen-
erous with McDougal's praise and said that he would not mind my going to Yale.
And I vividly recall the first day I was at Yale and visited with Professor McDou-
gal, and I especially remember the warmth with which he welcomed me. It was
not just me. With all his students, he made them feel very special. I hope that I
have learned from his example.
As I started teaching at the University of Denver, Professor McDougal's im-
print was clear. The Denver journal was named the Denver Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy. The curriculum at the University of Denver was heavily
influenced by his teaching. I know that the most fitting tribute to him is his stu-
dents' commitment and scholarship in the pursuit of the goals he so elegantly ar-
ticulated and lived by-the establishment of an international order based on human
dignity.
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"Smoking is the chief single avoidable cause of death in our society
and the most important health issue of our time."'
*J.D., Willamette University College of Law, 1998; M.B.A., University of West Florida,
1992; B.A., California State University Sacramento, 1982.
1. Joachim Roski & Robert Jeddeloh, Tobacco Use Control, MED. J. ALLINA, Winter
1997, at 8 (quoting C. Everett Koop). "Cigarette smoking remains the most important
cause of preventable morbidity and early demise in developed countries." LAWRENCE M.
TIERNY JR. ET AL., CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 5 (1997). "Cigarette
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"Tobacco products have no safe level of consumption, and are the
only legal consumer products that kill when used exactly as the manu-
facturer intends."2
I. INTRODUCTION
American actions and perspectives regarding tobacco have pro-
foundly influenced the world in many ways. Health concerns first ar-
ticulated by the Surgeon General in 19643 led to a new paradigm in how
we view tobacco, public health, and smoking in general. The Surgeon
General's 1964 report proved to be a watershed in America. It was the
first of many government publications to detail the unhealthy medical
effects of tobacco.' As a result, the U.S. government now regulates the
smoking is the chief preventable cause of death in our society." U.S. DEPT HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH: A NATIONAL STATUS REPORT 1 (2d ed. 1990) (state-
ment of Louis W. Sullivan) [hereinafter 1990 REPORT]. "Smoking is emerging as the
world's largest single preventable cause of illness and death." WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (WHO), THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1995: BRIDGING THE GAPS 34 (1995)
[hereinafter WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1995.
2. WHO, The Public Health Implications of the Economics of Tobacco (visited Mar.
30, 1999) <http://www.who.org/programmes/psa/pres2.htm>. "Tobacco is the leading pre-
ventable cause of death: cigarettes and other tobacco products kill 420,000 American
smokers and 53,000 nonsmokers every year. This toll exceeds the deaths resulting from
alcohol abuse, AIDS, traffic accidents, homicides, and suicides combined." STANTON A.
GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
3. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964)
[hereinafter 1964 REPORT].
4. See, e.g., Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products is a Drug and
These Products are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,454 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 FDA Nicotine Report]; SURGEON
GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994) [hereinafter PREVENTING TOBACCO
1994]; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE
SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISEASES (1993) [hereinafter PASSIVE SMOKING
19931; 1990 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-9, 37-48; SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS
OF PROGRESS (1989); SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION (1988); ADVISORY COMM. TO
THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF USING SMOKELESS TOBACCO (1986) [hereinafter SMOKELESS TOBACCO
19861; SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1986); SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC
OBSTRUCTIVE LUNG DISEASE (1984); SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE (1983);
1964 REPORT, supra note 3; U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), CDC's TIPS - Tobacco
Use in the United States (visited Mar. 21, 1999)
<http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphplosh/tobus-us.htm> (listing diseases and other adverse ef-
fects); CDC, CDC's TIPS - Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy (visited Mar. 21, 1999)
<httpJ/ www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/matsmkg.htm> (describing the relationship between
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formerly unfettered tobacco industry based, in part, on continuing
medical revelations.5  Despite a significant minority6 of the American
mental retardation and prenatal smoking).
5. See ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM AT McGILL UNIVERSITY 1989 (Donald J. Ecobichon & Joseph M. Wu eds.,
1990); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE MEASURING EXPOSURES
AND ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECTS (1986); A.K. Hackshaw et al., The Accumulated Evi-
dence on Lung Cancer and Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 980 (1997);
M.R. Law et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke Exposure and Ischaemic Heart Disease:
An Evaluation of the Evidence, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 973 (Oct. 18, 1997); Eliseo J. Psrez-
Stable et al., Nicotine Metabolism and Intake in Black and White Smokers, 280 JAMA 152
(1998) (suggesting racial differences may be due to behavioral and biological factors));
CNN Financial News: CEO Admits Smoking Risk (CNN cable broadcast, Aug. 21, 1997)
(acknowledging a possible link between smoking and death); Filter Cigarettes Linked to
Form of Cancer, TIMES UNION, Nov. 5, 1997, at A9 (use of filtered low-tar cigarettes and
resultant deeper inhaling closely parallels deaths from adenocarcinoma, a cancer deep in
the lungs); Robert Langreth, Secondhand Smoke, Past Tobacco Use Found to Irreversibly
Damage Arteries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1998, at A3 (reporting on George Howard et al.,
Cigarette Smoking and Progression of Atherosclerosis: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Com-
munities (ARIC) Study, 279 JAMA 119 (1998)); Thomas H. Maugh II, Study Links Gene
Pattern to Strong Smoking Addiction Health: Finding Supports View that an Impaired
Ability to Feel Pleasure Plays a Role in the Addictive Process, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at
Al; Nat'l Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse at Columbia Univ., Fetal Tobacco Syn-
drome (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http://www.casacolumbia.org/pubs/jun96/tob4.htm>; A. Ott
et al., Smoking and Risk of Dementia and Alzheimer's Disease in a Population-Based Co-
hort Study: The Rotterdam Study, 351 THE LANCET 1840-43 (1998) (reporting on the rela-
tionship between smoking and dementia); Andrea Petersen, A Study Warns of Cigars'
Role in Some Heart Diseases, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, at B1; John Schwartz, Perez-
Stable, Suffer Greater Smoking Toll, Studies Say, WASH. POST, July 8, 1998, at A3 (citing
Ralph S. Caraballo et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Serum Cotinine Levels of Ciga-
rette Smokers: Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1988-1991, 280
JAMA 135 (1998) (finding that black smokers retained substantially higher levels of co-
tinine than white smokers); John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Contrite Tobacco Executives
Admit Health Risks Before Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at A14; Cf. Henry Wein-
stein, Judge Orders Tobacco Firms to Turn over Secret Papers, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 8,
1998, at Al (revealing industry documents indicating knowledge of tobacco's detrimental
effects long before the public did); Henry Weinstein, Yearly Medicaid Cost of Smoking Put
at $12 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at Al (reporting on annual Medicaid costs
without including funding from any other federal program or private insurers).
Cigarettes are now responsible for one in every five deaths in the USA...
Tobacco dependence may have a genetic component. Smokers have twice the
risk of fatal heart disease, ten times the risk of lung cancer, and several
times the risk of cancers of the mouth, throat, esophagus, pancreas, kidney,
bladder, and cervix; a two- to threefold higher incidence of stroke and peptic
ulcers (which heal less well than in nonsmokers); a two- to fourfold greater
risk of fractures of the hip, wrist and vertebrae; and a twofold risk of devel-
oping cataracts.... Smokers die 5-8 years earlier than never smokers.
Smoking cessation lessens the risk of death and of myocardial infarction in
men and women with coronary artery disease; lessens the risk of stroke;
slows the rate of progression of carotid arteriosclerosis; and is associated
with a reversal of bronchitis and improved pulmonary function... The chil-
dren of parents who smoke have lower birth weights, more frequent respira-
tory infections, less efficient pulmonary function, and a higher incidence of
1999
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population that disagrees with the federal government, Congress and
several executive agencies have enacted many laws and rules to regu-
late tobacco: including labeling,7 advertising,' workplace rules,' and re-
porting." Proposed federal regulations continue to surface." The
march to regulate tobacco consumption continues nationwide.' Anti-
chronic ear infections than children of non-smokers and are more likely to
become smokers themselves.
TIERNY JR. ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
6. See, e.g., U.S. Senator Ford (D-KY) announcing his opposition to a FDA rule to
limit tobacco products sales and marketing to children. "It's like calling in the FBI for a
speeding ticket." Senator Wendell Ford Criticized for Remark on Kids' Smoking Issues, in
American Cancer Soc'y (ACS), Great American Smokeout GASP: The Dirt (visited Mar. 2,
1998) <httpJ/www.cancer.org/ smokeout/thedirtthtml> [hereinafter The Dirt].
7. See, e.g., Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (1994) [hereinafter 1986 Smokeless Tobacco Act]; Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994); Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994) [hereinafter 1969 Cigarette Smoking
Act]; Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994)) [here-
inafter 1965 Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act].
8. See, e.g., Little Cigar Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994); 1969 Cigarette
Smoking Act, supra note 7; 1965 Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Pro-Children Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6081-84 (1994); Smoking Aboard
Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1973); Prohibition Against Smoking on Scheduled Flights, 49
U.S.C. § 41706 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, FTC Requires Cigar Companies to Supply
Data on Cigar Sales and Advertising Expenditures, available in 1998 WL 49964; 1986
Smokeless Tobacco Act, supra note 7; FTC, 1997 Smokeless Tobacco Report (visited Mar.
22, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/reports/smokeless97.htm> (made pursuant to the 1986
Smokeless Tobacco Act and reporting smokeless tobacco sales and promotions).
11. See, e.g., Safety & Health: OSHA Suggests Legislating Workplace Ban; Language
Would Protect Rule From Lawsuits, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at A-7 (Feb. 25, 1998)
(proposal to regulate smoking in the workplace); Tobacco Disclosure and Warning Act of
1997, S. 527, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring a contents listing, tougher warnings, and ex-
plicit labeling). Compare Brad Sherman, Valley Perspective for Sake of Children, Con-
gress Must Ban 'Kiddie Packs" Tobacco Companies' Marketing Strategy Clearly Targets
the Young, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at B17 (proposal to ban sales of packages with less
than 15 cigarettes), with Myron Levin, Tobacco Deal Spurs Bonanza for Lobbyists, Mar. 1,
1998, L.A. TIMES, at Al (describing Single Stick Inc., an Arizona tobacco firm, that mar-
kets single cigarette packs).
12. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 6404.5 (West Supp. 1998) (first state to ban smoking
in bars, effective Jan. 1, 1998); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 17-501 to 514 (Smoke-Free Air
Act); 1986 Minn. Laws 352 § 2 (repealed 1987) (first state to ban free samples of smoke-
less tobacco); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-102 (1995) (first state to ban outdoor advertising,
excepting dealers); Minneapolis Code Ord. § 281.55 (with St. Paul, first cities to ban free
samples in 1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (West 1993) (first state to restrict
public smoking). See generally Alan Henderson, Snuff Out Attempts Aimed at Repealing
Smoke-Free Bar Law to Shine Golfer's Remarks Show How You Can Drive Your Reputa-
tion into the Rough, Bus. J. (SAN JOSE), Mar. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8035727 (re-
porting on the success of smoke-free bars and the tobacco industry's misinformation cam-
paign); Barry Meier, New Laws Take Anti-Tobacco Penalties Straight to Kids, THE
OREGONIAN, Dec. 7, 1997, at A10 (listing penalties for minors buying or possessing to-
bacco products such as fines up to $1000 or suspended driving privileges); Lynne Tuohy,
Proposal to Ban Sales of Tobacco Splits Small Town, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 1997, at
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tobacco public announcements "' and publications"4 are relatively com-
mon.
America continues a leading role in the legal arena too. Tobacco
litigation in America entered its third wave"6 when states sued the to-
bacco industry. States claimed that the industry committed fraud, de-
ception, and racketeering upon the public, thereby creating a causal re-
lationship between public smoking and excess state Medicaid
expenses.6 By focusing on the industry's actions in the third wave of
litigation, and not the smokers' behavior, the states avoid the winning
industry defense of assumption of risk because the states 7 are third
A14 (proposing to ban tobacco product sales).
13. See Vice President Gore Launches New Campaign to Help Stop Tobacco Sales to
Children, M2 PRESSWIRE, Mar. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10219859; California Dep't
Health Serv., California Launches Aggressive New Anti-Tobacco Advertising Campaign,
(visited Feb. 16, 1998) <httpJ/ www.dhs.cahwnet.gov/prssrels/1997/16-97.htm> (describ-
ing counter-advertising directed at youth); Roski & Jeddeloh, supra note 1, at 15 (discuss-
ing partnering between the CDC & managed care organizations to counter-advertise).
14. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 2 (examining 4,000 pages of formerly secret
internal tobacco industry documents).
15. See Heather Cooper, Tobacco Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of the United
States and European Community Approaches to Combating The Hazards Associated With
Tobacco Products, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 275, 279-89 (1990); Paula C. Johnson, Regulation,
Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a Response from the United States
Government, 25 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1991) (describing the first wave in the 1950s
and 1960s, based upon fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty theories, and the second
wave during the 1980s and 1990s based upon failure to warn and design defect theories);
Mark D. Fridy, Note, How the Tobacco Industry May Pay for Public Health Care Expendi-
tures Caused by Smoking, 72 IND. L.J. 235 (1996). See generally Marc. Z. Edell, Cigarette
Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90 (1986); Donald W. Garner, Cigarette
Dependency: Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423 (1980).
16. See, e.g., State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Ch. Ct. Jackson County,
1994) (first state to sue the industry for Medicaid expenses). See Henry Weinstein, Big
Tobacco Settles Minnesota Lawsuit for $6.6 Billion: Accord is Reached Hours Before Jury
was to Begin Deliberations. Industry Agrees to Ban Payments to Entertainment Sources
and Disband Research Council, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at Al. See generally Christa
Sarafa, Making Tobacco Companies Pay: The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,
2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 123 (1997); Warren Richey, Big Tobacco Hit by Florida
Strategy, Global Assault, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 10, 1997, at G1-2; Lawrence J. Goodman,
Hearings Show Quagmire of Issues in Tobacco Deal, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 14, 1997, at
A18. After individual settlements with Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas, the
tobacco industry settled with the remaining 46 states. Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Companies
and 46 States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Nov. 23, 1998, at
3, available in 1998 WL 21154753.
17. Cf. Christopher Clark, Cities Stake Claim for Share of States' Tobacco Money:
Municipalities are Watching Closely an Attempt by St. Louis and a Group of Missouri
Hospitals to Recoup Their Smoking-Related Costs, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 14, 1998, at A13;
Deborah Pines, Unions' Tobacco Suit Cleared to Proceed Class Action Claims Higher
Health Care Costs, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 27, 1998, at 1 (reporting on Laborers Local 17 Health
& Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc.); Saundra Torry, Foreign Nations Sue Tobacco
Companies The Governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama File Lawsuits Pat-
terned on the Actions Brought by U.S. States, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 19, 1999, at AS; Bob
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parties that never smoked. 8 The tobacco companies settled out of court
with the states, agreeing to payments totaling $206 billion over the next
twenty-six years. Additional conditions of the settlement are bans on
advertising directed toward teens and children, and tobacco company-
funded study of programs to reduce teen smoking and prevent tobacco
related disease. 9 Non-smokers adopted similar strategies to sue the in-
dustry."
Changing public perceptions and laws are like tremors that shake
the tobacco industry's foundation. In 1997, California removed tobacco
from a list of inherently unsafe consumer products that shielded manu-
facturers from product liability actions.2' While in the 1970s Florida
manufactured cigarettes and supplied them while in state prisons and
hospitals, by 1994 Florida's position had changed diametrically from
ratification to confrontation.' Congressional legislation may radically
Van Voris, Tribal Court to Judge Tobacco, THE NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1998, at A6 (describing
Beaver v. American Tobacco Co. et al., No. CV97-27 (Dist. Ct. Muscogee Creek Nation,
1997) and other Native American lawsuits against the tobacco industry); Richard B.
Schmidtt, Tribal Courts Draw Adroit Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, at B1.
18. Cf Sarafa, supra note 16, at 132-43. But see State ex rel. Miller v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. et al., No. CL 71048 (Polk County Dist. Ct., 1996). Judge Linda Reade dis-
missed part of Iowa's suit against tobacco companies and stated, "Iowa, unlike Florida,
has not enacted any legislation which specifically grants the state the right to proceed
directly against tobacco companies to recover for medical expenses paid by the state for
alleged smoking-related illnesses." Renee Montage, Morning Edition: Iowa Smoking
(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997). Cf Nancy Meersman, NH High Court Rein-
states Tobacco Suit; Second-Hand Smoke Case Seen as Precedent Setting, THE UNION
LEADER (Manchester, NH), May 30, 1998, at Al (noting the adoption of tort law making
suppliers of dangerous products subject to bystanders' negligence claims); N.H.'s Highest
Court Reinstates Secondhand Smoke Lawsuit; The Estate of Roxanne Ramsey-
Buckingham, an Nonsmoker Who Died of Lung Cancer, Wins the Chance to Go to Trial,
PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., May 31, 1998, at 6A, available in 1998 WL 12188143.
19. Tobacco Settlement Summary (visited June 14, 1999)
<http//www.naag.org/glance.htmi>; See also Multi State Settlement (visited June 14, 1999)
<www.tobaccofreekids.org/html/multi-statesettlement.html> (detailing how much money
each state will receive from the settlement and what plans the states have made for the
money).
20. See Debbie Elliott & Scott Simon, Weekend Edition: Smoke Suit Settled (Nat'l
Pub. Radio broadcast, Oct. 11, 1997) (describing settlement of the Florida flight attendant
class action suit involving second-hand smoke); John Schwartz, Firms Not Liable in Sec-
ondhand Smoke Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1998, at A17 (prevailing over Mildred
Wiley's estate in the first American wrongful death suit involving environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS)); Robert Siegel, All Things Considered Tobacco Year in Review (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast, Dec. 31, 1997) (flight attendant suit). But see Myron Levin, Verdict
Deals Tobacco Firms a Historic Defeat, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al (reporting on a
$1 million judgment for the estate of Roland Maddox, a smoker, against Brown & Wil-
liamson that included the first punitive damages ever awarded against a cigarette com-
pany).
21. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1998) (enabling individuals to sue tobacco
companies).
22. See Sarafa, supra note 16, at 138 (citing Florida Trial Court Strikes Affirmative
Defenses of Tobacco Companies, TOBACCO LITIG. REP., Feb. 14, 1997.
VOL. 28:1
TOBACCO, GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH...
alter the present situation by shifting liability on a national scale."
Although recent events continue to alter the American legal land-
scape on a regular basis, an in-depth analysis of the changes in the
third wave of litigation and legislative proceedings affecting tobacco are
beyond the scope of this article. This article's discussion of the chang-
ing legal strategies and results is limited to a general analysis as appli-
cable in a global context.
Global attitudes concerning tobacco are similar to the predominate
American perspective, but less pervasive in the public recognition of to-
bacco's dangers and set within a broader spectrum of beliefs, behaviors,
and knowledge. Health issues are the leading reason for concern,' due
in large part to world events in the later part of this century.2 Several
factors contribute to increasing tobacco consumption: rising living stan-
dards, the globalization of economies, technological innovations, and
modem advertising.' Predictably, tobacco consumption increased dra-
matically in recent decades. 7 International and domestic health or-
ganizations are leaders in the anti-tobacco war.U
23. See Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson Congressional Information Web Site
(visited June 14, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin.query> (listing 50 bills that have
been introduced to the United States Senate and House of Representatives proposing to-
bacco regulation).
24. See THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (Christopher J.L. Murray & Alan D. Lopez
eds. 1996) ("By 2020, tobacco is expected to kill more people than any single disease sur-
passing even the HIV epidemic." Figs. 3 (DALYs [Disability-Adjusted Life Years] Attrib-
utable to Diarrhoea, HIV and Tobacco, 1990-2020) & 4 (By 2020, Tobacco is Expected to
Cause More Premature Death and Disability than any Single Disease)); RICHARD PETO ET
AL., MORTALITY FROM SMOKING IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1950-2000 (1994); WHO, An-
swers to Some Commonly Asked Questions About Tobacco (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
<httpJ/www.who.int/psa/toh/Alertju96/E/6.htm> [hereinafter Tobacco Questions].
The World Health Organization estimates that ... [o]n current evidence, life-
long smokers, on average, have a 1 in 2 chance of dying from tobacco. And
half of these, or 1 in 4 of all smokers, will die in middle age, before age sev-
enty. Smokers who die will lose, on average, about 22 years off their normal
life expectancy.
Id. See also China's Cigarette Production Down, Profits Up, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Mar. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2247296.
25. See generally PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIzATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH: A
NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (1992).
26. WHO, Smoking Trends, in Tobacco and Health: The Facts (visited Aug. 4, 1997)
<httpJwww.who.org/programmes/psa/pres3.htm>.
27. Id. (smoking in China increased by 20% from 1985 to 1992); WHO, Tobacco Con-
sumption (visited Aug. Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.who.int/psa/toh/Alert/apr96/3.html>
(documenting the 260% increase in Chinese cigarette consumption from 1970-72 to 1990-
92). See generally, Chip Jones, Tobacco Growers Get Survival Strategy 'Never Seen Situa-
tion So Serious," RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 1998, at C1 (placing hopes on
emerging markets such as Turkey and Vietnam).
28. See, e.g., organizations such as: Action on Smoking and Health, International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), International Union Against Cancer , Interna-
tional Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, Pan American Health Organization,
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This article analyzes global tobacco issues within the context of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Part II reviews the health
aspects associated with tobacco. Part III examines public education and
awareness in a global scope together with local, regional, and interna-
tional efforts and resultant effects. Part IV addresses tobacco's effects
upon children. Part V studies the matter of tobacco consumption as a
vehicle for drug delivery within the scope of substance control. Part VI
surveys the wide ranging economic issues that involve tobacco, includ-
ing advertising, taxes, and workplace conditions. Part VII notes the call
for an international framework for tobacco control and analyzes desir-
able subject matter for inclusion. Part VIII concludes with a summary
of suggested actions to increase the effectiveness of the worldwide anti-
tobacco struggle.
II. TOBACCO AND HEALTH
Although cigarettes are the most prevalent form of tobacco con-
sumption, many other forms exist.2 There are approximately 1.1 billion
smokers worldwide, comprising about one third of the global population
age fifteen and over.' Global estimates indicate 47% of men and 12% of
women smoke."' Many smokers begin at an early age (in many coun-
and WHO.
29. Different types of cigarettes include commercially manufactured (the most com-
mon), "roll-your-own," bidis (tobacco wrapped in a temburni leaf), and kreteks (cigarettes
made with tobacco and cloves). Other means of smoking tobacco include cigars, pipes, wa-
ter pipes. Types of smokeless tobacco include chewing tobacco (plug, loose-leaf, and
twist), pan (betel quid, a combination of sliced betel (areca) nut, tobacco, lime, catechu,
and assorted spices wrapped in a betel leaf), and snuff (nasal (dry) and oral (moist)). See
generally CONTROL OF TOBACCO-RELATED CANCERS AND OTHER DISEASES: PROCEEDINGS
OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 13 (Parkash C. Gupta et al. eds., 1992); SURGEON
GENERAL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE
AMERICAS (1992); IARC, IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of
Chemicals to Humans: Tobacco Habits Other than Smoking; Betel-Quid and Areca-Nut
Chewing; and Some Related Nitrosamines, 37 IARC (1985); IARC, /ARC Monographs on
the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of Chemicals to Humans: Tobacco Smoking, 38
IARC (1986).
30. WHO, Smoking Prevalence (visited Aug. 4, 1997) <httpJ/www.who.org/ pro-
grammes/psa/toh/Alert/apr96/2.html>.
31. Id. In developed countries, 42% of men and 24% of women smoke while in devel-
oping countries 48% of men and 7% of women smoke. Male smoking varies by region (less
than 30% smoke in the African region while 60% do in the western Pacific region) and na-
tional economies (37% in established market economies compared to 60% in formerly so-
cialist central and eastern Europe). Female smoking is most prevalent in formerly social-
ist central and eastern Europe (28%), countries with established market economies (23%),
and Latin American and Caribbean nations (21%) while in all other regions the rate is
below 10%. Id. WHO, Table 2, Daily Smoking Prevalence, Men and Women Aged 15 and
Over, Selected Regions, Early 1990s (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http:ll
www.who.int/toh/Alert/apr96/gifs/table2.gif> ; WHO, Table 3, Estimated Smoking Preva-
lence Among Men and Women 15 Years of Age and Over by Country, Latest Available Year
(visited Aug. Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.who.int/psa/tobAlert/apr96/gifs/table3.gif>. For
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tries the median age of initiation is below age fifteen), thereby lowering
the age when a smoker will suffer smoking-related diseases and death.32
As a result of nicotine addition, nicotine tolerance increases over time
and causes smokers to increase their consumption to the extent they
can afford.
Tobacco is known to cause undesirable health effects. Medical
sources cataloged the effects over the last few decades.3 ' Although the
tobacco industry and some others still generally dispute the medical
knowledge implicating tobacco,' the tide has changed since the early
1960s. The addictiveness of nicotine is a material factor in continued
tobacco consumption.3
Smoking in developing countries became widespread in recent
years. Trends indicate an increasing daily consumption per smoker as
an in depth analysis of female tobacco consumption, see CLAIRE CHOLLAT-TRAQUET,
WHO, WOMEN AND TOBACCO 9-29 (1992).
32. Smoking Prevalence, supra note 30. In France and Spain 40% of the population
aged 18-24 smokes. Over half the men under age 35 in South Africa smoke. Id.
33. See TIERNY JR. ET AL., supra note 1; 1995 FDA Nicotine Report, supra note 4;
IARC, WHO, CANCER: CAUSES, OCCURRENCE AND CONTROL 169-80 (L. Tomatis et al. eds.,
1990); WHO, The State of World Health, in THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1997:
CONQUERING SUFFERING, ENRICHING HUMANITY 1 (1997) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH
REPORT 1997] (describing the circulatory diseases: coronary heart disease, cerebrovascu-
lar disease, cardiomyopathies, and hypertension; and fatal cancers: lung, stomach, breast,
colon-rectum, mouth, liver, cervix, and esophagus, which all share tobacco consumption as
a major risk factor); CHOLLAT-TRAQUET, supra note 31, at 31-56 (detailing tobacco's ef-
fects on females). See also supra notes 1, 3-5 and accompanying texts; Deborah Josefson,
Passive Smoking Doubles Risk of Heart Disease, 314 BRIT. MED. J. at 1572 (1997) (report-
ing on study by Dr. Ichiro Kawachi of the Harvard School of Public Health). In compari-
son, tobacco often competes with food as a necessary item for the poverty-stricken smoker
in the developing world. The indirect danger this presents is dietary deficiencies that
lowers the body's resistance to diseases. SIMON CHAPMAN & WONG W. LENG, TOBACCO
CONTROL IN THE THIRD WORLD: A RESOURCE ATLAS 18 (1990) (further noting that a poor
Bangladeshi smoking five cigarettes daily could incur a monthly 8,000 calorie deficit (cit-
ing N. Cohen, Smoking, Health, and Survival: Prospects in Bangladesh, THE LANCET
1090-03 (1981))). But see David Leff, French Clone Human Hemoglobin in Tobacco to
Avoid Contamination, BIOWORLD TODAY, Mar. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (reporting on Human Hemoglobin from Transgenic Tobacco, NATURE, Mar. 6,
1997); NIST Bets on Transgenic Tobacco, Mar. 2, 1998, POINTCAST (reporting on bio-
pharmaceutical research to develop therapeutic peptides and proteins).
34. See Phillip Cole & Brad Rodu, Would a Switch from Cigarettes to Smokeless To-
bacco Benefit Public Health? Yes, PRIORITIES FOR LONG LIFE & GOOD HEALTH, Winter
1995, at 24 (arguing the relative safety of switching tobacco products; "Smokeless Tobacco
Is A Lifesaver."); John Schwartz, Tobacco CEO Won't Make Cancer Link, Phillip Morris
Chief Appears for First Time Before a Jury in Damages Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998,
at A2.
35. 1995 FDA Nicotine Report, supra note 4, at 41, 463-520; NICOTINE ADDICTION
1988, supra note 4; TIERNY JR. ET AL., supra note 1, at 997; GLANTE ET AL., supra note 2,
at 58-107. See Schwartz, supra note 5; Smoking: One Tough Addiction (visited Feb. 27,
1998) <http:ll www.abcnews.com/sections/living/smokingl2l7/index.html>.
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economic conditions improve worldwide. 36 Despite decreasing consump-
tion in developed countries, the rapid increase in developing countries
kept world consumption from decreasing.37  While global cigarette con-
sumption per adult remained steady through the early 1990s, global
consumption increased as world population increased.3
Increased tobacco consumption corresponds with burgeoning health
effects on the world's population.3 9 Costs are more than just individual
health; they include environmental, quality of life, and economic costs. °
36. Smoking Prevalence, supra note 30. See Robert Weissman, Tobacco Legislation
Should Restrict the Overseas Marketing of Cigarettes, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 27.
37. WHO, Figure 2, Trends in per Adult Cigarette Consumption in Developed and De-
veloping Countries, 1970-92 (visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/ pro-
grarnmes/psa/tohAlertlapr96/gifsfig2.gif>; WHO, Table 4, Global and Regional Estimates
and Trends in Consumption of Cigarettes per Adult 15 years and over, 1970-72 to 1990-92
(visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/ programmes/psa/toh/Alertapr96/gifs/fig4.gif>.
In the early 1970s, cigarette consumption was highest in Canada, Switzerland, the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (in order of ranking and above 3,000 per cap-
ita). In the early 1990s, the cigarette consumption ranked highest in Poland, Greece
(both above 3,500 per capita), Hungary, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (above 3,000
per capita). WHO, Table 5, Estimated per Capita Consumption of Cigarettes per Adult 15
Years and over, Selected Countries, 1970-72 to 1990-92 (visited Aug. 4, 1997)
<http://www.who.org/programmes/psa/toh/Alert/apr96/gifs/table4.gif>.
38. See Tobacco Consumption, supra note 27.
39. "Tobacco causes six per cent of all deaths in the world and the mortality toll is
increasing rapidly. Tobacco causes more deaths than all other forms of substance abuse
combined." WHO, Tobacco or Health (visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/ pro-
grammes/psaltoh.htm>. "In another three decades, unless the trend changes drastically,
we can expect about 10 million people to be killed each year by tobacco products, with 70%
of these deaths occurring in developing countries." WHO, Message from the Director-
General of the World Health Organization for World No-Tobacco Day 1997 (visited Aug. 4,
1997) <http://www.who.int/ntday97/tale.htm>. "The biggest and sharpest increases in
disease burden are expected in China and India, where the use of tobacco has grown most
steeply. If current trends continue, two to three million annual tobacco-caused deaths are
predicted for China alone by the 2020s." WHO, Tobacco Use: A Public Health Disaster
(visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/programmes/psa/tohlAlert/4-96/E/ ta3.htm>.
See generally Jane Moir, Most Workers at Risk from Tobacco Smoke, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 8 (noting 80% of the workforce is at risk from ETS in Hong Kong).
40. Deforestation and chemical use are some of the environmental costs of tobacco
consumption. See Acceptance Speech from President Nelson Mandela on Receiving the To-
bacco or Health Commemorative Medal and Certificate (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://
www.who.cb/psa/tajulyl.htm> (detailing health, economic, and quality of life costs); The
Economic and Human Costs of Tobacco Use, in WHO, Costs of Tobacco Use (visited Aug.
4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/programmes/psa/pres4. htm>; The Environmental Costs of
Production in Panos; Tobacco: The Smoke Blows South (visited Mar. 13, 1998)
<http://www.oneworld.org/panos/briefing/tobacco.htm>. Employer costs are substantial.
Employee excess illness costs (e.g., healthcare claims, workers' compensation, and other
benefits) were the most costly factor, over twice that of obesity, the second most costly fac-
tor. Robert L. Bertera, The Effects of Behavioral Risks on Absenteeism and Health-Care
Costs in the Workplace, 33 J. OCCUP. MED. 1119-24 (1991). See Youth Smoking Preven-
tion: Hearings on S. 1530 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of William L. Roper) [hereinafter Roper]. A World Bank economist estimates
that tobacco use results in a global net loss of $200 billion per year, with developing coun-
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While life expectancy lengthens, the risks of infectious diseases de-
creases and the likelihood of noncommunicable or chronic diseases in-
creases.4' Chronic diseases remain incurable and the best solution,
presently, is prevention. Associated with this situation is the "epidemi-
ological transition"2 that occurs as the developing states become more
developed. The improving world economic condition generally acceler-
ates tobacco consumption (a detrimental lifestyle risk factor), the epi-
demiological transition, and the increasing burden of suffering and dis-
ease caused by tobacco. Fortunately, prevention or cessation of tobacco
consumption are effective means of countering tobacco's ill effects. 3
Strong arguments exist for minimizing tobacco consumption. A
simple economic argument posits that despite the short-term economic
gains from tobacco," the insidious nature of tobacco addiction and its
long-term costs far outweigh the industry's economic value overall. In
other words, if governments internalize the health care costs and life-
time productivity losses to offset tobacco benefits (e.g., jobs and reve-
nues), the tobacco habit is a net drain on national economies overall.4 '
A moral argument also exists for keeping adolescents from consuming
tobacco or becoming industry targets.6
International law supports a fundamental right to a healthy life,47
tries suffering half the losses. Sources include direct medical care, work absenteeism, fire
losses, reduced productivity, and lost income due to premature demise. WHO, Working
Towards Comprehensive Tobacco Control: A Shared Responsibility (visited Aug. 4, 1997)
<http://www.who.org/programmes/psa/tohlAlert/4-96/E/ta5.htm>.
41. WHO, World Health Report, Chapter 2, The Double Burden: Emerging Epidemics
and Persistent Problems, (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.who.int/whr/1999/en/report.
htm>.
42. "Epidemiological transition" denotes the changing pattern of health, where unde-
veloped states gain the problems of developed states. This includes associated diseases of
developed states and the harmful effects of risky lifestyle factors such as tobacco, alcohol,
and drug use, along with accidents, suicide, and violence. WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1997,
supra note 33. See THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE, supra note 24, at 1, 31-39 (describ-
ing the changing causes of death in developing countries that represent 80% of the world's
population).
43. The Benefits of Quitting Smoking (visited June 14, 1999)
<http://www.who.int/toh/worldnotobacco99/english/Health.htm>.
44. Such gains include jobs from farming, manufacturing, and sales, revenue from
taxes and monopolies, and profits from a high margin manufacturing industry with a
loyal customer base.
45. The Causes and Consequences of a Lucrative but Dangerous Trade, in The Eco-
nomic and Human Costs of Tobacco Use, supra note 40 (consuming 1,000 tons of tobacco
equates to a net drain of $27.2 million to the world economy; world consumption was over
7 million tons in 1995). In the United States, private tobacco-related medical insurance
costs are almost four times the aggregate amount spent by Medicare, Medicaid, and indi-
viduals. Roski & Jeddeloh, supra note 1, at 16, fig. 1 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SMOKING AND SMOKING CESSATION
(1996)). In Minnesota, lost income is nearly 150% of healthcare costs. Id. at 16, fig. 2.
46. See infra Part IV. See also Weissman, supra note 36.
47. See, e.g., "Everyone has the right to life .. " Universal Declaration of Human
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
and indirectly supports anti-tobacco public health efforts.' States are
obligated to protect their citizens' health, but, within the anti-tobacco
arena, such protection is slow in coming, if it comes at all. Naturally,
the state interest in its citizens' health should be balanced with per-
sonal choice. While promoting a legal and broadly accepted product,
along with the individual right to consume tobacco, the tobacco industry
generally prevented states from acting upon their legal obligations to
protect and improve public health in this arena. Fortunately, the tide is
turning against the industry due in large part to relentless efforts of
NGOs.4 9
The increasing predominance of global tobacco consumption causes
mixed opinions. Some organizations, for example the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS), are quite alarmed by the trends and projected statistics."0
The WHO's Constitution obligates it to minimize tobacco's unhealthy
influence." Although neutral in their stance, many governments im-
plicitly condone the industry through their inaction. At the opposite
end of the spectrum, the tobacco industry continues to zealously pro-
mote tobacco as a legal product. If one views the decades of medical re-
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). "States Par-
ties... recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and mental health." International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 12, 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8. "Everyone has the right to
benefit from any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest possible standard of health
attainable." European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, 92. The Right to
Safe and Healthy Working Conditions; id. at art. 11. "1. Everyone shall have the right to
health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and so-
cial well-being. 2. In order to ensure the exercise of the right to health, the States Parties
agree to recognize health as a public good .... " Additional Protocol to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14,
1988, 28 I.L.M. 156, 164, at art. 10. "Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy
environment. ... " Id. at art. 11.
48. Cf supra, note 47.
49. See International Non-Governmental Coalition Against Tobacco (visited June 14,
1999) <http://www.uicc.ch/ingcattenglish/info/position.declar01.htm>; see also Action on
Smoking and Health Thailand (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.ash.org.or.th/>; Cam-
paign for Tobacco Free Kids (visited June 14, 1999) <httpJ/www.tobaccofreekids.org/>;
Counsel for a Tobacco-Free Ontario (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.opc.on.ca/ctfo/>;
Smoke Free OK (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.smokefree.org.ok/>.
50. Tobacco or Health, supra note 39 ("For most tobacco related illnesses, effective
treatment is rarely possible. Only prevention of tobacco-related illness will be effective in
slowing the progress of the pandemic of tobacco-caused death and illness."); E. Loren
Buhle, Jr., Smoking is Causing a Global Epidemic of Death (visited Feb. 27, 1998)
<http://cancer.med.upenn.edu/cancernews/1994/ smoke-epidemic.html>.
51. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTION, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185
(1946) [hereinafter WHO CONSTITUTION]. "Health is a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every hu-
man being.. .. " Id. at preamble. "The objective of the [WHO Constitution] ... shall be
the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health." Id. at art. 1.
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search and present statistical projections as credible, then a question
arises. What, if anything, should be done about tobacco consumption
and global public health? This article examines the possibilities from a
global perspective viewed within the context of NGOs, while trying to
find a balance between personal choice, public health, and a legal com-
modity.
III. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AWARENESS
Cultural acceptance of tobacco is generally widespread and long-
standing.52 Tobacco has been a legal product since its introduction from
the New World in 1492. Thereafter, it gained popularity despite King
James' 1604 admonition that "[s]moking is a custome lothesome to the
Eye, hateful to the Nose, harmefull to the Braine, [and] dangerous to
the Lungs .... 53 Popular culture normalized and glamorized smoking
for most of this century," and thereby reinforced the desirability of to-
bacco consumption. Often, tobacco consumption is presented as part of
desirable lifestyle.5 A cultural example that contrasts with American
norms is the acceptance of betel quid chewing within Bangladeshi fami-
lies while viewing smoking as a socially unacceptable habit." Whatever
the culture, a significant portion of the population views some form of
tobacco consumption as acceptable. Despite cultural norms, people are
commonly misinformed about risks associated with tobacco.57
52. For an extensive overview, see Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline, (visited Mar. 26,
1998) <http://www.worldchat.com/public/geaston/history.html>.
53. ROBERT KL HEIMANN, TOBACCO AND AMERICANS 250 (1960) (citing KING JAMES I,
A COUNTERBLASTE TO TOBACCO (1604)).
54. For example, tobacco use is glamorized in movies (e.g., Humphry Bogart in
CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942)), television (e.g., Cigarette-Smoking Man in
The X-Files (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.)), advertising (e.g., Joe Camel and the
Marlboro man), and sports and arts sponsorships (see infra notes 201-03 and accompany-
ing texts). See generally Sherryl Connelly, Health Activists Fume About Movie Smoking,
THE OREGONIAN, July 26, 1998, at E4; Mark Henderson, Rise of "New Lad" Boosts Smok-
ing and Drinking, TIMES (London), Mar. 26, 1998, at 14; Petersen, supra note 5 (noting
cigar smoking morphed to become glamorous); Am. Lung Ass'n (ALA), Thumbs Up!
Thumbs Down! (visited Mar. 2, 1998) <httpJ/www.lungusa.org/tutd/lastyear.html> (pan-
ning and praising 1996 movies for their portrayals of tobacco).
55. In China, smoking is a social institution for many people. Morning Edition: In-
ternational Conference on Smoking (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997), Mark
Henderson, Rise of 'New Lad" Boosts Smoking and Drinking, TIMES (London), Mar. 26,
1998, at 14; Petersen, supra note 5 (noting cigar smoking morphed to become glamorous).
Aug. 27, 1997). The Chinese public usually saw Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping with
cigarettes. Ron Scherer, Worldwide Trend: Tobacco Use Grows, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 17, 1996, at 1.
56. See WHO, Betel Quid Chewing Habit Amongst a Group of Bangladeshi Adoles-
cents in East London, in Tobacco Alert July 1996 (visited Aug. 4, 1997)
<http:/www.who.org/programmes/psa/toh/Alert/ju96/E/10.htm>. "This habit is accepted
as a traditional cultural feature of this community." Id.
57. See Anwar Fazal, Foreword to CHAPMAN & LENG, supra note 30, at i; Allyn L.
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To alter a culture's perceptions, significant efforts must be made to
educate and persuade the society to accept a "cultural redefinition of
smoking." ' Public education is the first step in this process.59 The
American government attempts to alter public opinion regarding to-
bacco consumption with various forms of public education and, ulti-
mately, laws.6' The United States, like most countries, tends to respond
to its politic. Therefore, the social and political processes usually pull
the government and its statutory framework rather than government
pushing society. NGOs usually are the force that initially moves society
in a different direction (e.g., mobilizing initial anti-tobacco efforts in the
1960s). Similar efforts occurred internationally, but NGOs lead the
anti-tobacco crusade much more than various governments.6
Public education efforts are helpful, but information alone rarely
changes a smoker's actions. Often, when a smoker knows that the habit
is detrimental, he or she continues anyway. Information by itself usu-
ally is insufficient to alter a smoker's behavior. Common reasons as to
why the smoker began smoking in the first place are peer pressure and
social acceptance of the act.n Equally important is the addictive nature
Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L
L. 257, 266-67, n.49 (1996); Butting Out, in Int'l Dev. Res. Ctr. (IDRC), IDRC: 25 Years of
Science in Action - Media Review 1995-96 (visited Mar. 7, 1998)
<http://www.irdc.caa/media/erevue.html> (describing widespread misconceptions regard-
ing tobacco). "An amateur [Gambian] wrestler.., urgently puffed on a cigarette just be-
fore his championship match. When asked why, he answered that 'cigarettes make me
strong.'" Id.
58. See generally Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compli-
ance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). Several online sites offer extensive docu-
mentation on health and industry matters. See The Lib. & Ctr. for Knowledge Mgmt.,
Univ. Cal. San Francisco, Tobacco Control Archives Collections (visited Feb. 14, 1998)
<http:/ /www.library.ucsf.edultobacco/tacoll.html>; The Tobacco Resolution (visited May
25, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com>; Univ. Ariz., ETS Sites (visited Feb. 14,
1998) <http://www.ahsc.arizona.edu/aztepp/ets.html> (cataloging environmental tobacco
smoke information).
59. See, e.g., N.J. Family Physicians Fight Youth Smoking Through 'Tar Wars,' PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (describing Tar
Wars, "a pro-health tobacco education program... target[ing] fifth graders"). Philip Mor-
ris Inc. recently announced plans to air television ads to encourage children aged 10 to 14
years old not to smoke. Philip Morris Plans Ads to Warn Youth on Smoking, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1998, at A4.
60. For example, documenting medical research. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompa-
nying text. Publishing information for public consumption on the internet. See, e.g. the
CDC at http://www.cdc.gov, Federal Trade Comm'n (FTC) at http://www.ftc.gov, and HHS
at http://www.hhs.gov.
61. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying texts.
62. For example, events such as the 10th World Conference on Tobacco or Health
(Aug. 24-28, 1997 in Beijing, China), publishing information on the internet (e.g., the
WHO at <http://www.who.org>) and in books (SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS,
supra note 29).
63. A 1981 Phillip Morris document states: "There is no question but peer pressure is
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of nicotine, a drug present in all tobacco." The Australian "Will Frank
win" campaign illustrates how addictive smoking can be and how a
hard-hitting campaign can succeed.'
Anti-tobacco programs utilizing peer pressure, social acceptance,
and group support can be productive.6 NGOs take a leading and vital
role in sponsoring annual events to reinforce a tobacco-free lifestyle
(e.g., the World No-Tobacco Day67 and the Great American Smokeout").
The events typically educate the public, explain medical effects of to-
bacco, encourage abstinence or cessation, and support both the user and
nonuser.
The World No-Tobacco Day is an example of implementing the
WHO's duty "to assist in developing an informed public opinion among
important in influencing the young not to begin smoking. A decade or more ago it was a
major reason why teen-agers began to smoke. Now, it is a major reason for their not be-
ginning to smoke." Youth Smoking: Prevalence, Trends, Implications and Related Demo-
graphic Trends (1981) (quoted in Youth Smoking Prevention: Hearings on S. 1530 Before
the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)). See
CHOLLAT-TRAQUET, supra note 31, at 57-70 (explaining reasons why females consume to-
bacco). Cf. American Heart Association and Tobacco-Free Ohio Clear the Air About
Women and Smoking; Ohio Research Scientist Knows Why Women Won't Quit and How to
Help, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (not-
ing attitudinal differences between the sexes).
64. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; PREVENTING TOBACCO 1994, supra note
4, at 30-31 (noting nicotine is as addictive as cocaine or heroin); infra notes 129-43 and
accompanying text.
65. See Media Can be Important Allies in Tobacco Control, in WHO, Tobacco Control
is Everybody's Business (visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.who.org/programmes/
psa/toh/Alert/4-96/E/ta6.htm>. An Australian tobacco company staged a major promo-
tional contest in 1981 to find a cowboy for a model in their cigarette ads. Tobacco control
activists found a willing contestant in Frank who continued to smoke through a tracheo-
stoma. Activists distributed posters with Frank's picture and the caption, "Will Frank
win?" Despite extensive media coverage, Frank lost and the tobacco company suffered
significant embarrassment. This helped lead to a later comprehensive Australian tobacco
control legislation and a ban on promotional contests. Id. Innovative behavior modifica-
tion promotions have a substantially better chance of success. See, e.g., Theresa Kirsch,
What A Shot, THE OREGONI'N, Mar. 22, 1998, at T10 (quoting a Bahamian sign: "Please
Do Not Drop Your Cigarette Butts On The Ground. The Fish Crawl Out At Night To
Smoke Them And We Are Trying To Get Them To Quit", and noting the complete suc-
cess).
66. E.g., Jacksonville Jaguars, Foundation Program List and Description (visited
Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.jaguarsnfl.com/jag-web/found/programs.htm> (listing aspects
of the Nat'l Football League team's program to educate youth about the health risks of
tobacco use); National Spit Tobacco Education Program's Major League Baseball Initia-
tive, in Robert Wood Johnson Found., Media Resource Guide on Tobacco (visited Feb. 14,
1998) <http:I/www.rwjf.org/media/tbcgde5.htm>.
67. See WHO, World No-Tobacco Day 1997 (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http:/I
www.who.cha/psa/psa3.htm> (introducing World No-Tobacco Day, May 31, 1997).
68. See ACS, Great American Smokeout (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
<http://www.cancer.orglgasp/ main.html>.
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all peoples on matters of health."9 Its manner of presentation is nota-
bly adult and addressed to a reasonable, intelligent person with a tone
that is educational, strategic, and somewhat evangelical. This is the
public front in the WHO's war against tobacco. 70 The WHO's web site
offers anti-tobacco strategies; persuasive explanations on the extent of
the "public health disaster"; a reasoned explanation detailing the com-
prehensive necessity and responsibility for tobacco control; collabora-
tion tips to be used on local, national, and international levels; warn-
ings to targeted demographic groups (e.g., women); and contacts for
further action and guidance.7  The internet is an ideal medium for
worldwide dissemination on an inexpensive and timely basis and as a
supplement to traditional printed materials. WHO coordination with
local and national NGOs creates synergy in the anti-tobacco struggle.
Over the last two decades, the Great American Smokeout evolved
into a professional, positive, and engaging event. Although targeted at
all smokers (most of whom are adults), the 1997 Smokeout focused on
teens who compose 90% of all new smokers in the United States.72
Closely associated with the Smokeout is the Great American Smoke-
Scream, a week-long precursor to the Smokeout, with radio, television,
and newspaper affiliations.73 The Smokeout's web page is slick, interac-
tive, and geared to teens and preteens, potentially the most likely indi-
viduals to start smoking.74 Plentiful graphics, questions and answers,
and role models make the site entertaining and educational. The me-
dium itself, a web page, is naturally familiar with today's youth.
Closely allied with the Smokeout is the Campaign For Tobacco-Free
Kids.75
When properly promoted, annual events benefit from public recog-
nition and acceptance. For example, most Americans (including smok-
ers) positively associate the Smokeout with anti-tobacco efforts. Suc-
69. WHO CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at art. 2(r).
70. The theme, "United for a Tobacco-Free World," indicates the struggle's extent.
WHO, Message from the Director-General of the World Health Organization for the World
No-Tobacco Day 1997 (visited March 22, 1999) <http://www.who.int/ntday/ntday97/
tale.htm>.
71. WHO, Tobacco Control is Everybody's Business, supra note 65.
72. Tristanne L. Walliser, The Great American Smokeout: No Ifs, Ands or Butts (vis-
ited Dec. 24, 1997) <http://www.more.abcnewsgo.com/sections/living/smokeoutll20/index.
html>.
73. ACS, Great American Smokeout: SmokeScream (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
<http://www.cancer.orglsmokeout/scream.html>.
74. Id.
75. "The Campaign For Tobacco-Free Kids is the largest private initiative ever under-
taken to decrease youth tobacco use in the United States." The Dirt, supra note 6. Nota-
ble Campaign members include the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Cancer
Society, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, American Medical As-
sociation, National Association Elementary School Principals, National Association Sec-
ondary Principals, and National Parent Teacher Association. Id.
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cessful events like the Smokeout tend to further the event and the
sponsoring NGOs goals with the NGO prospering as a result. Such
events serve as bully pulpits for the promoters while presenting tar-
geted messages. The anti-tobacco messages probably are received best
when differing messages target specific groups, such as smoking cessa-
tion messages to smokers and both educational and how to organize
messages for nonsmokers. Typically, such anti-tobacco advertising
must be unique to capture a potential or actual smoker's attention and
get the message absorbed.71 Anti-tobacco organizations posit that it is
easier to keep a potential smoker from smoking than to get a smoker to
quit.
77
IV. TOBACCO'S EFFECT UPON CHILDREN
A. Influences Upon the Child
Nearly all tobacco consumers began as children."8 Children are
particularly susceptible to tobacco, both physiologically and psychologi-
cally.79 One strategy to counter youth smoking is to promote smoking
cessation programs for the benefit of both smokers and nonsmokers.
Parents who smoke have a profound influence upon their children.0
Their behavior normalizes smoking and is the dominant reason that
those children are likely to also smoke.8' Although it is critical to en-
courage underage potential smokers to avoid the addictive habit, it is
just as important to assist the present tobacco consumer, youth or
adult.82 Tobacco consumers who begin at a younger age generally con-
76. Morning Edition: Anti-Smoking Ads (Nat'l Pub. Radio radio broadcast, Aug. 27,
1997) (describing a Florida ad campaign after the state settled its suit with the tobacco
industry). An example was the "Cow Fart" television ad for the preteen and young teen
audience. "[We [took] a very unparental attitude in our advertising. In other words, the
last thing you want to do is lecture this particular group. So, the idea was to make smok-
ing as gross and unhip as possible." Id. The ad ran on MTV and emphasized the com-
monality between smoking and cows' poisonous methane gas. Id.
77. Id. See generally C. Everett Koop, Don't Forget the Smokers, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1998, at C7 (arguing for a holistic approach against tobacco that prevents adolescents
from beginning the habit and assists current users to quit).
78. "Almost 90 percent of adult smokers report beginning their use at or before age
18, and more than half became daily smokers before that age." Roper, supra note 40.
"Nicotine addiction begins when most tobacco users are teenagers, so let's call [smoking]
what it really is: a pediatric disease." 141 CONG. REC. S5915 (daily ed. May 1, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Simon) (quoting FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler).
79. Glenda Cooper, Teenage Girl Smokers Risk Eating Disorders, THE INDEP., Aug. 4,
1998, at 5 (noting the connection between smoking as a diet tool and the likelihood of eat-
ing disorders such as bulimia).
80. See Roper, supra note 40.
81. Youth Smoking Prevention: Hearings on S.1530 Before the Senate Comm. on Ju-
diciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Michael C. Fiore).
82. Koop, supra note 77.
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sume larger quantities, have an increased risk of death from a tobacco-
related illnesses, and suffer the onset of such illnesses at a younger
age.13 Tobacco has life-long detrimental effects: in neonatal conditions,
passively, and as a growing child." Cognizant of this, the international
community offers support.'
Youths are particularly susceptible to the slick advertising' of the
tobacco companies." The pervasiveness and magnitude of tobacco ad-
83. PREVENTING TOBACCO 1994, supra note 4, at 29-30; WHO, Smoking Prevalence,
supra note 30. See UNICEF, Finland's 15 year-olds Smoke Most (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
<http://www.unicef.org/pon96/ insmoke.htm> (noting about 12% of 15-year-olds smoke
daily).
84. TIERNY JR. ET AL., supra note 1; American Lung Association, Tobacco Control
General Smoking Information: Secondhand Smoke and Your Family (visited Mar. 22,
1999) <http://www.lungusa.org>. See Roper, supra note 40; Tobacco Issues: Hearings on
S.1415 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Sen. Chafee).
85. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, art
24, at 1465-66 (urging cooperation with U.N. efforts to minimize children's adverse health
effects).
86. A report prepared for the Brown & Williamson tobacco company described an ad-
vertising approach to employ:
Thus, an attempt to reach young smokers, starters, should be based.., on
the following major parameters: [1] Present the cigarette as one of a few ini-
tiations into the adult world. [2] Present the cigarette as part of the illicit
pleasure category of products and activities. [31 In your ads create a situa-
tion taken from the day-to-day life of the young smoker but in an elegant
manner have this situation touch on the basic symbols of the growing-up,
maturity process. [4] To the best of your ability (considering some legal con-
straints), relate the cigarette to "pot", wine, beer, sex, etc.. [5] DON'T com-
municate health or health-related points.
Ted Bates & Co., Inc., What Have We Learned From People? A Conceptual Summariza-
tion of 18 Focus Group Interviews on the Subject of Smoking (May 26, 1975) (quoted in
FTC, Staff Report on the Cigarette Advertising Investigation, reprinted in Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act: Appendix to Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Env't of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 261-64 (1982)) (citing a Brown & Williamson document describing an advertising
strategy for Viceroy cigarettes). Cf John Schwartz, Documents Indicate Strategy of Tar-
geting Teen Smokers Brown & Williamson Papers Date to 1972, Offer Detailed Descrip-
tions of Marketing Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1998, at A3.
87. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9285, 1997 FTC LEXIS 118 (FTC May
28, 1997) (alleging that Reynolds knew, or should have known, its efforts to reposition the
Camel brand would heighten the brand's attractiveness to underage smokers and thereby
result in unfair trade practices). "In fact, after the initiation of the Joe Camel campaign,
the percentage of smokers under the age of 18 who smoked Camel cigarettes became lar-
ger than the percentage of all adult smokers aged 18 and older who smoked Camel ciga-
rettes." Id. at *2; Nicola Evans et al., Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to
Smokers on Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1538 (1995)
(concluding that tobacco marketing is a stronger influence in nonsmoking adolescents be-
ginning to smoke than exposure to peer or family smokers or sociodemographic variables);
Marlene Cimons, Study Finds Sharp Rise in Teenage Tobacco Use Health: One-Third In-
crease Overall Since 1991 Was Even Worse Among African Americans, Federal Report
Says, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al; Barry Meier, Files of Reynolds Tobacco Show Effort
VOL. 28:1
TOBACCO, GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH ...
vertising is apparent when one learns that cigarette companies spend
$16 million per day or $6 billion per year." Anti-tobacco forces (typi-
cally NGOs) have nothing near the financial resources that the large
transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs)"9 do. However the 1968-69,
free counter-advertising under the American fairness doctrine9° proved
effective against tobacco ads.9' The concept of counter-advertising is
utilized today, albeit on a significantly smaller scale. 9' Counter-
advertising clearly lessens tobacco consumption and, therefore, should
be implemented on a global, national, and local basis.
Some commentators present a moral argument for tobacco regula-
tion upon the tobacco consumer's status as a minor when first begin-
ning to smoke or otherwise use tobacco.93 President Bill Clinton pre-
sents such an example. 94 Even the tobacco industry tries to avoid an
on the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998 at A12; U.S. Cigar Makers Urged Not to "Glamor-
ize" Smoking, AAP NEWSFEED, Mar. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File (request by House Commerce Health & Env't Subcomm. chairman for cigar compa-
nies pledge not to engage in product placements in film or television); Henry Weinstein,
R.J. Reynolds Targeted Kids, Records Show, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al. But see
Philip Morris Plans Ads to Warn Youth on Smoking, supra note 59.
88. ACS, Great American Smokeout: FAQ (visited Mar. 16, 1999)
<http://www.cancer.org/ smokeout/faq.html>. Cf. Anna Dolgov, Western Tobacco Firms
Packing Russia Market Heavy Consumption, Low Taxes Make up for Lost Revenue, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 1, 1998, at 3J.
89. E.g., TTCs include the American companies (Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and
American Brands) and British companies (British American Tobacco (BAT) parent of
American Brands and Rothmans (a British/South American joint venture)).
90. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)
(upholding the fairness doctrine); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (upholding the abandonment of the fairness doctrine).
91. 132 CONG. REC. S16,862, S16,866-67 (July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
92. See Youth Smoking Prevention: Hearings on S. 1530 Before the Senate Comm. on
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Gregory N. Connolly, Dir. of Mass. Tobacco
Control Program, Mass. Dep't. of Pub. Health, and statement of Sen. Hatch); Bob Ed-
wards & Debbie Elliot, Morning Edition, Teen Smoking, Part II (Nat'l Pub. Radio broad-
cast, June 16, 1998) (reporting on the Am. Lung Ass'n Campaign "Teens Against Tobacco
Use" and Florida's "Truth Campaign"); Dan Morain, State Unveils TVAds Against Cigars
Health: Campaign Says that the Fad is "the Big New Trend in Cancer" and Says that
Smoking One Stogie Has as Much Nicotine as 70 Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at
A3 (describing California's anti-tobacco ads). E.g., Grafeeties, Grafeeties, the Original
Bumper Stickers for Shoes (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.grafeeties.com/ to-
bacco.htm> (illustrating commercial products); WHO, supra notes 60, 61 (regarding World
No-Tobacco Day); American Cancer Society, supra note 68 (regarding Great American
Smokeout).
93. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 STAN. L. REV.
475, 481 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT E. GOODIN, No SMOKING: THE ETHICAL ISSUES (1989))
(supporting government regulation since nearly all smokers choose to smoke as teens, the
state views minors "as incapable of exercising full autonomy of choice" and, therefore,
government regulation is not paternalistic).
94. See generally William J. Clinton, Remarks by President Clinton on Tobacco Legis-
lation and America's Youth, Remarks at the Rose Garden, FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 20,
1998, available in LEXIS, Exec. Library, Fednew File; Rick Weiss, Clinton Pushes for
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image of targeting youths as customers.'
There is close to universal agreement that children should not con-
sume tobacco or be targeted as (potential) customers. Conversely, most
smokers begin as teens.9 Despite industry denials that it targets un-
derage people, its advertising appeals significantly to "future" smok-
ers.Y This dichotomy between (a) the consequential, yet allegedly unin-
tentional, acquisition of and alarming statistics concerning replacement
smokers and (b) a hands-off attitude towards teens as potential tobacco
consumers indicates an unresolved dilemma. A simplistic and one-
sided response would be to severely limit or prohibit advertising, yet
such a concept is close to a pipe dream under some legal systems. To-
bacco is a legal product, the industry is very powerful and capable, and
advertising is generally accepted in the world's cultures. Naturally,
there are legal issues involved too. The issue of advertising is later ex-
amined in more detail in Part VI. For now, the dichotomy between
children and "unintended" advertising effects is noted along with the
greater susceptibility of adolescents.
B. Support from International Law
International law adds support to state efforts to regulate tobacco
and prevent children's access to it.9 There is a substantial worldwide
Anti-Smoking Bills in Congress, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at A2.
95. David Phelps, R.J. Reynolds Chief Denies Marketing to Kids, STAR TRIB., Mar. 6,
1998, at lB. See generally 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (summarizing pro-tobacco industry
arguments). But see Doug Campbell, Lorillard Documents Revealing Documents Discuss
Nicotine Levels and Marketing to Teens, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), June 28, 1998,
at Al; Kathleen J. Lester, Cowboys, Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is the Tobacco In-
dustry's Commodification of Childhood Protected by the First Amendment?, 24 N. KY. L.
REV. 615, 628-31 (1997); John Mintz & Saundra Torry, Internal R.J. Reynolds Documents
Detail Cigarette Marketing Aimed at Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al;
Schwartz, supra note 34; John Schwartz, Tobacco Firms Must Reveal Documents, WASH.
POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at A2 (referring to a report describing the smoking habits of children,
as young as age five, that allegedly is protected by the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship).
96. American Academy of Pediatrics Analysis: First Cigarette in Grade 6 or Below Not
Uncommon, Oct. 1, 1997, POINTCAST (reporting approximately 30% of high-school seniors
first smoked in the sixth grade or below).
97. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP), Trends in Smoking Initia-
tion Among Adolescents and Young Adults-United States, 1980-1989, 274 JAMA 528, 529
(1995) (noting the influence advertising has on adolescents who generally smoke the most
heavily advertised brands); Evans et al., supra note 87 (noting the increasing prevalence
promotional activities rather than just advertising); 43% of Teens Smoke or Chew To-
bacco, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at 1A (reporting on a CDCP study noting substan-
tial increases in tobacco consumption over the last two years). E.g., Joe Camel, a cartoon
character particularly appealing to adolescents.
98. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art. 24(1)
("States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health. .. ." ); Protect all Children from Tobacco, Says UNICEF, UNICEF, at
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consensus regarding a child's fundamental rights, as stated in the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention)." The United
States, however, is not yet a party to the Convention, although it be-
came a signatory on February 16, 1995200
Arguably, the Convention has the force of customary law'' as a re-
sult of its rapid and near universal acceptance'0 and worldwide compli-
ance due to of a sense of legal obligation. 0 3 The unprecedented accep-
tance of the Convention in such a short time by nearly all states
indicates, at least, the creation of "soft law" by the parties. The Con-
vention is "intended for adherence by states generally and [is] in fact
widely accepted."' A sampling of the Convention's subjects indicates
compliance by states from a legal sense of obligation (e.g., a definition of
a child; protection from narcotic drugs,"° pornography, 7 abduction
1, U.N. Doc. CF/DOC/PR/1977/32 (1998) [hereinafter UNICEF, Protect All Children].
99. The Convention has been ratified by 188 parties U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF.,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31
DECEMBER 1996 at 203, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/15, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.5 (1997)
[hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES]. "UNICEF's role in advocating curbs on tobacco
grows out of the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, which obligates gov-
ernments to safeguard the health of infants and children; protect children from drugs and
exploitation; and promote health education." UNICEF, Protect All Children, supra note
98, at 3.
100. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 99. By becoming a signatory long after
the Convention became effective, the United States exhibits a creeping acquiescence that
partly indicates a U.S. state practice. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2), cmt. b (hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)].
101. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 100, §102(2). See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971).
102. "International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead
to the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for
adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 100, §102(3). "[Tjhe passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or
of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law." Id. §102 n.2
(quoting the North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44). U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF.,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31
DECEMBER 1990 AT 191, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9, U.N. Sales No. E.91.V.8 (1991) (rati-
fied by 62 parties); U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF., MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 99
at 187, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E/11, U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.11 (1993) (ratified by 127 par-
ties). Although this is not a case of "instant customary law," the Convention was very
widely accepted for adherence by states generally.
103. Opinio juris may be inferred from states' acts indicating compliance inferring a
sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, §102, cmt. c.
104. A practice can be generally accepted even if it is not universally followed; no pre-
cise formula indicates the required breadth of practice, "but it should reflect wide accep-
tance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity." Id. §102, cmt. b.
105. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art. 1.
106. Id. at art. 33.
107. Id. at art. 34
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and trafficking of children;" and torture"). One cannot reasonably ar-
gue that "a significant number of important states" did not adopt the
majority of practices (herein discussed) detailed in the Convention to
prevent the Convention from becoming "general customary law."11°
Therefore, the Convention is at least soft law and arguably has the force
of customary law (excepting the controversial articles) and, in turn, is
binding on states that have not yet ratified the Convention.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child offers a broad scope of
protection for the world's children. The Convention states that "[iun all
actions concerning children ... the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration."' Although tobacco takes decades to kill, it det-
rimentally affects a child's growth and development and, in turn, indi-
rectly impacts a child's "inherent right to life.""' States possess a man-
datory obligation to "ensure to the maximum extent possible the
survival and development of the child.""' Therefore, being cognizant
that tobacco imparts harmful health effects on both children and the
unborn, governments have an obligation to neutralize, or at least mini-
mize, tobacco's negative effects upon children. In particular, states pos-
sess an affirmative duty to prevent children from consuming tobacco di-
rectly or its byproducts indirectly."4 This can be done by a full
spectrum of regulatory means."
Article 13 of the Convention concerns the child's freedom of expres-
sion and receiving "information and ideas of all kinds , including
commercial speech regarding legal products. The tobacco industry has
always claimed a right to advertise its products to the fullest extent
possible. If one state prohibits any television ads for tobacco products,
the industry complies in only that state, unless similarly required by
other states. The difference between states is their legal systems (the
process), not the resultant harm that affects the children and popula-
108. Id.'at art. 35.
109. Id. at art. 37.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, §102 cmt. b. Notwithstanding some con-
troversial Convention topics (e.g., the minimum age for participation in armed combat or
freedom of religion), the topics discussed in Articles 3, 6, 13, and 17 are generally accepted
by states. See Cynthia P. Cohen, Introductory Note, in Convention of the Rights of the
Child, supra note 85, at 1450.
111. U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art. 3(1).
112. Id. at art. 6(1).
113. Id. at art. 6(2).
114. For example, from the mother in a neonatal condition or through environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS).
115. For example, prohibiting sales to minors and limiting advertising.
116. "The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
the child's choice." U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art.
13(1).
VOL. 28:1
TOBACCO, GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH...
tion in general.
Some states have touted tobacco's benefits in the past and, argua-
bly, some justification may exist for advertising tobacco."' However,
medical evidence clearly overcomes such perceived benefits. In light of
the fact that minors are viewed "as incapable of exercising full auton-
omy of choice,""' the concept of open and uninhibited information may
be restricted when the child's best interests so require. 9
A state may exercise its police powers to protect its interests and,
therefore, has the power to regulate tobacco to protect its youth. Possi-
ble restrictions are limited by what is necessary (e.g., banning television
ads for tobacco products at times children are likely to be viewing),
statutory mandates, and protection of the public health or the rights of
others, such as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) exposure. 20 When
states regulate tobacco to protect their children, the reasons proffered
are for the children's protection, not compliance with international law
or custom. 121 Presently, international law and custom are not signifi-
cant sources of protection in the struggle to control tobacco consump-
tion. Despite the Convention's legal authority, it has not been, nor is it
likely to be, applied as a mechanism to protect children from tobacco.
117. Smokers may rationalize the psychological and sociological benefits of their habit
(qualities include relaxation and pleasure). In 1995, the Japanese Ministry of Health
(MOH) reported that "tobacco has long been an item of personal preference [shikonhin],
and at the present time, there are many smokers. Accordingly, some [committee mem-
bers] would point out the mental and psychological benefits from smoking." KOSEISHO
TABAKO KODO KEIKAKU KENTOKAi [MOH TOBACCO ACTION PLAN WORKING GROUP],
KOSEISHO TABAKO KODO KEIKAKU KENTOKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT BY THE MOH
TOBACCO ACTION PLAN WORKING GROUP] (Mar. 29, 1995), cited in Mark A. Levin, Smoke
Around the Rising Sun: An American Look at Tobacco Regulation in Japan, 8 STAN. L. &
POLVY REV. 99, 105 n.132 (1997). Japan is noted for its cooperation with and lack of con-
frontation towards its tobacco industry, a former state-run monopoly with continuing sub-
stantial government ownership. Id. at 99-102.
118. Rabin, supra note 93. "Children tend to imitate other children and they often
lack the ability to foresee and avoid dangers.... [Miany children do not comprehend the
nature of the risk or seriousness of nicotine addiction or the other dangerous health ef-
fects of smoking." FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, The ABCs at the FTC: Mar-
keting and Advertising to Children, at *6 (1997), available in 1997 WL 441740 (addressing
the Minnesota Institute of Legal Education).
119. U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art. 13(2).
120. Id. See Ed Rivera, Texas in Forefront of Teen Tobacco Battle, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 3, 1998, at 9A (reporting the passage of Senate Bill 55, "one of the strongest
and most comprehensive tobacco control packages in the country"). Senate Bill 55 be-
comes effective in 1998. It prohibits minors from purchasing, consuming, or possessing
tobacco products except in the presence of a parent or guardian. Violations can result in
fines up to $250, community service, attendance of a tobacco education class by the minor
and his/her parents, or suspension of the minor's drivers license. Senate Bill 55 prohibits
outdoor advertising of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a church or school. Identifica-
tion is required of purchasers who appear younger than age 27. Self-service sales such as
vending machines are generally restricted to locations closed to minors. Id.
121. Id.
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Because states implement diverse laws and consistently uniform
standards are necessary for effective global tobacco control, global stan-
dards should be determined to implement authorized protections under
Article 13. Within the scope of tobacco control, the Convention author-
izes and obligates states individually, and supports the idea of a frame-
work convention for tobacco control. A framework convention for to-
bacco control would be instrumental in implementing global standards.
With uniform standards, present generally unaccepted practices that
appear in minimally regulated countries could be avoided.'22 Although
the legal authority exists, global implementation has yet to occur. A
global will to regulate tobacco is evident; changing public opinion along
with regulatory and legal changes indicate tobacco's zenith has passed,
despite the industry's recent profitable successes.' The world is nearly
ready to commit to a framework protection, and the WHO is the appro-
priate NGO to lead the effort for a framework convention because of its
expertise and stature in the field of tobacco control."M
Anti-tobacco public education, peer support, and advertising can
lessen the rate of adolescent tobacco consumption. NGO programs and
events are the most common, and probably successful, means of influ-
encing youths.2' The success experienced by model NGO programs in-
dicate that all NGOs should join efforts with the media to promote the
well-being and health of children as envisioned by the Convention.
2 6
Government regulatory measures are vital in an anti-tobacco effort
as a means of setting minimum levels of behavior (e.g., sales and adver-
tising restrictions) but are generally incapable of leading the cause.1 7
NGOs are best suited to alter public opinion and spearhead the battle
against the tobacco industry on local, national, regional, and global lev-
els. NGOs can, do, and should lead governments and the public to raise
the regulatory constraints on the tobacco industry. While NGOs can
pull tobacco control, they are incapable of pushing it. The converse is
true for governments; they often push the issue by legislative and regu-
latory means, but seldom are able to pull it. 12 8 As leaders in the anti-
tobacco cause, NGOs increase awareness, educate, and help to focus
public opinion. Examples of NGOs doing this are the American Cancer
122. For example, free samples to and targeted marketing of youths. See Dolgov, su-
pra note 88.
123. For example, the U.S. legal and regulatory environment radically changed during
the 1990s
124. See World Health Organization Home Page, (visited June 15, 1999)
<http://www.who.int>.
125. See generally supra notes 62-97 and accompanying text.
126. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, at art. 17.
127. See World Health Organization Home Page (visited June 15, 1999)
<http://www.who.int>.
128. A notable exception is the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report that changed the
smoking paradigm. See 1964 REPORT, supra note 3.
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Society and the WHO. NGOs are essential partners in combating un-
derage tobacco consumption. The time is ripe for NGOs to lead a tripar-
tite coalition of NGOs, state governments, and the public, to implement
an international framework convention on tobacco control that includes
regulative mechanisms to protect children from tobacco.
V. SUBSTANCE CONTROL
A Medical Basis
Medical research has documented nicotine's effect upon the body
and its psychoactive characteristics.!" The WHO's Programme on Sub-
stance Abuse (PSA) expressly addresses tobacco as a psychoactive sub-
stance." The PSA's mandate is reflected in its mission statement "to
promote health for all by preventing and reducing the adverse conse-
quences of... tobacco... use."3 The Tobacco or Health (TOH) project,
an ongoing PSA program, gained significant visibility with its annual
"World No-Tobacco Day."'3 This event is an exemplary means of pro-
moting an international anti-tobacco effort. With its global recognition
and reputation, the WHO (with the PSA) is the proper international
NGO to preach the anti-tobacco gospel.
Nicotine's addictiveness3 has been equated to that of cocaine and
heroin.'34 Tobacco is not generally considered a psychotropic'1 sub-
stance by the medical or legal fields." If one considers recent medical
129. "Nicotine is the most prevalent psychoactive drug [and] ... is only second to alco-
hol as the most abused drug." Community Outreach Health Information System (COHIS),
Boston University Medical Center, About Nicotine Addiction (visited Mar. 19, 1998)
<http://bu.edu/cohis/smokingupsmoketaboutnic.htm>. Psychoactive is defined as "pos-
sessing the ability to alter mood, behavior, cognitive process, or medical tension; usually
applied to pharmacologic agents." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1284 (William R.
Hensyl et al. eds., 25th ed. 1990).
130. See WHO, Programme on Substance Abuse: Factsheets: Trends in Substance Use
and Associated Health Problems, Factsheet N.127 (visited Feb. 14, 1998)
<http://www.who.int/inffs/ en/fact127.html>.
131. The PSA mandate is "to: 1. prevent and reduce the negative health and social
consequences of psycho-active substance use; 2. reduce the demand for non-medical use of
psychoactive substances; and 3. assess psychoactive substances so as to advise the United
Nations with regard to their regulatory control." Id.
132. See WHO, supra note 67.
133. See Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate Nicotine-Containing Ciga-
rettes? Has the Agency Established a Legal Basis and, If Not, Should Congress Grant It?,
51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85, 114-20 (1996); Michael L. Pianezza et al, Nicotine Metabolism
Defect Reduces Smoking, 393 NATURE 750 (1998) (describing gene CYP2A6 and its rela-
tion to producing enzymes to consume nicotine).
134. See PREVENTING TOBACCO 1994, supra note 4, at 30-31.
135. Psychotropic is defined as "affecting the mind." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 129, at 1288.
136. But see Arlene Levinson, Smoker Vows To Pursue Religious Fight Against Cam-
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discoveries concerning nicotine and tobacco, an argument emerges to
classify tobacco as a psychotropic substance. Nicotine is a unique drug
with multiple characteristics that makes it difficult to classify in a sin-
gle category.'37 It "exerts psychoactive (or mood-altering) effects on the
brain that motivate repeated and compulsive use of the substance." 8
Nicotine has both sedating and stimulating effects upon brain activ-
ity.'39 The tobacco industry classified nicotine as "a narcotic, tranquil-
izer, or sedative""'' and "a physiologically active ... substance... [that]
alters the state of the smoker by becoming a neurotransmitter and a
stimulant.""' Medical research revealed that nicotine stimulates the
release of both dopamine, a neurotransmitter, which stimulates the
brain's pleasure receptors, and norepinephrine which increases alert-
ness and energy."" This process directly affects the tobacco consumer's
cognitive functions.'1' Thus, tobacco use materially affects one's mind
and body.
bridge Smoking Ban, Feb. 18, 1987, available in 1987 WL 3132747.
137. "At low blood levels nicotine stimulates all nicotinic receptors: in sympathetic and
parasympathetic ganglia, in the adrenal medulla, in the CNS [central nervous system],
and on skeletal muscle. At higher concentrations it blocks the same receptors." ELAINE N.
MARIEB & ELAINE N. MARIEB MARSHAL SCHLAFER, THE NURSE, PHARMACOLOGY, AND
DRUG THERAPY 268 (1989).
138. David A. Kessler et al., The Legal and Scientific Basis for FDA's Assertion of Ju-
risdiction over Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 277 JAMA 405 (1997) (citing
SMOKELESS TOBACCO 1986, supra note 4, at 182-83; NICOTINE ADDICTION 1988, supra
note 4, at 7-8, 270, 334-35).
139. Kessler et al., supra note 138 (citing R. Norton et al., Smoking, Nicotine Dose and
the Lateralisation of Electrocortical Activity, 108 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 473-79 (1992);
W.S. Pritchard, Electroencephalegraphic Effects of Cigarette Smoking, 104
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 485-90 (1991)); Robert Langreth, Kicking the Habit: Why Smokers
Don't Quit; New Clues to How Nicotine Affects the Brain; Personality Traits May Predis-
pose Some People to Addiction, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997, at B1.
140. Kessler et al., supra note 138, at 407 (citing AL UDOw, WHY PEOPLE START TO
SMOKE (1976), in 141 CONG. REC. H7646, H7663 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (Udow was a
Phillip Morris researcher)).
141. Kessler et al., supra note 138, at 407 (citing Phillip Morris Inc., Draft Report Re-
garding a Proposal for a "Safer" Cigarette Code-Named Table). See generally Elyse Ta-
nouye, Kicking the Habit: Why Smokers Don't Quit; New Clues to How Nicotine Affects the
Brain; Antidepressant, Other Drugs Offer New Hope, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997, at 31.
"Nicotine is the best and most effective over-the-counter antidepressant available in the
world." Id.
142. Gordon B. Lindsay & Jacquie Rainey, Psychosocial and Pharmacologic Explana-
tions of Nicotine's "Gateway Drug"Function, 67 J. SCH. HEALTH 123 (1997); David N. Leff,
Why Day's First Cigarette is Best Nicotine Addiction Traced to Neurons Releasing Pleas-
ure-Giving Dopamine, BIOWORLD TODAY, Dec. 9, 1997, available in 1998 WL 14876468;
Tanouye, supra note 141; U.S. HHS: One Step Closer to Unraveling Nicotine's Addictive
Properties, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5047105.
143. Langreth, supra note 139.
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B. Argument for an International Legal Basis
The WHO has a duty to inform the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations if the WHO
finds:
(a) that the substance has the capacity to produce
(i) (1) a state of dependence, and
(2) central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hal-
lucinations or disturbances in motor functions or thinking or behavior
or perception or mood, or
(ii) similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in Schedule I,
II, III or IV,
(b) that there is that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so
as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the plac-
ing of the substance under international control.'"
Although tobacco is not abused in a manner similar to Schedule I-
IV drugs (i.e., hallucinogenics, amphetamines, or barbiturates), it cer-
tainly would not be approved for over-the-counter use if it was intro-
duced today. Tobacco consumption by underage and/or uninformed
consumers can easily be construed as abuse, particularly when consid-
ering the medical effects. It resides in a gray zone between relatively
harmless drugs and the inherently dangerous Schedule I-IV drugs. In
comparison to Schedule I-IV substances, a tobacco consumer remains
lucid while consuming tobacco and the direct medical effects persist for
a relatively short time period. Tobacco is a dependence-creating sub-
stance that stimulates the central nervous system and one's cognitive
functions, thoughts, behavior, perceptions, and/or moods. Therefore,
tobacco meets the medical definition of a psychotropic45 drug and the
conditions stated in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, article
2(4).146 Hence, the WHO should classify tobacco as a psychotropic sub-
stance.
Cognizant of the subtle dangers and social acceptance of tobacco,
the WHO would be reasonable in classifying tobacco as a Schedule V
psychotropic substance. This would create a new category, Schedule V,
to reflect the serious and insidious nature inherent in tobacco while rec-
144. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 19, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, 178 at
art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
145. See STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 135.
146. See Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 144.
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ognizing that tobacco poses a smaller risk than Schedule I-IV sub-
stances. A Schedule V substance would require less regulatory control
than Schedule I-IV substances. Possible regulatory controls include
limits on advertising, required labeling, vendor licensing, and manda-
tory reporting of production and sales.
If tobacco is classified as a psychotropic substance, the Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
offers regulatory assistance.147 Parties possess a duty to: protect mi-
nors, ' monitor the import and export of psychotropic substances,14
suppress illicit trafficking in free trade zones (e.g., duty-free areas),"
and furnish the United Nations with text of applicable laws and regula-
tions along with reported domestic cases of illicit trafficking.' 5' These
affirmative obligations increase tobacco awareness and control. In-
creased attention to unlawful tobacco distribution would naturally help
to regulate tobacco within a legal context by increasing containment.
Within the context of tobacco as a legal psychotropic substance, a
reasonable compromise would be to license all tobacco vendors and re-
quire universal labeling. 2 standards for all tobacco products (e.g., using
a plain and predominate manner to maximize consumers' awareness of
tobacco's health risks).' These universal standards should utilize
thresholds that may be raised by parties individually or in concert."
The WHO, with its Tobacco or Health program, is the proper NGO to
promote this plan of action because of its credibility, leadership, and
recognition. Although an international legal basis exists to control to-
bacco as a psychotropic drug, arguendo, it has not been, nor is likely to
be in the near future, implemented towards this predictably controver-
sial end. Similarly, the tobacco industry will steadfastly resist efforts to
mandate warning and ingredient labeling.
147. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 [hereinafter Convention Against Illicit Trafficking].
148. Id. at art. 3(5)(f).
149. Id. at art. 9(2)(c).
150. Id. at art. 18(1).
151. Id. at art. 20(1).
152. E.g., Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 144, at art. 10 (address-
ing warnings, labeling, and advertising); WHO CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at art. 21(e)
(possessing authority to regulate advertising and labeling).
153. ROB CUNNINGHAM, SMOKE & MIRRORS: THE CANADIAN TOBACCO WAR (1996) (de-
scribing "generic" warning labels).
154. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking, supra note 147, at art. 24.
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VI. ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. Economics
The tobacco industry is an economic juggernaut. In today's world of
global economic competition, it is rare to find an industry with such
high profit margins.'5 Investors are naturally attracted to its
profitability. 6
The tobacco industry has oligopolistic characteristics. 5 ' There is
only a handful of tobacco product manufacturers while countless grow-
ers supply the TTCs. Utilizing their vertical integration, the TTCs earn
substantial profits by adding value to the tobacco and marketing it. 5 8
The farmers do well to earn a modest living, partly because they only
supply a commodity. Being oligopolistic allows the TTCs to exert sig-
nificant influence over the tobacco industry.5 ' Past industry behavior
reveals how jealously the TTCs protect their interests, even to the pub-
lic's detriment In the past, only (some) governments have been able to
confront the TTCs.5 8
Despite modest earnings, farmers view tobacco favorably because it
is one of the best paying cash crops and grows well in most environ-
ments, except the northern climates.16' In the past, tobacco has been
155. Tobacco products have one of the highest markups for manufactured goods. Of 36
sectors tracked in the G-7 countries, it has the highest markup in the United States,
France, United Kingdom, second highest in Germany, and below average in Canada.
Similar results occur in seven other European countries. Joaquim 0. Martins et al.,
Mark-up Ratios in Manufacturing Industries Estimates for 14 OECD Countries, OECD
Doc. OCDE/GD/(96)61 (1996). See Rekha Balu & Ernest Beck, Tobacco: Sara Lee Corp.
Kicks Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at B1 (reporting that although the Dutch Douwe
Egberts Van Nelle Tobacco unit had annual sales of only $300 million, it contributed 6%
of Sara Lee's operating income from aggregate sales of $19.73 billion).
156. Tobacco Questions, supra note 24. "A successful American stock market investor,
with a strong interest in tobacco stocks, summed it up this way: 'I'll tell you why I like the
cigarette business. It costs a penny to make, sell it for a dollar, it's addictive and there's
fantastic brand loyalty.'" Id. Despite the current U.S. legal climate and their population's
greater suffering from tobacco, Native American tribes are building cigarette production
facilities as a job creation and investment strategy. Pam Belluck, Tribe's Unlikely Busi-
ness: Manufacturing Cigarettes, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 22, 1998, at A14.
157. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION OF TOBACCO, at 2,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/205, U.N. Sales No. E.78.II.D.14 (1978). While there are countless
tobacco farmers, the large TTCs generally control the production of retail tobacco prod-
ucts. See generally Farm Leader Lobbies for Tobacco Program, KY. J. COM. & INDUS., Oct.
2, 1997 (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http:/l www.aik.org/kj-10297j.html>.
158. See Convention Against Illicit Trafficking, supra note 147.
159. See CHAPMAN & LENG, supra note 33, at 44; Chip Jones, Brazil's Expansion Wor-
ries Va. Growers; Its Leaf Costs Half of American Grown, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
June 29, 1998, at Al (describing globalization effects on tobacco producers).
160. See Convention Against Illicit Trafficking supra note 147.
161. See CHAPMAN & LENG, supra note 33, at 27-29 (noting the economic infrastruc-
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viewed as a source for economic growth. 62 Today, governments and
NGOs generally take a neutral or negative view on tobacco's economic
contributions." There is a dark side to tobacco's economic character,
namely its costs to society. The World Bank estimated that the net
global cost of tobacco to the world economy is over $200 billion per
year." As a result, World Bank policy now discourages the use of to-
bacco products and grants no new loans for tobacco production, process-
ing, or marketing." On a more human scale, tobacco is faulted by some
because acreage devoted to tobacco propagation is acreage removed
from food production.
ture that enables tobacco production); Gail Gibson, Churches Stumble over Morality of
Tobacco Guilt and Ambiguity Clash with Profits and Tradition in Tobacco Belt, ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Mar. 29, 1998, at A3. See e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S446 (1993)
(statement of Sen. McConnell) (noting that the average Kentucky farmer raises only three
acres and there is no other alternate crop that pays as well as tobacco on such a small
scale). But see CHAPMAN & LENG, supra note 33, at 30-31 (describing the increasing at-
tractiveness of alternative crops that offer higher returns, are less labor intensive, and
require fewer chemicals and fertilizers). Tobacco grows well as far north as southern
Canada. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 185
162. The World Bank funded tobacco development in the past. See infra note 164 and
accompanying text; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 185-86. But see Gumisai Mutume,
Southern Africa-Commodities: Save Tobacco, Save Our Economies, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Aug. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File (reporting that Zimbabwe
and Malawi supply 44% and 33%, respectively, of world tobacco production). In Zim-
babwe, tobacco in one of the largest employers, provides $414 million annually (nearly
30% of export earnings), and is the single largest source of foreign exchange. Id. Tobacco
furnishes 80% of Malawian exports. Zimbabwe: Tobacco's Struggle for Survival, AFR.
ECON. DIG., Aug. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
163. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153; Jeanne Cummings & David Wessel, Treasury
Pegs Smoking's Economic Cost, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1998, at A3 (reporting that U.S.
smoking costs are about $130 billion annually); Lawrence H. Summers, Tobacco Issues,
FED. Doc. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8993691.
164. Economic Role of Tobacco Production and Exports in Countries Depending on To-
bacco as a Major Source of Income, at 3, UNTAD/COM/36 (1995) (citing Howard Barnum,
in WHO, WORLD No-TOBACCO DAY 1995 TOBACCO ALERT 6-13 (1994)); Tobacco Questions,
supra note 24.
165. See Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council on the Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco or Health, U.N. ESCOR, at 7-8,
U.N. Doc. E/1955/67 (1995).
166. See Stanley A. Taylor, Tobacco and Economic Growth in Developing Nations, BUS.
CONTEMP. WORLD, Winter 1989. Raising tobacco reduces the quantity of food produced
and therefore increases food prices. Id. at 55 (citing acreage data in STAT. DIV. OF THE
ECON. & SOC. POLY DEPT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 35 1981 FAO PRODUCTION Y.B. (1982)).
See also Corporate Watch, The Global Politics of Tobacco (visited Mar. 19, 1998)
<http://www.corpwatch.org/feature/tobacco/ framework.htm> (noting that worldwide to-
bacco production utilizes land that alternatively could feed 20 million people); Pamphil
H.M. Kweyah, Tobacco Expansion in Kenya: The Socio-Ecological Losses, id at 248, 248-
51; Henry Muwanga-Bayego, Tobacco Growing in Uganda: The Environment and Women
Pay the Price, 3 TOBACCO CONTROL 255, 255-56 (1994), cited in Susan M. Marsh, U.S. To-
bacco Exports: Toward Monitoring and Regulation Consistent with Acknowledged Health
Risks, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 29, 38 n.32 (1996)).
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Previously, a dichotomy existed between government action to in-
crease the trade in tobacco and government action to fight its adverse
health effects.1 67 A prime example was the U.S. trade policies during
late 1970s and 1980s that utilized federal law to open foreign markets
for tobacco products. 69 Prominent critics decried the inconsistency in
U.S. actions. 170  Fortunately, the U.S. government now precludes this
dichotomy by not promoting tobacco products in its trade policies.'7 '
B. Agricultural Subsidies
Agricultural tobacco subsidies are another method of governmental
support that presents problems common to subsidies and unique to to-
bacco. Subsidies are generally intended to support farm income, farm
commodity prices, or manage commodity supplies. 7 1 Overall, subsidies
167. See 144 CONG. REC. S1801-02 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Heidi S. Gruner, Note, The Export of U.S. Tobacco Products to Developing Countries and
Previously Closed Markets, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 217 (1996); Heidi S. Gruner, Note,
The Export of U.S. Tobacco Products to Developing Countries and Previously Closed Mar-
kets, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 217 (1996); Andrea J. Hageman, Note, U.S. Tobacco Ex-
ports: The Dichotomy Between Trade and Health Policies, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 175
(1992); Jonathan Wike, Note, The Marlboro Man in Asia: U.S. Tobacco and Human
Rights, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329, 334-38 (1996). Cf. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153,
at 186 (describing Canadian tobacco export promotions).
168. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. 2411 (1994).
169. The U.S. Trade Representative used § 301 and the threat of possible retaliation to
remove trade barriers and open foreign markets for U.S. tobacco products. E.g., Japan in
1979 (cigars and pipe tobacco) (46 Fed. Reg. 1388-89 (1981)); CHAPMAN & LENG, supra
note 33, at 44-45; (Taiwan in 1986 ) (cigarettes); (Memorandum for the United States
Trade Representative, Oct. 27, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,639 (1986)); South Korea (cigarettes)
(53 Fed. Reg. 4,926-27, 20,406 (1988)); Thailand (cigarettes) (54 Fed. Reg. 23,724-25
(1989)); Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991)). In
contrast, Hong Kong banned smokeless tobacco in 1987 but avoided retaliatory actions
while claiming the ban was an internal health matter and not a trade issue. CHAPMAN &
LENG, supra note 33, at 44. Cf. Health Policy: MEPs Call for Wider Overall Emphasis on
Health Considerations, EUR. REP., Mar. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8801099 [herein-
after MEPs CALL FOR HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS]. But see Lloyd Doggett, Eliminate Tax-
payer Support for Big Tobacco, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, Sept. 26, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
170. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop stated that "it is the height of hypocrisy
for the United States to export tobacco." See Barbara Rudolph, Fuming over a Hazardous
Export, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 82. The American Medical Association stated that U.S.
trade policy "perpetuates the problem of smoking by trying to develop overseas a market
that is drying up at home." AM.A. Assails Nation's Export Policy on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1990, at Al, A12. See Weissman, supra note 36.
171. See Diana Degette, Degette Amendment Stops U.S. Promotion of Tobacco Over-
seas, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, Sept. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File; Doggett, supra note 169; Samuel Goldreich, House OK's Ending Tobacco-Export
Support, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at All.
172. See Geoffrey S. Becker, An Introduction to Farm Commodity Programs (visited
Apr. 17, 1998) <http://www.cnie.orgnle/ag-1O.html>.
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are often inefficient; in effect, they are more a political response than an
economic solution. As decades pass, many farmers "learn" to view sub-
sidies more like an entitlement than as an economic equalizing mecha-
nism. Indeed, the agricultural and technological contexts have sub-
stantially changed since the Great Depression of the 1930s and the
original purposes for subsidies are no longer present.' A problem
unique to tobacco subsidies is the inherent conflict between government
promotion of a legal, but harmful, agricultural product"" and govern-
ment actions and policies to encourage the public to avoid or discon-
tinue use of tobacco products.'75
There are no simple solutions to tobacco production subsidies. A
recent European Union (EU) proposal" is a notable example. The EU
produces 4.6% of the world's tobacco, yet it is a low-grade quality, sells
at a very low price, and is heavily subsidized. 7 The Mediterranean EU
states, who produce the majority of EU tobacco (i.e., Italy at 39%,
Greece at 36%, and Spain at 13%) are comfortable with the status quo
and wish to avoid any major changes to the EC (European Community)
Tobacco Regime. At the same time, the United Kingdom and Sweden
argue for a phased reduction of tobacco subsidies and financial incen-
tives to encourage tobacco producers to seek other livelihoods.'78 EU to-
bacco subsidies are particularly high (80% of the producers' revenue)
when compared to other agricultural subsidies (e.g., a 15% U.K. "set-
aside"). 9 Such substantial tobacco subsidies will probably become a free
trade issue. Subsequently, these tobacco subsidies probably will be a
source of disputes within the World Trade Organization (WTO) between
producing states. 180 In general, agricultural subsidies continue to be a
contentious issue in world trade.
Providing tobacco subsidies invokes moral and economic questions.
What makes tobacco subsidies a difficult issue is the breadth of areas
affected. In the EU, "the problem is really a social one; not a commodity
173. See Edward Lotterman, Farm Bills and Farmers: The Effects of Subsidies Over
Time, THE REGION, Dec. 1996, at 4.
174. "Tobacco is one of the few subsidised crops which is not eaten and which is
uniquely recognised as injurious to health." 581 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 798 (1997)
(statement of Lord Grantchester).
175. See EUROPEAN COMMITTEE, THIRTEENTH REPORT 17-18, 39 (1997) (visited Apr.
17, 1998) <http://www.parliment.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldselect/ldeucom
073xiii/ecl301.htm> [hereinafter THIRTEENTH REPORT]; James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent
Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Case for Improving Regulation Of Tobacco Products, 3
ADMIN. L.J. 215, 240-42 (1989).
176. Report from the Commission to the Council on the Common Organisation of the
Market in Raw Tobacco, COM(96)554.
177. THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 175, at 4, 7.
178. Id. at 4, 24-27, 30, 51-54.
179. Id. at 1; 581 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 796 (1997) (statement of Lord Brain).
180. See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 175, at 11-12.
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issue."'"" The situation also involves moral issues regarding govern-
ment support of an addictive substance and a disingenuous argument
that if the EU does not produce the tobacco someone else will. 2 How
can a government justify tobacco subsidies while it also attempts to
minimize tobacco consumption in its population? Is it any more justifi-
able if the tobacco is raised only for export? Posing these questions in-
vokes examination of the tobacco industry's legislative clout and sub-
stantial lobbying influence. Past experience illustrates that the
contentious matter of tobacco subsidies is slow to change. Anti-tobacco
forces must fight established economic interests and political inertia.'8
Difficult situations like this exist worldwide and plainly demonstrate
the need for comprehensive change. An optimum solution is a interna-
tional framework convention for tobacco control that is discussed later
in Part VIII. Without global cooperation, this type of quandary will
persist.
181. 581 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 806 (1997) (statement of Lord Donoughue).
Tobacco tends to be grown in remote rural areas on very small plots with an
average size.., of about three acres. It also involves Napoleonic or Conti-
nental land ownership issues. There are great difficulties in changing land
use .... It is an intensive crop and the social problem is that in some areas
it is a, or the, major employer and important source of income.
Id. See McConnell, supra note 161. But see Lord Rea's argument:
It is possible, with a slight stretch of the imagination, to compare [EUI to-
bacco production with South American cocaine production or Asian opiate or
heroin production. The production of crops of all these addictive substances
persists despite the strong opposition of their governments because of the
high price which the products command in relation to alternative crops. Ef-
forts to persuade Thai hill farmers or Colombian peasants to grow other
crops tend to fail because even if they are subsidised they bring in much less
income. The price of the dangerous controlled addictive drugs is artificially
high largely because of their illegality and their subsequent scarcity. In the
case of European tobacco, which of course is a perfectly legal product, the
reward to the farmers is artificially high solely because of the regime which
is funded by the taxpayer.
581 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 790 (1997) (statement of Lord Rea).
182. Lord Rea posits:
While little of the [EU] tobacco production is consumed in Europe nearly all
of it is eventually consumed in the developing world. To say that ending
[ECI production would lead to its replacement "from elsewhere" avoids ac-
knowledging the actual situation in which strong, bad quality tobacco from
Europe is currently contributing to the rapidly growing epidemic of tobacco
related sickness and death in the less developed world. Not only are we sup-
plying them with a dangerous addictive substance; they also have to pay
hard currency for it, although admittedly far less than it costs us in subsidis-
ing its production.
581 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 790 (1997) (statement of Lord Rea).
183. E.g., MEPS CALL FOR HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 169 and accompany-
ing text.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYO
C. Advertising
Tobacco advertising is quite effective and tobacco is a legal product
nearly everywhere. Some countries, like the United States, protect
commercial speech and, thus, tobacco advertising."M What, if any, limi-
tations or prohibitions can be applied to a legal product? At one end of
the spectrum is a complete ban on tobacco advertising by some states.""
Other states have implemented less extreme measures. 86 Because of
the inherent differences between states, regional anti-tobacco regula-
tions are predictably elusive. However, the EU is on the verge of im-
plementing a regional agreement to significantly limit tobacco advertis-
ing and sponsorship."7 To a lesser extent, the United States and the
EU limited tobacco advertising on television and required warning la-
bels.'"
Although the TTCs suffered setbacks over the last decade, the anti-
tobacco forces are far from gaining dominance over the TTCs. Exam-
ples abound of failed efforts to limit tobacco advertising. During the
1980s and 1990s, events in Eastern Europe and Asia illustrate big to-
bacco's influence and its ability to increase sales despite regulatory ef-
forts.
189
184. See infra, notes 210-212.
185. E.g., Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Paupa New Guinea, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Singapore, and Sudan. RUTH ROEMER, WHO, LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO COMBAT THE
WORLD TOBACCO EPIDEMIC 182, 205, 211, 237 (2d ed., 1993). See also CHAPMAN & LENG,
supra note 33, at 65; Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues: The Global Per-
spective, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rev. 309, 342 (1994); Neil Buckley, Belgians Back
Tobacco Advertising Ban, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at 2 (banning all forms of advertising
and sponsorship beginning in 1999); Scherer, supra note 55.
186. E.g., Russia banned tobacco advertising on television, front and back pages of
print media, and daytime radio on Jan. 1, 1996. Scherer, supra note 55. On April 1,
1998, Hong Kong banned tobacco advertising on the internet. See Jane Moir, Anti-
Smoking Moves Seen as Small First Step, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
187. See Melissa N. Kurnit, The Uncertain Future of Tobacco Advertising in the Euro-
pean Community, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 177 (1994); Charles Bremner, EU Vote
Spells End to Tobacco Ads in Four Years, TIMES (London) (reporting the European Par-
liament's endorsement of draft passed by the EU ministers); Tobacco Advertising Ban
Reaches Final Hurdle, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Feb. 12, 1998, at 7 (agreeing to phase out
tobacco advertising and sponsorships).
188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333 (1994); Council Directive 89/552/EEC, art. 13, 1989 O.J.
(L 298) 28; Council Directive 92/41/EEC, art. 4, 1992 O.J. (L 158) 30.
189. See Susan Meyer, Comment, New Players for the Old Tobacco Game: The Czech
Republic and Romania; It's Time to Change the Rules, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1057
(1996-97). See generally Johnson, supra note 15; Levin, supra note 117. But see World
Tobacco, ESTONIA Advertising Ban (July 1997) (visited Feb. 26, 1998)
<httpJ/www.marketfile.co.uk/tobademo/news/WTNEWS/ ESTONIA. I.html>; World To-
bacco, HUNGARY Tobacco Advertising Given Limited Run (July 1997) (visited Feb. 26,
1998) <http://www.marketfile.co.uk/tobademo/news/WTNEWS/HUNGARY.lhtml> (re-
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The following example illustrates the power of TTCs to influence
the law and advertising in a national market. Czechoslovakia banned
tobacco advertising' before its communist government fell in 1989, but
rescinded the law after President Vaclav Havel's governments came
into power.' 9' Shortly thereafter, the Czechs began a "privatize or die"
campaign to convert their economy into a market driven economy."
Phillip Morris, a TTC, purchased approximately 77% of the Czech to-
bacco company Tabak and now dominates the Czech market.'93 Parlia-
ment banned all tobacco advertising in the 1992 Law on Consumer Pro-
tection.'" Tobacco advertisers flouted the law in Prague and forced a
modification of the law in their favor. 95 In November 1993, the Czech
Parliament again banned tobacco advertising but allowed it to continue
for advertising contracts in force before 1994. '9 Despite a proposed leg-
islative timetable to ban the grandfathered contracts in 1994, the time-
table slid back during 1994 and in May 1995, President Havel, a
smoker, rejected the law for economic reasons.'9 In June 1995, the
country again regulated tobacco but the new law is equivocal and less
stringent than the Czech Voluntary Advertising Code.'9 The Czech Re-
placing a 1978 law that totally banned all tobacco advertising with a lenient act) [herein-
after HUNGARY Tobacco Advertising].
190. The Czechs banned cigarette advertising in March 1989. ROEMER, supra note
185, at 211-12.
191. Id. at 212. The Czechs adopted a 1991 law regulating radio and television broad-
casting and it permitted tobacco ads in the press, on billboards, and between 10:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. on television. MS, Legal and Ethical Regulation of Tobacco Advertising,
CTK Nat'l News Wire, Aug. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File
[hereinafter Czech Legal & Ethical Law].
192. Neil King, World Business (A Special Report): How It Works; Faster, Faster: The
Czech Voucher System had One Overriding Aim: Get the Job Done Quickly, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Oct. 23, 1995, at Rll.
193. Tobacco Producer Disagrees with Consumer Protection Law, CTK NAT'L NEWS
WIRE, Mar. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Czech
Tobacco Producer Disagrees]; Gasping, Tobacco in Eastern Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
21, 1993, at 52.
194. Czech Tobacco Producer Disagrees, supra note 193; Debate Continues on Role of
Advertising in Business, CTK NAT'L NEWS WIRE, Sept. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File (citing the Consumer Protection Law 634/92) [hereinafter Debate
Continues].
195. The television ban on tobacco ads continued, see Gasping, Tobacco in Eastern
Europe, supra note 193; Debate Continues, supra note 194.
196. See Czech Republic: Czech Republic Bans Tobacco Advertising, EUROMARKETING,
Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, USA- A Roundup of Activity, ADVER.
AGE, Nov. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
197. Czech Tobacco Ban Delay, EUROMARKETING, Mar. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allnws File; Thomas Kellner, Havel Vetoes Tobacco Legislation on Eco-
nomic Grounds, PRAGUE POST, May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws
File; Will Tizard, Tobacco-Government Alliance 'Fruitful', PRAGUE POST, Aug. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
198. Czech Legal & Ethical Law, supra note 191; Confusion Prevents Enforcement of
Tobacco Advertisement Law, CTK Bus. NEWS, Apr. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
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public is a prime example of big tobacco's economic muscle, the indus-
try's ability to persuasively sell its allegedly positive economic contribu-
tion to a national economy (without internalizing the negative external-
ities), and its will to manipulate market influences.
Arts and sports sponsorship can be considered indirect advertising.
By sponsoring an event, a TTC can get corporate and/or brand logos
displayed in the background (e.g., on a stadium wall, on an athlete's
uniform or equipment, in a program, and/or on a television screen).
Sponsorship can thus circumvent television advertising bans and gain
high visibility for tobacco products. This has the effect of legitimizing
and normalizing the product to viewers and tends to increase social ac-
ceptance and awareness.
Individual countries'" and regional organizations' have regulated
tobacco sponsorship. Legislative efforts generally cannot provide a
complete answer to indirect advertising. Experience proves a patch-
work result occurs at best. A comprehensive mechanism is required to
effectively deal with the tobacco industry.
Tobacco sponsorship has insidiously "addicted" many event organ-
izers (e.g., automobile racing"0 ' and sports tournaments'). Occasion-
Library, Allnws File; Czech Republic: Czech Self Regulation Win, EUROMARKETING, Mar.
21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
199. Tobacco Products Control Act, ch. 20, 11 C. Gaz. 393 (1988) (repealed 1997) (Can.)
(banning sponsorship in the name of tobacco brands); Lebensmittel und Bedarfsgegen-
standegestz [Foodstuffs & Goods in Daily Use Act] § 22, 1974 BGB1.I 1945, amended by
1986 BGB1.I 2610, 1987 BGB1.III 2610 (F.R.G.) (restricted display of cigarette logos in
televised sports) (cited in Randall H. Stoner, Note, 200 MPH Cigarette Ads: A Comparison
of International Restrictions on Tobacco Sports Sponsorship, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 639, 641, nn. 11, 12 (1992)); Voluntary Agreement between the Government and the
Tobacco Industry on Sports Sponsorship to Stand at Least Until 31/10/1989, available in
DEP'T HEALTH & SOCIAL SEC., FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR MONITORING
AGREEMENTS ON TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND SPONSORSHIP annex (1988) (restricted dis-
play of cigarette logos in televised sports) (cited in Stoner, supra note 199, at 641, n.13).
See S. African Cabinet Okays Tobacco Control Bill, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 29, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File (reporting on draft legislation that would
permit the health minister to prohibit all tobacco advertising, including sponsorships).
200. An EU-wide ban of tobacco product advertising is close to final approval. See
Council Directive 97/36/ED, 1197 O.J. (L 202) 1 (amending Council Directive
89/552/EEC); Council Adopts Common Position on Tobacco Advertising, SPICERS CTR. FOR
EUROPE, Feb. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Spicer File; Health Minis-
ters Pave the Way for EU-Wide Tobacco Adverts Ban, Spicers Ctr. for Europe, Dec. 6,
1998, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Spicer File.
201. E.g., National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing's (NASACR) Winston Cup;
International Motor Sports Association's (IMSA) Camel GT; and Marlboro sponsored In-
dianapolis 500 cars. See Letter from Lord Tordoff, Chairman of the [Select] Committee [on
European Communities Eleventh Report], to Tessa Jowell MP, Minister of State for Public
Health, Department of Health, PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (Dec. 17, 1997), (visited Apr. 18,
1998) <http://parliment.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/Idl99798/ldselect/deucom/06oxi
/ecll4l.htm> ("[I]t still seems to us illogical, in terms of health policy, that the [U.K]
government should be so insistent on special treatment for this particular sport when
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ally, a conscious effort is made to avoid or remove the tobacco industry's
influence.' When tobacco-free events occur, it is often in partnership
with an NGO rather than the event organizer unilaterally acquiring re-
placement sponsorship. In effect, NGOs serve as catalysts and thus are
usually a significant factor in altering the event's dependence on TTC
financial support.
The TTCs are forces not to be taken lightly. Their past behavior
plainly reveals that advertising and market share are the means to the
end-namely profit.2' They are ruthlessly efficient capitalists. Adver-
tising plays a crucial role in the TTC's success.20 Counter-advertising
can operate as a substantial deterrent. While governments and NGOs
sometimes utilize counter-advertising, results often depend on how the
message is presented. Past experience underscores the general ineffec-
tiveness of voluntary advertising self-regulation.'
A new approach to limiting tobacco promotion is to proscribe the
deductibility of certain advertising expenses as tax deductions.2  One
U.S. proposal would deny tax deductions for advertising and promo-
tional expenses when the ads target children.'m Although this approach
other glamorous, male-dominated sports such as Premier League football have no diffi-
culty in attracting significant sponsorship from commercial interests outside the tobacco
industry."). Id. But see Douglas P. Shuit, Anti-Smoking Forces Ready to Invade Tobacco
Road, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at BI (describing anti-tobacco sponsorship of race cars).
202. E.g., Virginia Slims Women's Tennis Tour.
203. For example, the International Olympic Committee and WHO coordinated to
make the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, smoke-free. WORLD HEALTH
REPORT 1995, supra note 1, at 61. But see Commission Welcomes FLA Move for Ban on
Tobacco Sponsorship, SPICERS CTR. FOR EUROPE, Mar. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, Eur-
com Library, Spicer File (skeptically noting that the Federation Internationale de
l'Automobile conditions its compliance on clear data proving the link between advertising
and smoking habits).
204. In Minnesota's suit against the tobacco industry, Phillip Morris' chief executive,
Geoffrey Bible, testified that profitability was as important as public health. See Myron
Levin, Tobacco Executive Endures 4 Hours of Tough Questioning, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1998, at Al; Profit as Important as Public's Health, Tobacco Exec Testifies, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 3, 1998, at 7.
205. E.g., advertising is critical to entice and retain "replacement" smokers. "Eighty-
six percent of underage smokers prefer one of the three most heavily advertised brands -
Marlboro, Newport or Camel." Children's Health Preservation and Tobacco Advertising
Compliance Act, S. 1902, 105th Cong. (1998). See 144 CONG. REc. S. 1902-01 (daily ed.
Mar. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Reed).
206. See supra notes 13, 14, 90-92, and accompanying text.
207. See generally Meyer, supra note 189, at 1078-82; Levin, supra note 117, at 100-01,
103, 106;. But see Jennifer A. Lesny, Note, Tobacco Proves Addictive: The European
Community's Stalled Proposal to Ban Tobacco Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
149, 167-68 (1993).
208. 144 CONG. REC. S. 1902-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Reed).
209. "Key components of [S. 1638's] restrictions include: a prohibition on point of sale
advertising except in adult only stores and tobacco outlets; a ban on outdoor advertising
within 1000 feet of schools and publicly-owned playgrounds, and outdoor advertising be-
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
is certain to be controversial, in the United States there are few, if any,
constitutional questions posed by this tax code mechanism. There are
substantially more constitutional questions posed by outright bans or
substantial regulation of commercial speech.10
Labeling tobacco products with health warnings is a common regu-
latory tactic that varies extensively between states. Some are relatively
lax" 1 while other states are substantially more demanding 22 in their re-
yond those areas restricted to black-and-white text only; and, a prohibition on brand-
name sponsorship of sporting or entertainment events." Id.
210. See Jeff I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 1147
(1996); Stoner, supra note 199, at 650-58
211. Japan requires the warning to state: "As smoking might injure your health, let's
be careful not to smoke too much." Levin, supra note 117, at 100 (citing KITsUEN TO
KENKO, SMOKING AND HEALTH 7 (Ministry of Health & Welfare Ed., 2d ed. 1993)). Hun-
gary requires the warning to state "[simoking seriously damages your health and that of
those around you." HUNGARY Tobacco Advertising, supra note 189.
212. The United States requires four rotating warnings on cigarette packages and ad-
vertising: "smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease and may complicate pregnancy,"
.quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health," "smoking by preg-
nant women may result in fetal injury, premature birth, and low birth weight" and "ciga-
rette smoke contains carbon monoxide." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994). For smokeless tobacco,
the United States requires three rotating warnings: "this product may cause mouth can-
cer," "this product may cause gum disease and tooth loss" and "this product is not a safe
alternative to cigarettes." 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (1994). Canada requires warnings at the top
of the package's front and back. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 105-07. Cigarette and
roll-your-own packages must carry the following rotating statements: "cigarettes are ad-
dictive," "tobacco smoke can harm your children," "cigarettes cause fatal lung disease,"
"cigarettes cause cancer," "cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease," "smoking during
pregnancy can harm your baby," "smoking can kill you," and "tobacco smoke causes fatal
disease in non-smokers." Id. The warnings appear in white on black or black on white,
not in the package colors. Id. Australia requires six rotating warnings that cover 25% of
the package front: "smoking is addictive," "smoking kills," "smoking causes heart disease,"
"smoking when pregnant harms your baby," "your smoking can harm others" and "smok-
ing causes lung cancer." CDC, Tobacco Control Measures, in Australia (visited Mar. 19,
1998) <http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/oshwho/ australi.htm>. Cf The EU's Tobacco Label-
ing Directiverequires a general warning on each tobacco product, "tobacco seriously dam-
ages health," and a second, specific alternating warning. Council Directive 89/662/EEC,
art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 359) 1, amended by Council Directive 92/41/EEC, supra note 175, art.
1. Specific warnings on each cigarette or rolling tobacco packet have two mandatory
warnings, "smoking causes cancer" and "smoking causes heart disease," and a choice from
14 optional warnings: "smoking causes fatal diseases,"'smoking kills," "smoking can kill,"
'smoking when pregnant harms your baby," "protect children: don't make them breathe
your smoke," "smoking damages the health of those around you," "stopping smoking re-
duces the risk of serious disease," "smoking causes cancer," "smoking causes chronic bron-
chitis and other chest diseases," "more than (... ) people die each year in (name of coun-
try) from lung cancer," "every year, (... ) people are killed in road accidents in (name of
country) times more die from their addiction to smoking," "every year, addiction to smok-
ing claims more victims than road accidents," "smokers die younger," "don't smoke if you
want to stay healthy," "save money: stop smoking," and "smoking causes addiction." Id.
A specific warning, "causes cancer," is on each smokeless tobacco product. Id. Each unit
packet of cigar, cigarillo, pipe tobacco, or other smoking tobacco product carries a rotating
specific warning: "smoking causes cancer," "smoking causes fatal diseases," 'smoking
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quired warnings. When a state does not require warning labels, TTCs
often avoid labeling the tobacco product. 13 As a result, many consumers
in underdeveloped countries are unaware of the dangers associated
with tobacco consumption and the breath of ingredients.2 " Therefore,
labels should include both ingredients and health warnings. To enable
the public to make an informed choice when consuming a product with
dangerous characteristics, labeling should be standardized globally and
implemented where it does not exist. Standardized labeling would
mandate disclosures by the TTCs for the public benefit. Although a
large part of the global public would learn some of tobacco's dangers,
most probably, that would not alter their consumption habits. Overall,
such labeling probably would not harm the TTC's profitability much, if
at all. History shows that without international labeling standards,
only a patchwork of national regulations (and matching success) re-
sults, if at all. Universally effective labeling requires an international
standard. Therefore, the WHO is the appropriate NGO to press for and
oversee labeling implementation within the context of an international
framework convention.
Considering the gravity of tobacco's health implications, past ex-
perience with voluntary regulation, and the inherent profit oriented na-
ture of the industry, uniform regulations on advertising should be es-
tablished. Such regulations should involve time, place, and manner
restrictions. The regulations should include uniform minimum global
standards; the right to avoid preemption of stricter regional, national,
or local law; television advertising bans; a phased elimination of sports
and arts sponsorships; prohibition of free samples; and mandatory la-
beling including health warnings and ingredients. The economic justifi-
cation for these restrictions is based upon the current high expense for
health care with explosive increases certain to appear within three to
four decades if current trends remain unaltered. A moral justification
exists based upon the fundamental right of all people to achieve "the
damages the health of those around you," and "smoking causes heart disease." Id.
213. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 38, n.194 (interviewing a R.J. Reynolds spokesper-
son in 1989 who revealed that RJR did not include the labels unless the law required it).
But see Health: Ingredients of Tobacco to be Revealed: Producers, Importers Issued Stern
Warning, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 26, 1998, at 3 (reporting on a new Thai regulation that
requires tobacco importers and manufacturers to reveal the ingredients of tobacco prod-
ucts); Mark Moran, 'Cough Up" Ingredients, Health Officials Tell Tobacco Industry, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20199081 (reporting the industry's un-
successful trade secret argument to avoid disclosing cigarette ingredients in Massachu-
setts Superior Court).
214. See Fazal, supra note 57. Typically, chemicals are part of processed tobacco. See
Campbell, supra note 95 (utilizing ammonia to increase nicotine's pH and speed of ab-
sorption); Marlboro Secret Said to be Ammonia, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1998, at A4;
Karen Mills, Witness: R.J. Reynolds Used Freon in Cigarettes from 1970-73, Apr. 1, 1998,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, available in 1998 WL 6648870 (using freon to puff up tobacco vol-
ume).
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highest attainable standard of health."215 An optimum means to accom-
plish this goal today is through the WHO and an international frame-
work convention on tobacco control.216 The phrase, "think globally, act
locally" is indicative of and critical to success.
D. Taxes
Excise taxes are an excellent governmental tool for modifying be-
havior and as a revenue source in an inelastic demand/elastic supply
situation.21 7 Taxes are a particularly effective means of lowering teen
tobacco consumption28 because adolescent discretionary income is lim-
ited.2 9 Despite decreased sales, revenue increases because consumption
falls proportionately less than the price increases. The public generally
favors a sin tax over other types of taxes, such as income or sales taxes.
Significant excise tax increases have proven themselves as an effective
tool for decreasing tobacco consumption.' Some states utilize higher
taxes as a tobacco consumption control mechanism, but the majority
can and should substantially increase tobacco excise taxes for the public
benefit."2 An international framework convention on tobacco control
should include a platform for significantly increased uniform excise
taxes.m
An inherent concern associated with substantially increased taxes
is smuggling. The larger the relative difference in the tax rate (and
hence retail price) between political entities, the greater the probability
of smuggling.' Although smuggling tobacco is low on the scale of pub-
215. WHO CONSTITUTION, supra note 51.
216. See infra Part VII.
217. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 119.
218. WHO, Tobacco Taxation: Turning the Economic Tables in Favour of Health, in
Costs of Tobacco Use, supra note 40 [hereinafter Tobacco Taxation].
219. Research indicates that a 10% price increase for tobacco products results in a 3-
9% decrease in consumption. For adolescents who are more price sensitive, the consump-
tion decrease jumps to 14%.
220. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153; Tobacco Taxation, supra note 205.
221. E.g., the current U.S. legislative process continues debating the extent to increase
taxes.
222. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 249.
223. See Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy at the Senate Democratic Tobacco
Task Force Hearing on Cigarette Smuggling, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, May 4, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7323398 (criticizing big tobacco's "smoke-screen" of smuggling);
Mark Suzman, Summers Dismisses Fears on Tobacco Deal, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at 6
(affirming the U.S. Treasury's ability to regulate tobacco and avoid smuggling). See gen-
erally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 125-30; Alissa J. Rubin & Henry Weinstein, To-
bacco Company Affiliate Pleads Guilty in Smuggling Trade: Firm with Ties to RJR Na-
bisco Admits Avoiding Taxes and Aiding the Illegal Export of Cigarettes to Canada. It
Agrees to $15-Million Fine., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at A10. But see Mark Johnson,
Cigarette Tax Hike a Smuggler's Boon?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 1997, at Al
(quoting Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Agent Joseph P. Dougherty; "(Smuggling) will in-
VOL. 28:1
TOBACCO, GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH ...
lic concern and prosecution, it tends to involve violence, debases public
lawfulness, and can quickly acquire a large market share, thereby de-
priving governments of valuable revenue.' A standard international
excise tax on tobacco would tend to equalize tobacco's consumer prices
between states and thus decrease smuggling by removing the black
market incentive.
To smuggle, a cigarette wholesaler commonly buys from the factory
and sells to an exporter. The exporter ships the cigarettes to a specially
licensed warehouse just across the border and smugglers then ship the
cigarettes back into the country of origin, thereby avoiding the substan-
tial excise tax. The exporter, wholesaler, and manufacturer typically do
not pay the tax.m One method to counter tax avoidance is to directly
tax all parties who distribute tobacco products from the manufacturer
through the retailer, rather than only the retailer. Similarly, all to-
bacco distributors should be licensed by governmental authorities and
all tobacco product packages should require labeling that identifies the
product for domestic use or export. These tobacco regulation methods
would substantially limit smuggling opportunities."m Globally, tobacco
smuggling is significant. 227
Duty-free sales also offer incentives for tax avoidance by purchas-
ing duty-free or smuggling.' Considering the uniqueness of tobacco
and the serious health implications, duty-free sales should be renegoti-
ated to prohibit tobacco products.m In a similar manner, tobacco sales
over the internet also are a means to avoid taxes.' ° Unlike duty-free
sales that occur in a definite location, internet sales present a unique
set of problems because of the internet's pervasive presence combined
with an extraterritorial situs.21 Because of the internet's nature, a re-
gional or global situation should address taxing tobacco products to en-
sure equivalent taxes on tobacco despite the means of acquisition. An
international convention framework for tobacco control is an ideal
crease exponentially").
224. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 130; Samer Iskander, EU Defrauded of Ecu
1.4bn, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at 2; Rubin & Weinstein, supra note 223.
225. See Johnson, supra note 15.
226. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Re: Tobacco Control Legislation and the
Black Market, FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (statement of Lawrence Summers, Deputy Treasury Secretary) [hereinafter
Tobacco Control Hearing].
227. Approximately 6% of world cigarette production, valued at $16 billion, is smug-
gled. L. Joossens & M. Raw, Smuggling and Cross Border Shopping of Tobacco in
Europe, 310 BRrr. MED. J. 1393-97 (1995); Rubin & Weinstein, supra note 223.
228. Tobacco Control Hearing, supra note 226 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
229. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 250.
230. See Quantum Research, Discount Cigarettes & Tobacco (visited Mar. 19, 1998)
<http://www.pricepro.com>. "Are you a smoker feeling discriminated against, >grossly
overtaxed', and, searching for the best discount cigarette and tobacco prices .... " Id.
231. See generally Quill Corp. v. South Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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method to implement this strategy.
Taxation is a proven method of modifying behavior. States should
increase excise taxes to a uniform global rate thereby significantly de-
creasing tobacco consumption. A uniform global excise tax would be an
effective tool to combat smuggling. Although regional agreements can
help, the better solution has a global nature. An international frame-
work convention for tobacco control is the best mechanism to control tax
related problems stemming from nonuniform tobacco taxation. Despite
the certainty that the tobacco industry will fight substantial excise tax
increases, the time has never been better to implement a global solu-
tion.
E. Workplace Conditions
Smoking gives rise to issues involving workplace health conditions
caused by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS).m In enclosed areas,
ETS becomes significantly more hazardous. Although the extent of
harm resulting from ETS is debated, the World Health Assembly
(WHA) "[r]ecogniz[ed] that there is no safe level of exposure to tobacco
smoke ... ."' To lead by example, the WHA urged a workplace tobacco
ban at U.N. facilities.m The WHA urged states to ban smoking on pub-
lic transportation to protect people from ETS. 3 Consumer groups also
232. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 249-50.
233. ETS is also referred to as secondhand smoke and side-stream smoke. See gener-
ally PASSIVE SMOKING 1993, supra note 4; Henderson, supra note 12; Cal. Envtl. Protec-
tion Agency, Health Effects of Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (visited Apr. 1,
1998) <http:// www.calepa.cahwnet.gov/ oehhaldocs/finalets.htm>. Debate continues re-
garding health risks of ETS. See Nigel Hawkes, Smoking Out the Risk, TIMES (London),
Mar. 30, 1998, at 15; Major Environmental Tobacco Smoke Study Finds No Risk, PR
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. But see
Simon Chapman, The Hot Air on Passive Smoking; Medicine and the Media, 316 BRIT.
MED. J. 945 (1998) (reporting on the alleged statistical disinformation released by tobacco
industry scientists to the media; "The truth is rarely pure, and never simple.. ."); Cancer
Study Criticism Tied to Tobacco Money, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1998, at A2 (reporting "mas-
sive evidence of a propaganda machine"); David Concar & Michael Day, Undercover Op-
eration, NEW SCIENTIST, May 16, 1998, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
234. World Health Association Res. 44.26, 44th W.H.A., (1991) [hereinafter WHA
44.261, compiled in WHO, III HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXECUTIVE BOARD (1985-1992) 53 (3d ed. 1993). See WHA
39.14, infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
235. World Health Association Res. 46.8, 46th W.H.A.. (1993) (urging the UN Secre-
tary-General "to take the necessary steps to ban the sale and use of all kinds of tobacco").
236. "Aware of the technical problems of ensuring a smoke-free environment in many
public conveyances, especially trains and aircraft.... ." WHA 44.26, supra note 234. See
China is to Ban Smoking on All Public Transport, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1997, at 1 (effective
May 1, 1997); Smoking Banned Outdoors, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at 44 (reporting on
smoking ban in busses, trains, schools, government offices, cinemas, and outdoors in New
Delhi, India).
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noted the detrimental effects of ETS in aircraft and recommended
measures to restrict or ban in-flight smoking. 7 ETS becomes an inter-
national issue whenever people travel between states.
Some states have regulated smoking on aircrafts,2 but many more
have yet to do so. Market forces led legislative efforts to provide con-
sumers more smoke-free flights."s Following the WHA's lead, the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted Assembly Reso-
lution A29-15, which advocated that states completely ban smoking on
all international flights in Assembly Resolution A29-15.240 Although the
ICAO Assembly cannot enforce a worldwide in-flight smoking ban, its
position of global leadership carries substantial influence. Working to-
gether, ICAO and market forces made the "majority of flights...
smoke-free today, especially in North America."" This noteworthy suc-
cess is not due to the force of law but rather public desire.2  For exam-
237. Breathing on a Jet Plane, How Fresh is the Air?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1994, at
501, 502.
238. For example, the United States banned nearly all smoking on domestic flights.
Smoking Aboard Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1997). See also U.S., Australia, Canada Sign
Pact to End In-flight Smoking, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Nov. 11, 1994, available in 1994
WL 8731642; Summary of Replies to Questionnaire Attached to State Letter AN 5/13-
97/8, App. A, ICAO Doc. A32-WP (1997) [hereinafter ICAO Summary of Replies].
239. ICAO Summary of Replies, supra note 238. Legislation in the following states
enacted a complete or partial smoking ban on international and/or domestic passenger
flights: Armenia, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland,
France, Hungary, Iceland, Jordan, Moldova, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Paki-
stan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, United States, and Zambia. Id. Airline policies in the following states
supplement legislation to provide fewer opportunities for in-flight smoking: Argentina,
Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Korea, Lithuania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Qatar,
Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United
Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. Id. See Senate OKs Transportation Bill with Air-
line Smoking Ban, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1998, at N15 (describing an amendment that bans
smoking on international flights arriving and departing from U.S. airports); Cath Urqu-
hart, Travel: Ban That Flies in the Face of Smokers Worldwide, DAILY TEL., Sept. 3, 1994,
at 25 (reporting that American Airlines, Delta Airlines, British Airways, and Singapore
Airlines instituted smoke-free transatlantic flights). See generally Pena Grants Anti-
Trust Immunity for Carriers to Discuss Smoking Ban, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Jan. 30,
1995, available in 1995 WL 6154837.
240. Smoking Restrictions on International Passenger Flights, ASS. RES. A29-15, at I-
37, ICAO Doc. 9600 (1996) [hereinafter ICAO A29-15]. The resolution urged states to
"take measures as soon as possible to restrict smoking progressively on all international
passenger flights with objective of implementing complete smoking bans by 1 July 1996."
Id.
241. Letter from Dr. Claus Curdt-Christiansen, Chief of Aviation Medicine, ICAO, to
the author (Apr. 7, 1998) (on file with author). See ICAO Summary of Replies, supra note
238.
242. See Canadian Airlines Bans Smoking on Daily Flights to Japan, AIRLINE MKTG.
NEWS, July 6, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8734555; Delta Snuffs Out Cigarette Smoking
in the Sky, AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS, Nov. 23, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8731657; Icelan-
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ple, A29-15 lacks mandatory means to enforce its goal of smoke-free
flights. A29-15 "requests" intensified studies, "requests" the ICAO and
WHO to promote smoke-free travel, and "[u]rges all Contracting
States ... to restrict smoking progressively on all international passen-
ger flights with the objective of implementing complete smoking
bans."" This is a prime example of an NGO pulling a tobacco control
issue and legislation along. Despite the contentious nature of ETS
regulation, legislatures continue working to protect the public in the
workplace.2"
Leadership by NGOs like ICAO and WHO are essential when
workplace issues involve tobacco and transcend national boundaries.
Although a compulsory international legal mechanism to protect people
from ETS is lacking, ICAO and WHO leadership significantly influ-
enced market forces and, in turn, governmental actions. Despite sub-
stantial advancements in ETS protection, much remains to be done.
The international status and recognition of NGOs such as WHO and
ICAO serve as a vital lens to focus regional and professional associa-
tions, and local grass roots organizations. Whereas change is slow to
come for the benefit of anti-tobacco forces, the pendulum now swings in
their favor.
dair Bolsters Image as First Smoke-Free European Carrier, AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS, Feb.
15, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8157552; International Airlines Hasten Move Toward
Non-Smoking Markets, AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS, Aug. 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL
8734432; Martinair Imposes Smoking on All International Flights, AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS,
Aug. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8157865; Northwest, KLM Snuff out Smoking on More
International Flights, AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS, July 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL
8157816; Three More Carriers Cut Smoking as Congress Mulls International Air Ban,
AIRLINE MKTG. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8157567.
243. See ICAO A29-15, supra note 240.
244. See CAL. LABOR CODE, supra note 12; N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE, supra note 12;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., supra note 12. Local regulations that prohibit indoor smoking are
based upon health concerns rather than purely economic matters. Despite the contro-
versy, once such statutes are enacted the public generally supports them despite a vocal,
opposing minority. See Bar Patrons in L.A. County Overwhelmingly Support Smoke-Free
Bars, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Dr.
David R. Nielsen, Debating a Point Pro-Tobacco Arguments, Fears Fall Flat, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1998, at EV4; HK New Anti-Smoking Measures Effective on July,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 25, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File
(reporting on a Hong Kong ordinance that bans smoking at indoor shopping malls, de-
partment stores, supermarkets, and banks, except for restaurants within those facilities);
S. African Cabinet Okays Tobacco Control Bill, supra note 199 (reporting on draft legisla-
tion that would allow broad smoking bans in the workplace).
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VII. AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR TOBACCO
CONTROL
A The Need for an International Legal Instrument
Since the 1980s, the WHO and the World Health Assembly (WHA)
took a more active leadership role in the fight against tobacco. In the
later 1980s, the WHA affirmed the causal link that tobacco consump-
tion leads to death and disease. 5 The WHA also affirmed that ETS is a
"noxious form of environmental pollution" that violates nonsmokers'
right to health.' A later WHA resolution urged states to protect the
public from ETS in public transport."
Several countries regulate tobacco consumption and marketing. 2
However, legislative efforts have a patchwork effect due to the indus-
try's lobbying and influence."" Without a global approach to tobacco
control, further inconsistent and highly variable regulations will result.
The WHO, through the WHA, recognized the need for a compre-
hensive approach to the situation.5 After determining the feasibility of
a framework convention,"l the WHA adopted a resolution2 2 calling on
the WHO Director-General to begin developing an international frame-
work convention for tobacco control in accordance with Article 19 of the
WHO Constitution. 2 3 The stated goals of the framework convention in-
clude the "adoption of comprehensive tobacco control policies" and
methods to cope "with aspects of tobacco control that transcend national
boundaries."'
245. World Health Association Res. 39.14, 39th W.H.A. (1986), compiled in WHO, III
HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD (1985-1992) 53 (3d ed. 1993).
246. Id.
247. WHA 44.26, supra note 234.
248. See supra notes 7, 8, 10 and accompanying text.
249. E.g., supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. See, e.g., John Bacon, Big to-
bacco Set to Sign $206 Billion Settlement, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1998, at 3A; Debbie Elliot
& Robert Siegel, All Things Considered: Whether Tobacco (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast,
Nov. 23, 1998);
250. An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, World Health Association Res.
48.11, W.H.O., 48th W.H.A., 12th plen. mtg., Annex 1, Agenda Item 19, W.H.O. Doc.
WHA48/1995/REC/1 (1995).
251. International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, W.H.A. Res. 49.17,
W.H.O., 49th World Health Ass., W.H.O. Doc. WHA49/1996/REC/1 (1996).
252. Id.
253. WHO CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at art. 19.
254. Id.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
B. Progress Through an International Framework Convention
Tobacco's controversial nature makes it better suited for a frame-
work convention rather than a detailed treaty. If the world attempted
to implement a traditional treaty comprised of detailed terms, similar to
the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotro-
pic Substances, it may never happen because parties probably would
fail to agree on the explicit terms that compose such a treaty. The con-
troversies surrounding tobacco would doom a traditional treaty from
the start. A framework convention is much better suited for an initial
global means of controlling tobacco. The framework treaty could list the
tobacco control objectives,' set forth the principles to guide the parties
in implementing the objectives," and establish commitments to ensure
an objective means of compliance to measure the parties' progress.25
Elements of "comprehensive tobacco control policies" should ad-
dress the overall policy of tobacco control and further develop a program
of shared information for all interested parties. States should report
tobacco production, sales, exports, and imports to aid in comprehending,
and eventually, comprehensive monitoring of the tobacco industry and
critical areas inherent to tobacco control. Tobacco policies should delib-
erately address advertising, sponsorship, taxes, smuggling, and duty-
free sales. Institutions and states should increase testing and reporting
of toxic constituents. Both the tobacco consumer and tobacco-free popu-
lation should have full information supplied on exactly how tobacco af-
fects people.
Standardized, detailed reporting on tobacco production and market-
ing are required to fully understand the variable factors relating to the
industry and consumer. Market research is a vital tool for the indus-
try's success and forces for tobacco control should possess equal knowl-
edge as a means of ensuring their success. The WHO and its Tobacco or
Health (TOH) program acquired and shared substantial knowledge re-
garding the industry and health matters but much remains to be
learned. The WHO's leadership position and reputation make it the
logical choice to continue in this capacity. The WHO and TOH program
could serve as an informational clearing house for local and regional
NGOs along with many governments. This is a critical role for the
WHO since one organization cannot fight the anti-tobacco battle single-
255. E.g., raising tobacco excise taxes; eliminating duty-free tobacco sales; controlling
smuggling; regulating advertising and warning labels; reporting production, imports, ex-
ports, and sales of tobacco products; and testing and reporting of toxic ingredients.
256. E.g., ensuring the world's population has full knowledge of tobacco's effects upon
personal health and national economies; encouraging states to remove supports of the to-
bacco industry and regulate its actions; and implementing uniform standards for tobacco
control on a global basis.
257. E.g., implementing standardized reporting concerning all aspects of tobacco con-
trol, regulation, production, and consumption.
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handedly; success requires an extensive network.2
Advertising objectives should address advertising bans on televi-
sion and billboards and also the material role that advertising plays in
underage tobacco consumption. Although the framework probably will
be unable to go as far as advocating minimized advertising, such goals
within the framework's scope serve as an incentive for progressive
states. The framework should include labeling guidelines that include
explicit health warnings and a detailed ingredients listing. By setting
global baselines for advertising practices, health warnings, and ingredi-
ent labeling the field can be leveled so that consumers are informed and
can make knowledgeable choices regarding the tobacco habit. The
framework could add a measure of protection for underage persons.
Encouraging counter-advertising could rebut the glamorization of to-
bacco consumption for the benefit of susceptible youths."9
The international framework convention for tobacco control pres-
ently possesses the highest probability of success because of (1) the cer-
tainty that a traditional, detailed treaty would never be agreed upon
and (2) the public's swelling anti-tobacco sentiment and its correspond-
ing desire for a means of tobacco control. A framework convention
would certainly advance anti-tobacco efforts to a higher level. Due to
the deadly serious nature of the issue, the WHA, WHO, and United Na-
tions should implement the framework convention before the new mil-
lennium begins.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The global majority acknowledges the causal relationship between
tobacco consumption and ill health. Since the 1980s, the TTCs have ag-
gressively marketed their wares in the developing world with notable
success. Despite decreasing consumption in developed states, the gains
in developing states more than offset any losses the TTCs may suffer.
Although some argue that a tobacco pandemic is presently amongst us,
the explosive increase in tobacco consumers predicates a certain pan-
demic in thirty to forty years." The economic and social costs will in-
crease proportionately with the inevitable health costs.
Around the world, many people are ignorant of tobacco's ill effects,
yet are quite cognizant of the image sold to them by TTCs. Children are
particularly susceptible to tobacco and its marketing. Approximately
90% of all smokers began before age eighteen.2 6  The international
258. See, e.g., The International Nongovernmental Coalition Against Tobacco, in
WHO, International Collaboration (visited Mar. 26, 1998) <http://www.who.org/
psa/toh/Alert/4-96/E/ta10.htm>.
259. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
260. See supra, notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
261. See supra, note 78.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLWY
community, through the Convention, has an obligation to ensure the
fundamental right of children to maximize their health and develop-
ment. Arguably, this Convention also possesses the authority of cus-
tomary law due to its near-universal acceptance and basic premises
that tend to be followed because of a sense of legal obligation. Alterna-
tively, the Convention is soft law. The Convention offers a legal basis
and a moral argument for regulating tobacco advertising that affects
impressionable youths.22 Although international legal authority exists,
it is not utilized to control tobacco presently and the likelihood that the
Convention will be employed to regulate tobacco is quite slim. There-
fore, an alternative means of international tobacco advertising regula-
tion is essential.
Nicotine's presence in all tobacco and ongoing medical research
present a reasonable basis for regulating tobacco as a drug.2" Nicotine
is arguably a psychotropic drug when one considers its physiological ef-
fects. It clearly affects the central nervous system and the brain, pro-
duces dependence, and is abusable. Although it does not present the
severity of danger that hallucinogenic, barbiturate, or amphetamine
drugs do, it falls in a gray zone and should be regulated. Despite an ar-
guable international legal basis for regulating tobacco as a psychotropic
drug, it is highly improbable that the international community will at-
tempt to control tobacco in such a manner. Tobacco is too controversial
a subject and the industry is too powerful for the world's interested par-
ties to regulate tobacco as a psychotropic drug. Conversely, it may be
sufficient to regulate the packaging, advertising, and sale of tobacco in
the form of time, place, and manner restrictions without the contentious
status of being regulated as a dangerous drug. After all, tobacco gener-
ally is legal and culturally acceptable worldwide, similar to alcohol. Is-
sues like this that transcend national borders are best handled by an
international framework convention.
Advertising is the engine that propels the tobacco industry's suc-
cess. The industry is a formidable economic and social force that cannot
be effectively regulated by voluntary measures because penalties do not
exist to ensure compliance. The TTCs are often powerful enough to in-
262. See generally U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85 and ac-
companying text.
263. E.g., the U.S. Food and Drug Administration currently lobbies for authority to
regulate tobacco as a nicotine delivery substance but suffered legal setbacks. See Alissa J.
Rubin, Court Rules FDA Cannot Regulate Tobacco as Drug; Law: Appeals Panel's Decision
Deals Key Blow to Clinton Administration's Fight to Curb Youth Smoking. Judges Say
Congress Never Gave the Agency Jurisdiction, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1998, at Al (reporting
on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, No. 97-1604 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998)). See
generally Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes?
Has the Agency Established a Legal Basis and, If Not, Should Congress Grant It?, 51
FOOD & DRUG L.J. (1996); Barbara Noah & Lars Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing
the FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
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fluence governmental actions for their benefit. The current patchwork
of national regulations regarding advertising illustrates this and por-
tends a predictable failure if the world attempted to introduce a tradi-
tional treaty to regulate tobacco. Traditional treaties would probably
fail for a lack of agreement on the details. The industry's influence ne-
cessitates a global standard; a possibility with an international frame-
work convention. An international framework convention should ad-
dress advertising, ingredient listing, and warning label issues.
Taxes are an effective tool for modifying consumer behavior and as
a revenue source. Significantly raising excise taxes directly impacts
underage and lower income consumers who possess less disposable in-
come. It diminishes the number of people beginning the habit and gives
incentive to current consumers to decrease consumption or quit all to-
gether. A problem with substantial tax increases is the inevitable
smuggling where prices vary significantly between political entities.
Within a global solution, tobacco taxes and anti-smuggling efforts must
be examined concurrently. Because of the health dangers associated
with tobacco, duty-free sales should also be reexamined. The frame-
work convention should encourage uniform and substantial taxation of
all tobacco products. A framework convention could begin a continuing
process that incrementally leads states to implement controls toward
the eventual goal of standardized global tobacco control.
The international issue of ETS as a workplace health risk is gain-
ing credence along with the concept of a nonsmoker's right to be smoke-
free. Businesses, individual political entities, and the United Nations
have led by example and banned or limited smoking in enclosed places.
In turn, workers gain significant health benefits from limiting their
ETS exposure. A noteworthy example is the push by the ICAO and
market forces to ban in-flight smoking. The health of passengers and
particularly flight crews benefit from in-flight smoking bans while the
airline industry enjoys secondary financial and safety benefits. Al-
though ICAO lacks legal authority to enforce an in-flight smoking ban,
it is in a position to lead the industry and states. Banning in-flight
smoking facilitates a growing anti-tobacco public perception with com-
mercial self-regulation and governmental regulation often following
public opinion. Further strong leadership is needed to protect all work-
ers. NGOs lead the struggle from grassroots to international levels.
Without NGOs, any advances in ETS protection would be slow to come,
if at all, particularly in the international context.
Without international tobacco controls, we can expect no significant
progress in the anti-tobacco fight. An international framework conven-
tion for tobacco control is arguably the best method for examining all
issues related to, and implementing measures for, tobacco control. The
issues must be dealt with on an international basis to effectively regu-
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late the tobacco industry, manage adverse consequences, and avoid
patchwork regulations.2 6 The gravity of tobacco control requires a uni-
fied approach. The traditional treaty form would fail because meaning-
ful consensus could not be obtained within a reasonable time. It is bet-
ter to make a looser framework to build upon than stall and make no
progress at all.
The WHO, through its constitution, possesses the authority to call
a convention for matters within its domain. The issue of tobacco or
health is clearly inside the WHO's purview. The WHO has the oppor-
tunity to lead the United Nations and improve the lives of the world's
citizens. It is questionable that any other organization could accom-
plish the task. The WHO must take the lead and move beyond its con-
servative, technocratic past to prevent a tobacco pandemic.
The framework convention should contain guiding objectives and
principles for implementing the objectives, as well as commitments for
objectively measuring compliance. It should standardize reporting and
information dissemination to better understand the issues associated
with tobacco control. The time is ripe for an international framework
convention for tobacco control-it is achievable and essential. The sub-
stantial likelihood of an unsuccessful traditional treaty for tobacco con-
trol contributes to the need for a framework convention. The interna-
tional community has an obligation to alter the status quo and not turn
away from the difficult issue of tobacco control.
Some assert that the present concerns about tobacco are much ado
about nothing and tobacco is a reasonably safe and legal product, like
alcohol. However, if current trends do not change, the world will assur-
edly experience a pandemic of monumental proportions, if it is not al-
ready. NGOs are a catalyst, in a leadership role, to implement positive
change in how the world views and regulates tobacco. Without NGOs,
meaningful global tobacco control will not materialize. Although inter-
national legal mechanisms exist to regulate tobacco globally, they have
not been used in that capacity. Current public attitudes toward tobacco
control, expansive medical and scientific evidence, and influential
NGOs present the world with a unique opportunity for tobacco control
through an international framework convention. The role of NGOs and
the international framework convention for tobacco control will play a
pivotal role in the next century's public health. Difficult choices and
hard work remain for the world to gain effective tobacco control, yet it is
possible within an international legal context, but only with support
from NGO leadership and coordinated state commitments.
264. Cf. Torry, supra note 17 (describing internationally unique lawsuits by Guate-
mala, Nicaragua, and Panama against the tobacco industry).
VOL. 28:1
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND RUSSIA'S




Communication with the Russian military on the Kola Peninsula is
poor. We can understand their situation, but the problems of nuclear
waste there are so great that they have to be solved. A catastrophe in
the North would affect the whole of Europe.
Jorgen Kosmo, Norwegian Defense Minister1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959 the first Soviet nuclear submarine, the Leninski Komsomol
(K-3), entered into service and since that time the former Soviet Union
(FSU) has launched a total of 248 nuclear powered submarines.2 The
majority of these vessels have served with Russia's Northern Fleet,
based in Murmansk in the Barents Sea region.3 At the height of the
Cold War the Barents region was home to the highest concentration of
nuclear weapons and nuclear powered submarines in the world, due, in
part, to the fact that the region contained the only ice free ports on the
Russian Arctic.4
The Soviets, like their NATO counterparts, began their nuclear
B.A.(HONS.), Memorial University of Newfoundland; M.A., Royal Military College of
Canada; L.L.B., Dalhousie University. The author is presently employed by the New-
foundland Department of Justice. I am indebted to Dr. David VanderZwaag of Dalhousie
University for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. I
would also like to thank Pia Pace-Asciak for her constant support. Correspondence may
be addressed to: justin-mellor@canada.com.
1. Michael Bond, Arctic Standoff, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 22.
2. Joshua Handler, The Lasting Legacy: Nuclear Submarine Disposal, JANE'S NAVY
IN'L 11, Jan. 1, 1998, at 15 (in NATO nomenclature the K-3 was referred to as Novem-
ber class).
3. In the early 1990s, 84 of the former Soviet Union's submarines were serving with
the Northern Fleet. See A. BAKLANOV ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE KOLA REGION: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR MAN 36 (1996).
4. Gennady P. Luzin et al., The Kola Peninsula: Geography, History and Resources,
ARCTIC, Mar., 1994, at 1.
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building program with little thought to how the nuclear vessels would
be decommissioned without creating serious environmental damage.5
As these submarines have reached the end of their natural service lives,
they have become environmental hazards.6 The spent fuel from the
submarines, and the reactor compartments themselves, pose serious
health and environmental risks.7 Since the end of the cold war, a com-
bination of factors, including financial restraint, maintenance problems
and arms control, have accelerated the rate of decommissioning,
thereby aggravating the problem! At present, the Northern Fleet's in-
terim storage facilities are exhausted and much of the waste is being
stored in an unsafe manner.9 Though immediate damage from Russian
activities may not be obvious, exposure to even low levels of radiation
may have grave consequences for the health and well being of people in
neighboring states.'0
International, regional and bilateral initiatives have been created
in response to the nuclear waste problems generated by the Russian
Navy." Many of these have provided funds for studies and initial aid
towards solving the problems of waste disposal. 2 The Rovanniemi Dec-
5. Alexi Yablokov the head of the Center for Russian Environmental Policy in Mos-
cow indicated that despite the centralized economy of the Soviet Union, "when they pro-
duced nuclear submarines,.. nobody thought about how to decommission them." See
David Hoffman, Russia Suffering Fallout Over Nuclear Submarines: Disposal Problems
Causing Worries Worldwide, DALLAS MORNING STAR, Nov. 27, 1998, at 55A
6. Handler, supra note 2, at 17-18. Environmental hazards include: leakage of fuel,
inappropriate storage of fuel when decommissioning the submarines, reactor accidents,
and sinkings of submarines.
7. Geoffrey York, Russia's 'Floating Chernobyls" Part of Deadly Nuclear Mix: Disas-
ter in the Making, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 2, 1996, at Al.
8. Handler, supra note 2, at 16-18.
9. H.-J. ENGELMANN, ET AL., INVENTORY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT FUEL AT
THE KOLA PENINSULA REGION OF NORTH-WEST RUSSIA 115 (1996) [hereinafter
INVENTORY].
10. Apart from long latency periods for certain kinds of cancer, it has also been sug-
gested that exposure to radiation may produce cumulative genetic damage with mutated
genes being passed on from one generation to the next. See Herman Muller, Radiation
and Heredity, 54 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 44 (1964). Russia's neighbors should be con-
cerned given the example of the Isle of Man where low level exposure from the UK's Sel-
lafield nuclear reprocessing plant has been linked to increases in childhood cancer in Ire-
land and the Isle of Man. See Terry Hall, '....Carried by the Wind Out to Sea" Ireland
and the Isle of Man v. Sellafield: Anatomy of a Transboundary Pollution Dispute, 6 GEO.
INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 639, 649-53 (1994).
11. See Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, in ORAN YOUNG,
CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 200 (1998) [here-
inafter Kirkenes Declaration]; Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Re-
gion, in id. at 217.
12. The problem has been studied extensively. For example: IAEA funded Interna-
tional Arctic Seas Assessment Project (1993), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Pro-
gram, International Science and Technology Centre established by Japan, EU, U.S., Arc-
tic Nuclear Waste Program (ANWAP), Euro-Arctic Barents-Region, and NATO. For a
more detailed description of studies and initiatives, see BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3,
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laration on the Protection of the Environment13 , signed by the eight Arc-
tic nations,4 cited the importance of international co-operation and fi-
nancial support in the "rehabilitation of areas that have been polluted
as a result of the operation of nuclear facilities." 5 Similarly, the Bar-
ents Euro-Arctic Council in the Kirkenes Declaration recognized it as a
serious problem that requires international co-operation."6 Despite this
push towards international co-operation and aid for dealing with its
spent fuel problem, the Russian Navy has continued to operate nuclear
powered submarines and is presently engaged in building and launch-
ing new vessels that rely on nuclear propulsion. 7
This paper argues that the international community is undermin-
ing principles of international environmental law, such as state respon-
sibility and co-operation. Russia has not been admonished for its viola-
tion of existing treaty law, such as the London Convention, 8 and has
instead become the beneficiary of international aid. 19 By reconstructing
the problem as regional, Russia has avoided the issue of state responsi-
bility. It has further ignored the precautionary approach and has
launched new submarines as well as proposing the creation of floating
nuclear plants for the Arctic communities based on naval reactor de-
signs.2° Regional co-operation has become nothing more than a military
subsidy in that it allows the Russian Navy to avoid diverting portions of
its operational budget into nuclear waste disposal and treatment.
Before analyzing this problem from the principles of state responsi-
bility and co-operation, it is first necessary to outline the scope and
magnitude of the nuclear waste problem.
at 15-21.
13. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 200.
14. The eight Arctic nations are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada, and the United States of America. See
Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 200.
15. Id.
16. Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Region, reprinted in YOUNG, supra
note 11, at 217.
17. The SSBM Yuri Dolgoruky, the lead boat of the new Borey class, is under con-
struction at Severodvinsk. See Alison Clayton & Ian Kemp, Russian Navy Readiness
Remains Despite Cuts, JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY, Sept. 9, 1998, at 8.
18 Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at
Sea: Final Documents, Nov. 13, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291 (as amended in 1996, the chief in-
ternational convention for the control of deliberate disposal of substances at sea). The
1996 Protocol takes an even greater precautionary approach to dumping by creating a
reverse listing. Article 4(1)(c) "prohibits the dumping of any wastes" other than those
listed in annex 1. Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
19. Id. at art. VIII, X
20. Russia Nuclear Power Plant in Works, GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 11, 1997, at A17.
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II. DEFINING THE NORTHERN FLEET'S WASTE PROBLEM
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
engaged in an extensive submarine building program, culminating in
the construction of 248 submarines.2' Over the years, the FSU has suf-
fered fifty-two known accidents involving nuclear submarines or ves-
sels.2 Before 1992, the navy often dumped spent fuel and reactor com-
partments, along with low level waste, into the Barents Sea.23 In the
area surrounding Novaya Zemlia, the navy has dumped two subma-
rines, one with two loaded reactors, the other with a reactor containing
spent fuel.' In total, thirteen submarine reactors were disposed of in
the area; 5 six of them containing varying amounts of spent fuel."
Dumping was typically carried out when a submarine was damaged or
when its fuel could not be extracted safely and put into interim storage
to await reprocessing.27 This occurred despite domestic and interna-
tional prohibitions against dumping.'
Due to a combination of fiscal restraint and the START agree-
ments, the rate of decommissioning has rapidly accelerated. 29 By 1998
the FSU had retired approximately 167 submarines and was averaging
about twenty submarines per year.0 In the Northern Fleet alone, there
are presently 132 inoperative reactors in decommissioned vessels,31
many of which have fuel assemblies remaining in the reactors because
2of the critical shortage of storage space.
The FSU procedure for dealing with spent fuel involves off loading
the fuel onto service ships, which then transport it to fuel depots for
temporary storage. After cooling, the spent fuel is transported by rail to
the Mayak reprocessing plant in the Urals.' The contaminated reactor
21. Handler, supra note 2, at 15.
22. BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 44.
23. Id.
24. Jason H. Eaton, Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to Nuclear Waste Dumping
at Sea, 23 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 287, 293 (1995).
25. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. International concern provoked numerous reports of radioactive waste dumping.
Id.
29. Id. at 16. The two START agreements are: Treaty on the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in JOZEF
GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 591 (1994)
[hereinafter START I]; Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in id. at 697 [hereinafter START II].
30. Handler, supra note 2, at 15.
31. Id. at 16.
32. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 90.
33. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
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compartments are then sealed up and stored afloat.' Due largely to fis-
cal problems, the FSU has not been able to afford the cost of transporta-
tion and reprocessing. 5 Consequently, approximately 49,000 spent fuel
assemblies are now sitting in interim storage,31 some being stored im-
properly at outdoor sites.
It is difficult to assess the extent of the environmental damage from
the FSU submarine program. It is generally believed that there is wide
spread "low level contamination" throughout the entire fleet support fa-
cility.3 Some recent reports have found an eight-fold increase in radio-
activity in the sediment found around the Kola bases in the last three
years.3 9 The amount of Cobalt 60 found in the vicinity of the naval base
at Poljarny has increased from 10(bq/kg) to 80 (bq/kg).4° Scientists from
the Russian Academy of Science's Marine Biology Institute discovered
that levels of Caesium 137 in Andreeva Bay near Norway had also in-
creased.4' These increases are likely due to deteriorating storage facili-
ties."2 A recent European Commission report concluded, "the storage
situation constitutes a major hazard to the population of the area and
the environment."
4 3
However, a 1996 review of studies carried out on radioactive nu-
clides in the region concluded that most of the marine pollution was
composed of Caesium 137 and Strontium 90, both of which could be
traced directly to the Chernobyl accident and nuclear atmospheric tests
carried out in the Soviet north." This finding lends support to an early
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study that found fine grain
ocean sediment actually traps radioactivity and limits environmental
damage. 45 This has led some to suggest that the dumping option may be
34. Id. at 16. It is important to differentiate between the high level waste (the spent
fuel) and the low level radioactive waste (reactor compartments). For a description of
what is involved in decommissioning a nuclear submarine. See Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries House of Representatives on Oversight of the Ocean dumping Act
and National Ocean Pollution Planning Act and the Disposal of Defueled, Decommis-
sioned Nuclear Submarines, 97' Cong. 16-17 (1982) (statement of Carl Schmidt, U.S. Na-
val Nuclear Propulsion Program Director).
35. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
36. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 92.
37. York, supra note 7, at Al.
38. Handler, supra note 2, at 18. The storing of waste outside creates the risk that
the containers will develop cracks as a result of thawing and freezing. See Thomas Nil-
sen, Nuclear Waste Storage in Andreeva Bay (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <http://
www.Belona.no/e/fakta/fakta87.htm>.
39. Rob Edwards, Hot Waters, NEW SCIENTIST, May 9, 1998, at 11.
40. Id. (According to Bellona these high levels of Cobalt are indications that storage
of submarine reactors holding liquid waste in the vicinity are corroding.)
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 119.
44. BAKLANOV ETAL., supra note 3, at 100.
45. David Schneider, Not In My Backyard: Could Ocean Mud Trap Nuclear Waste
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a safe environmental solution to Russia's problem."
The immediate absence of extensive radioactive marine contamina-
tion does not mean that a problem does not exist. Almost all of the
dumped naval reactors were filled with a special hardening solution to
prevent salt-water deterioration, which means it may be some time be-
fore the effects of the contamination begin to appear in the environ-
ment." The potential for an accident also increases as more submarines
await decommissioning or are scrapped." The shortage of interim stor-
age facilities poses grave hazards and there have already been reports
of leakages and accidents.4 9 Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister
Nikolay Yegorov has stated that "matters worsen every year... and
could turn into a catastrophe worse than Chernobyl."' Government
statements such as this are of obvious concern to Russia's northern
neighbors.
The lack of Russian government funding resulted in only two sub-
marines being scrapped in 1997 for both the Pacific and Northern
Fleets. 5' In addition, at the current rate of fuel shipment, it will take
thirty to forty years to reprocess all of the spent fuel." In spite of these
facts, the Russian Navy has continued operations and a nuclear build-
ing program. In 1996 the Navy launched the much delayed nuclear
powered cruiser, Peter the Great, with an estimated operating cost of
U.S. $50-100 million per year,' as well as laying the keel of the nuclear
submarine Yuri Dolgoruki.' The Russian Navy announced in 1998 that
it hoped to launch two nuclear submarines in 1999' and Admiral Oleg
Yerofeyev indicated that Russia's building program will now focus on
higher technology boats because it makes "sense to have fewer vessels
but of a higher quality."" The Russian Navy demonstrated its opera-
from Old Russian Subs, SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Mar. 1997 at 20, 21.
46. The IAEA has studied plutonium that was dispersed by a downed B-52 bomber of
the coast of Greenland. Charles D. Hollister of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute
has been vocal in supporting a study of the dumping option for subs. Id. at 22.
47. Eaton notes that witness accounts indicate that the navy often fired at nuclear
waste containers to quicken their sinking. Eaton, supra note 24, at 293.
48. In December 1995 the Northern Fleet failed to pay its electricity bill and had its
power cut resulting in a failure of the cooling system and overheating of one reactor. See
York, supra note 7, at A12.
49. BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 188. One defueled reactor compartment was
lost at sea in 1995 whilst being towed from Severodvinsk to Murmansk for storage.
Handler, supra note 2, at 17.
50. Al Venter, Russian Nuclear Neglect May Cause Next Chernobyl, JANE'S DEFENCE
WKLY., Apr. 7, 1999, at 8.
51. Handler, supra note 2, at 19.
52. Id.
53. Russia Arms for Oblivion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1996, at 47.
54. Id.
55. Clayton & Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
56. Id.
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tional capability in December 1997 when the Russians tested ballistic
missiles from submarines in the Barents Sea.7 All of this information
supports the conclusion that severely limited Russian Navy funds have
been directed towards operations and building as opposed to dealing
with the waste problem.
Though construction of new boats has fallen behind schedule" and
operations for the Northern Fleet have declined as a result of recent
troubles in the Russian economy,59 analysts still believe that submarine
and anti-submarine warfare will continue to have the "highest priority"
in terms of Russia's defense expenditures.' Recent government docu-
ments indicate that Russia is still planning to allocate three and-a-half
percent GDP for defense appropriations in the 1998-2025 period.6' Rus-
sia has sought extensive foreign co-operation in dealing with its nuclear
problems. 2  As early as 1992, it began seeking aid from the United
States; but despite its pleas for assistance in dealing with nuclear
waste, Russia has still commissioned several nuclear vessels in ensuing
years.6 Much of the Russian interest in Arctic co-operation has been in
attempt to obtain environmental aid to deal with self-inflicted prob-
lems.64 As part of a recent Russian-Norwegian bilateral agreement, the
Norwegian government has agreed to provide assistance to clean up the
Andreeva Bay sight, build rail cars for shipping waste and begin a pilot
project to deal with a contaminated submarine tender named the
Lepse.6 The Norwegian parliament has been adamant that it will not
provide financial assistance if the money can be used to support the op-
erations of the Russian Navy.6 However, simply by paying for a portion
of the clean up, the Norwegians are relieving the Russians of the need
to divert resources from their naval operations budget into waste man-
agement. In that sense, co-operation and aid serve as indirect military
subsidies.
The increase in international co-operation has not changed Russian
57. Cold Wars in Cold Waters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23 1998, at 19.
58. Clayton & Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Norman Polmar, The Soviet Navy, PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1998, at 88.
61. See Richard F. Staar, Russia's New Blueprint For National Security, 26
STRATEGIC REV., 31, 34 (1998).
62. Japan Asks U.S., Russia, LAEA for Help in Nuke Accident, MALAY. GEN. NEWS,
Oct. 1, 1999, at Al; Democracy and Investment New Focus of EU Assistance to Russia,
Ukraine and Other Newly Independent States, RAPID, Dec. 22, 1998, at 1.
63. Gabriel Schonfeld, Underwatergate, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 27, 1992, at 20.
64. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 66.
65. Igor Kudrick, Russian-Norwegian Commission on Radwaste Holds First Meeting
in Moscow, (July 31, 1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/
nfl/news/98073>.
66. Thomas Nilsen, Nuclear Waste Cleanup to Start in Russian Arctic, (Jun. 2, 1998)
(visited Nov. 3, 1998) <http'//www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news/980731>.
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behavior or policy on contamination in the Barents.67 The Northern
Fleet continues to generate 5000 tons of solid radioactive waste each
year despite the absence of a comprehensive plan to deal with it.6 In
October 1997, the Russian government announced that it planned to
build a series of floating nuclear power plants, based on naval reactor
designs, to supply Siberian towns with electricity.69 This plan would re-
quire the barges to be towed to Murmansk for servicing and refuelling."
The Norwegian Defense Minister, Jorgen Kosmo, condemned the initia-
tive, stating, "[t]his is not the kind of progress I am hoping for from
Russia.... They should use their first class engineers to make existing
power plants more secure, rather than try to realise a vision of floating
plants.""
As well as creating problems in the Barents region with nuclear
waste, Russia has also been complicit in the proliferation of the problem
in the developing world. In the late 1980s, Russia leased a nuclear at-
tack submarine (SSN) to India, as well as providing technicians and as-
sistance, which served as basis for the development of an indigenous
Indian SSN project.72 This occurred in spite of Russia's own problems
with the disposal of waste from the Northern Fleet 73 and is indicative of
the blind nature of Russian policy on the costs and impacts of nuclear
technology.74
Despite Russia's willingness to accept financial aid to deal with the
Barents problem, it has been less than forthcoming with information
about the situation. It has refused Norwegian experts access to the fuel
depot at Andreeva Bay, fifty kilometers from Norway.5 As one senior
official stated, "[nio nation would want this kind of storage facility so
close to its border. We would like to see it for ourselves, and it concerns
us that we cannot."76 The cloak of secrecy extends not only to foreign,
but also to domestic authorities. In 1996, inspectors from Gosatomnad-
zor, the civil radiation protection agency, were barred from inspecting
the site.77
67. Ethirajan Anbarasan, Nuclear Watch in the Far North; Scandinavian Countries
Concerned Over the Concentration of Russian Nuclear Material on the Kola Peninsula,
UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1, 1998, at 10.
68. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 92.
69. Norway goes Critical over Floating Reactors, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 22.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Rahul Bedi, India Presses Ahead with SSN to Boost Navy's Nuclear Profile,
JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., July 22, 1998, at 26.
73. INVENTORY, supra note 9.
74. Id.
75. Bond, supra note 1, at 22.
76. Id.
77. Deborah MacKenzie, Russian Secrecy Could Sink Nuclear Aid, NEW SCIENTIST,
Apr. 20, 1996, at 4.
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The Russians have effectively ignored the principle of state respon-
sibility and twisted the concept of co-operation. The Northern Fleet
situation demonstrates the contradictory nature of state responsibility
and co-operation and shows how a country may become the beneficiary
of co-operation without having to accept liability or even modify its haz-
ardous behavior."8 As the following sections will demonstrate, interna-
tional environmental law is inadequate to deal with this type of situa-
tion.
III. ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In order to examine the effect of Russian policy regarding nuclear
waste, it is necessary to look at both treaty law and customary interna-
tional law in the area of state responsibility.
A. Treaty Law
Part of the difficulty with imposing any liability on the FSU for con-
tamination in the Barents Sea is that the pollution source is military
based, not civilian. Many treaties specifically exclude military pollution
sources.7 9 The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter" prohibits marine
dumping in Article 4,81 but Article 7 specifically excludes vessels that
are entitled to sovereign immunity under international law.82 Article
10(4) of the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention' also exempts
those vessels with sovereign immunity.' Because military vessels are
subject to such immunity, these articles effectively remove the Barents
78. Id.
79. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Nov.
1982, 21 ILM 1245 [hereinafter Third United Nations]; Contracting Parties to the Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention), 1972: Final Act, 1996 Protocol and Resolutions, 36 ILM 1 [herein-
after London Convention].
80. London Convention, supra note 79.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and Resolutions Adopted by the Special Meeting (as
adopted by the Special Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Convention
1972 on Nov. 7, 1996) LC/SM 1/6, Nov. 14, 1996.
84. Article 10 (4) states:
Application and Enforcement: This protocol shall not apply to those vessels
and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law. How-
ever, each Contracting Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate
measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a
manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Protocol and shall in-
form the Organization accordingly.
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problem from the reach of the conventions, since most of the threat
stems from submarines awaiting de-fuelling.
Some commentators have suggested that once a submarine is de-
commissioned it loses its sovereign immunity and that a de-fuelled
submarine dumped at sea would be subject to London Convention regu-
lation." This argument is based on the definition of "warship" con-
tained under Article 29 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conven-
tion,8 which requires the ship to be under the command of an officer."
But this argument leads one to make fine distinctions in order to iden-
tify the point at which decommissioning takes place; something that is
very difficult to do in the Russian case, where much of the submarine
scuttling occurred in an emergency context.m
Even if the London Convention was applicable to waste that was
dumped into the Barents Sea; the convention would still be of little use
in attempting to impose state responsibility. First, the Convention did
not come into effect until 1976 for the Soviet Union, by which point con-
siderable amounts of dumping had already occurred.89 Second, even
under the 1996 Protocol, there are no specifics on responsibility and li-
ability for dumping.' Article 15 simply states that "the Contracting
Parties undertake to develop procedures regarding liability arising from
the dumping or incineration at sea of wastes."9' This means that coun-
tries in the Barents Region have no recourse against the FSU should
the contamination problem increase, as previously dumped waste be-
gins to work its way into the environment and existing storage sites de-
teriorate.
The one convention that could have effectively imposed state re-
sponsibility on the FSU for contamination in the Barents Sea was the
Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.2 It
applied to both civil and naval vessels 3 and, under Article 2(1), held
that "[tihe operator of a nuclear ship be absolutely liable for any nuclear
damage upon proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear in-
cident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive products or waste
85. See W. Jackson Davis and Jon M. Van Dyke, Dumping of Decommissioned Nu-
clear Submarines at Sea, 14 MARINE POLY 467, 475 (1990).
86. See Third United Nations, supra note 78, at 1275.
87. Id.
88. For example, in April 1970 the Soviets scuttled a November Class SSN off the
coast of Spain following a loss of stability in pitch caused by a fire on board. See
BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 44.
89. See generally London Convention, supra note 79.
90. See id.
91. Id. at art. 15.
92. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AM.
J. IN'L L. 268 (1963), reprinted in PHILLIPPE SANDS, CHERNOBYL: LAW AND
COMMUNICATION 82 (1988).
93. Id. at art. 1(1).
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produced in such a ship."" However, the convention was never signed
by either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and did not enter into force.95 The fact
that none of the countries with naval programs relying on nuclear pro-
pulsion signed the treaty indicates the ultra-hazardous nature of the ac-
tivity.96
Similarly, Russia is not a party to the recently concluded Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management." Even if it were a party, the
agreement would be of little use in imposing responsibility and liability
on the FSU's government. In the preamble, the Convention reaffirms
"the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and ra-
dioactive waste management rests with the States."" However, Article
3(3) of the Convention explicitly exempts "radioactive waste within mili-
tary or defence programmes" unless the Contracting Party decides to
bring it within the Convention.' In the Russian case, it would be diffi-
cult to evaluate the applicability of the Convention since the decommis-
sioning of nuclear submarines is in the process of being transferred
from the Ministry of Defense to the civil Ministry of Atomic Energy.'6
Even presuming the applicability of the Convention, the agreement
is lacking in substance. There are no provisions within the Convention
to impose liability on a state or civil operator for transboundary pollu-
tion caused by the mishandling of spent fuel.'0 ' The Convention does
not even specify exact standards of storage for spent fuel. Rather, it
simply requires that the contracting parties take appropriate steps to
"ensure that.., individuals, society, and environment are adequately
protected against radiological hazards."'02 It then provides some very
94. Id. at art. 2(1).
95. Id. at 83.
96. Id.
97. Signing of Conventions: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Manage-
ment and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <http:
//www.iaea.org/worldaton/updates/jointa.html>.
98. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1436, 1437, preamble (vi) [here-
inafter Spent Fuel Convention].
99. Id. at 1440, art. 3(3). Article 3(3) states:
This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel
or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared
as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the
Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence
programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and
managed within exclusively civilian programmes.
Id.
100. It appears that reallocation of responsibility was made in May 1998. See Clayton
& Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
101. See generally Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98.
102. Id. at art. 4.
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general recommendations on storage." The absence of precise rules
and a provision for liability in the case of an accident results in hard
law becoming soft law due to the absence of content.'0 Further, under
Article 36(3),'0' the Convention allows a contracting party to impose a
veil of secrecy around information dealing with military waste that the
party chooses to bring under the auspices of the Convention.'0 This
makes proving the negligence of a contracting party extremely difficult.
Conventions like the Spent Fuel Convention that rely largely on the
domestic law of contracting states to enforce standards of safety and re-
sponsibility are of limited worth. The Russian Navy dumped spent fuel
despite its own regulations and those of other domestic agencies against
it."° The present Russian Constitution contains provisions under Arti-
cle 42 that hold the state liable for domestic ecological damage."' It
states that "[elveryone has the right to a favourable environment, to re-
liable information about its conditions, and to compensation for any loss
caused by ecological damage to his health or property.""° The constitu-
tion also indicates that the general principles and norms of interna-
tional law are an integral part of Russian law if the Russian Federation
is party to an agreement.1 However, this is of little use in attempting
to enforce state responsibility since the Russians have vigorously
avoided conventions that impose liability and most nuclear law is now
based on the concept of "incentives" as opposed to punitive sanctions."'
Western states, in providing assistance to deal with Russia's mili-
tary waste problem, need to tie the aid to specific hard law provisions
concerning state responsibility. One particular model might be the
103. Id.
104. Katia Boustany, The Development of Nuclear Law or the Art of Legal Evasion, 51
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 39, 44 (1998).
105. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at 1450, art. 36(3). Article 36(3) states:
With respect to information relating to spent fuel or radioactive waste fal-
ling within the scope of this Convention by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article
3, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the exclusive discretion
of the Contracting Party to decide: (i) whether such information is classified
or otherwise controlled to preclude release (ii) whether to provide informa-
tion referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above in the context of the Convention;
and (iii) what conditions of confidentiality are attached to such information
if it is provided in the context of this Convention.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Eaton, supra note 24, at 297.
108. KONST. RF. art. 42, reprinted in S. E. FINER ET. AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS
257 (1995).
109. Id.
110. Id. at art. 15.4.
111. See, e.g., Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1514 reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY: LEGAL
SERIES No. 16, 1 (1994) (This Convention lacks "hard" standards or any liability for
radiological transboundary pollution).
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Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment.1 12 Article 3
gives citizens of contracting parties the right to bring cases before each
other's courts in order to obtain compensation or to question the per-
missibility of an activity.11 3 This would allow individuals in other Bar-
ents countries the right to seek redress within the Russian legal system
for damage done by the nuclear activities of the Northern Fleet.
It may be argued, however, that some treaty law on nuclear mat-
ters works in direct opposition to the concept of state responsibility. For
example, the Russians are party to the Vienna Convention on Early No-
tification of a Nuclear Accident,"' which requires that notification be
given to those states that are affected by a nuclear accident at any "ra-
dioactive waste management facility." The state must also furnish in-
formation on the characteristics of the accident to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)11 6 and to those "States which are physi-
cally affected." 7 Whilst, on the surface, the early notification appears
to be a positive step, it may be argued that by providing notification of a
nuclear accident involving the Northern Fleet, the Russians may claim
that they have fulfilled their procedural obligations and that their li-
ability is limited. In that case, the Convention shifts the onus and may
result in a victim being accused of not acting to prevent damage and
112. Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 1092
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in SANDS, supra note 92, at 144.
113. Id. at 145. Article 3 states:
Any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by envi-
ronmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State shall have the
right to bring before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of
that State the question of the permissibility of such activities, including the
question of measures to prevent damage, and to appeal against the decision
of the Court or the Administrative Authority to the same extent and on the
same terms as a legal entity of the State in which the activities are being
carried out. The provisions of the first paragraph of this Article shall be
equally applicable in the case of proceedings concerning compensation for
damage caused by environmentally harmful activities. The question of
compensation shall not be judged by rules which are less favorable to the in-
jured party than the rules of compensation of the State in which the activi-
ties are being carried out.
Id.
114. Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986,
1439 U.N.T.S. 276, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986).
115. Id. at art. 1.
116. Id. at art. 2(a). The International Atomic Energy Agency is a specialized agency
within the United Nations system, comprised of 129 Member States. The IAEA serves as
the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in
the nuclear field, and as the international inspectorate for the application of nuclear
safeguards and verification measures covering civilian nuclear programs. Profile of the
/AEA (visited Oct. 9, 1999) http://www.iaea.org/worldatonAbout/profile.shtml>.
117. Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, supra note 114,
at art. 2(a).
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therefore being contributorily negligent.""
The recent Norwegian-Russian agreement on waste clean up spe-
cifically insulates the parties involved from any form of liability in case
of an accident during the clean up.' This means that there is abso-
lutely no recourse for liability either against the state, using treaty law,
or on a civil basis against the companies participating in the project.
Treaty law in the areas of spent fuel management and liability for
nuclear accidents are either non-applicable, in the case of the Russian
Navy, or are based on incentive conventions and impose no require-
ments for state responsibility.2 ° Therefore, the Northern Fleet and its
environmental problems are beyond the reach of international treaty
law."' This leaves only customary international law as a means of im-
posing liability should an accident occur."
B. Customary Law
There are many sources of customary international law that could
impose a duty of state responsibility on the Russians for any trans-
boundary pollution that might result from their nuclear activity in the
Barents Sea. 22 In 1961, the United Nations passed Resolution 1629,
which dealt with the issue of nuclear pollution." It stated that "the
fundamental principles of international law impose a responsibility on
all States concerning actions which might have harmful biological con-
sequences for the existing and future generations of peoples of other
states."'2 The most frequently cited source of customary state responsi-
bility is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration ,126 which holds that
states have a "responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
118. This idea of notification limiting liability may also be applied to Ukraine and the
existing situation with Chernobyl. See Justin Mellor, The Negative Effects of Chernobyl
on International Environmental Law: The Creation of The Polluter Gets Paid Principle,
17 WIS. INT'L L. J. 65, 73-74 (1999).
119. Igor Kudrick, Russian-Norwegian Commission on Radwaste holds first meeting
in Moscow, (visited Nov. 8, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nflnews/98073>.
120. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at art. 3.
121. Id.
122. Customary international law, in contrast to treaty law, is a consequence largely
of uniformities in state behavior rather than formal writings resulting from extensive
deliberation and negotiation. BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 107 (3 ed. 1997).
123. See G.A. Res. 1629, Nov. 28, 1961, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS,
Series I, Vol. VIII 241 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1974)
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human En-
vironment, The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
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diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond their national jurisdiction.""7 The Rio Decla-
ration,2 in Principle 2, reaffirms the issue of state responsibility.'" It
also recognizes, under Principle 16, that "the polluter in principle
should bear the cost of pollution.""'0
Besides the Rio Declaration and Stockholm Declaration, there are
also legal precedents such as the Trail Smelter arbitration13 and the
Corfu Channel case," 2 which imply a custom of state responsibility. The
Trail Smelter arbitration established the principle that "no state has the
right to permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause in-
jury... in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
there in.""= The Corfu Channel case held that every state has an "obli-
gation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States."3'
However, the weight of these precedents has been undermined in
recent years by the Sandoz chemical fire'3 and the Chernobyl acci-
dent,13 1 in which liability for damage was not imposed on the polluter
states. 137 In fact, it can be argued that Chernobyl has resulted in a "pol-
luter gets paid principle," in which the polluter becomes the recipient of
aid rather than compensating those states that are harmed.'3 By 1995,
127. Id. at princ. 21.
128. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on En-
vironment and Development, Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), re-
printed in STANLEY P. JOHNSON, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED), 117-121 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declara-
tion].
129. Id. at 118.
130. Id.
131. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) 1931-1941, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 1209 (Hugh K.
Kindred et al., eds, 4" ed., 1987).
132. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA, supra note 131, at 1229.
133. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, at 1212.
134. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 1231.
135. See generally Devereaux F. McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade
Later: The Evolution of State Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659, at 661 (1996). On November 1, 1986, a fire broke out in a
chemical warehouse owned and operated by the Sandoz Corporation in Schweizerhale,
near Basel, Switzerland. Id. The fire spread quickly and because of all the water used
water used by the fire departments to combat the fire, between 10,000 to 15,000 cubic
meters of chemically-infested water seeped into the Rhine River through the Sandoz
sewer system. Id.
136. Id. On April 26, 1986, a reactor exploded at a nuclear power plant located in
Chernobyl, U.S.S.R. Id. As a result of the explosion, a devastating amount of radioactive
emissions were released into the atmosphere, spreading quickly throughout the Soviet
Republic and eventually across the entire face of Europe. Id.
137. See Mellor, supra note 118, 65-66 (1999).
138. Id.
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the Ukraine had secured U.S. $2.3 billion from western nations to close
the Chernobyl plant and begin a full cleanup.9 The recent Norwegian-
Russian agreement on dealing with pollution from the Northern Fleet
provides U.S. $60 million for clean up purposes, but fails to attach any
meaningful provisions surrounding state responsibility.40 This serves
only to reinforce the polluter gets paid principle, rather than one of
state responsibility. It can be argued that the indulgences shown by the
West in the Chernobyl affair have been counterproductive in trying to
get the FSU to accept responsibility for its own nuclear contamina-
tion."" As one commentator has suggested, one must wonder "given the
Russian Federation's persistent delay in adopting legislation on nuclear
third party liability and on safety, whether such indulgence has not in
fact been counterproductive."' At the very least, there is no incentive
to change or modify their current behavior. This reluctance to change
was confirmed at the recent conclusion of the Russian-Norwegian
agreement, when the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov,
clearly indicated that the agreement in no way applies to "those subma-
rines that are patrolling the region, that are on active duty."
A further source of customary law for imposing state responsibility
is found in the ILC's Report of the Working Group of International Li-
ability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law.'" Article 1(a) indicates that draft articles apply to
activities that are not prohibited by international law but involve the
risk of transboundary harm. 4" This would clearly bring Russia's fuel
storage at Andreeva Bay, fifty kilometers from Norway, within its
scope. Article 3 acknowledges that states do not have unlimited free-
dom to carry on activities within their jurisdiction and that they have "a
general obligation to prevent or minimize the risk of causing trans-
boundary harm."'" The draft articles also make states liable to pay
compensation for activities that create harm. 47 However, Article 16
specifically allows data and information on national security to be with-
held by the state.4 This exemption for national security purposes
139. See Jeff Sallot, G-7 Nations to Finance Chernobyl Closing, GLOBE AND MAIL,
June 19, 1995, at A13.
140. Id.
141. Boustany, supra note 104, at 53.
142. Id.
143. Richard Paddock, Russia Signs Accord With Norway to Dismantle Aging Nuclear
Subs, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1998, at A4.
144. Report of the Working Group of International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Draft Articles from
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.10, at 235-244, U.N. Doc. AI51/10 (1996).
145. Id. at art. l(a).
146. Id. at art. 3.
147. Id. at art. 5.
148. Id. at art. 16.
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would allow the FSU to put the Northern Fleet beyond the reach of the
articles. 149 Absent information on the matter, legal causation would be
very difficult to prove.
Even if causation could be proved and state liability imposed by
means of customary law, the present economic state of Russia would
prevent the payment of any form of compensation to states suffering
transboundary harm. Recent studies indicate that Russia has a "virtual
economy," with its economy appearing larger than it actually is.' 5
Businesses frequently operate without paying taxes to the central gov-
ernment, which acts as a type of subsidy to unproductive sectors of the
economy, further worsening the crisis. 5' The Red Cross has gone as far
as warning that starvation is possible if the economy does not improve
in the near future. 52 In Russia's case, the impecuniosity of the polluter
may serve to make liability for its actions meaningless.
Russia's obligations of customary state responsibility come into di-
rect conflict with its existing treaty obligations. Under the Treaty Be-
tween the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms (START I), there are restrictions on the total
number of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and launchers
that Russia may posses in conjunction with other parts of its strategic
deterrent.'" Under Article 1(3) of the Treaty Between the USA and
Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START II),"u the Russians are required, by 2003, to reduce the
number of deployed warheads on SLBMs to 1750.'5 Compliance with
the provisions of START I & II has aggravated the Russian Navy's prob-
lems with radioactive waste by requiring the decommissioning of nu-
clear powered submarines.'57 A European Commission report found
that future projections on the quantity of solid nuclear waste produced
149. The Barents Region has always held great strategic importance for the Russians
and would clearly qualify as a matter within national security. This was recognized by
the Russian minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, in his dealings with his
Norwegian counterpart in 1944 and it remained critical during the cold war. See
GEOFFREY TILL, NORTHERN WATERS 69 (Clive Archer & David Scrivener eds., 1986).
150. Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy, 77 FOREIGN AFF.
53, 54 (1998).
151. Id. at 56-57.
152. Geoffrey York, Red Cross Warns of Starvation in Russia, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct.
1, 1998, at Al.
153. START I, supra note 29, at 591.
154. The total number of deployed ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs and launchers
cannot exceed 1600. See id. at art. II(1)(a).
155. START II, supra note 29, at 697.
156. The aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed a number between 1700
and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each
Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750. See id. at art.
I , I(4)(a).
157. INVENTORY. supra note 9, at 98.
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would depend on the extent of Russian compliance with the START
agreements before 2003. 8
The START agreements put Russia in a legal double bind: the state
can comply with the agreements despite inadequate storage facilities for
waste and thereby violate the principle of state responsibility by creat-
ing potential transboundary pollution,'59 or it can comply with the cus-
tomary principle of international environmental law and suffer the
ramifications of violating the arms control agreements. Russia is essen-
tially caught between two different forms of state responsibility.
The effects of disarmament on the normative values of interna-
tional environmental law are largely ignored. There is little recognition
of Russia's legal double bind. Also, U.S. assistance under the Co-
operative Threat Reduction Program has been limited to providing tools
for scrapping the submarines and the program has focused more on the
safeguarding and storing of fissionable material from Russian nuclear
160
weapons.
State responsibility can not be achieved by means of treaty law, nor
is it realistic to impose state responsibility by way of customary law. As
the next section demonstrates, the weak concept of state responsibility
for transboundary harm has been further diluted by the principle of co-
operation.
IV. CO-OPERATION
Mikhail Gorbachev, in a 1987 speech in Murmansk, spoke of the
need for co-operation amongst Arctic nations and the urgent need to
draw up an "integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural
environment of the North." 6' This proposal echoes the customary prin-
ciple of co-operation as stated in the preamble to the Stockholm Decla-
ration, which holds that "[a] growing class of environmental problems,
because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the
common international realm, will require extensive co-operation.. .by
international organizations in the common interest."" The concept was
further recognized in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which affirmed
that "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Handler, supra note 2, at 19. The program of threat reduction (Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram) has focused on the fear of proliferation of FSU warheads. See Military Implica-
tions of START I and START II: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services,
102nd Cong., Sess. 2, 89 at 90 (1992).
161. Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Oc-
casion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Mur-
mansk, Oct. 1, 1987 (visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.sipri.se/projects
SAC/871001.html>.
162. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 126, at pmbl.
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protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.""1
These principles are given meaning by the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the initiatives of the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region (BEAR). AEPS was established in 1991 by the eight Arc-
tic nations and focuses on co-operation in the areas of indigenous peo-
ple, sustainable development, environmental protection and the role of
science in the Arctic." BEAR was established in Kirkenes, Norway in
1993, and involves co-operation among Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden and Russia." It has a two-tier structure involving a
regional council comprised of county and indigenous representatives
and a national council of government representatives.'6
Both of these regimes recognize the importance of nuclear contami-
nation in the Arctic and are involved in initiatives to assist with clean
up. However, AEPS and BEAR are programmatic in nature, and focus
on the co-ordination of activities as opposed to the "promulgation of
regulatory measures intended to guide the behaviour of various classes
of subject."1 7 The hope with BEAR is that this approach will eventually
lead to a dense web of co-operation in the region.
BEAR's Kirkenes Declaration specifically mentions that the par-
ticipants recognize the importance of international co-operation in the
areas of monitoring radioactivity, enhancing safety at nuclear facilities
and rehabilitating areas polluted as a result of nuclear facilities.'6 It
further emphasizes the need to create "international financial arrange-
ments," as well as encouraging "national financial contributions. 69
Such provisions seem to indicate that increased regional and Arctic co-
operation is in accord with the customary international legal principle
of co-operation.
It can be argued, however, that the initiatives, rather than giving
life to the customary principle of co-operation, simply redefine a Rus-
sian national problem as a regional problem and in doing so undermine
the principle of state responsibility. Co-operation has come to be de-
fined strictly as western funding. As the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
environmental task force indicated, "[tihe funding requirement is great
and the projects planned are under-funded."70 Much of the funding for
initial pilot projects has come through the Nordic Environment Finance
163. Rio Declaration, supra note 128, at princ. 7.
164. Davor Vidas, Polar Marine Environment in Regional Cooperation, in PROTECTING
THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT 110 (Davor Vidas ed. forthcoming).
165. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 217.
166. Id. at 218.
167. Id. at 123.
168. Id. at 220.
169. Id.
170. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, The Environment Task Force, Report to the
Third Ministerial Conference, St. Petersburg, Oct, 9, 1997, at 9.
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Corporation, which is supported by the governments of Nordic coun-
tries.171 Oran Young has pointed out that the major attraction of AEPS
for the Russians is the "prospect of western assistance" with environ-
mental concerns."' When viewed in this light, regional co-operation be-
comes a means to create a conduit of funds and to reduce potential li-
ability. Clearly subregional programmatic initiatives such as the Kola
Smelter Works and the Nuclear Waste Management Program have re-
sulted in the victim paying considerable amounts of the abatement
costs.'73 Some have suggested that this is the "normal procedure" for
environmental projects dealing with transboundary pollution and that
the benefit to countries such as Norway is that it puts the issue on the
agenda.7 However, heightened political awareness of a problem is a
high price to pay for the undermining of an essential principle of inter-
national environmental law.
Co-operation in dealing with the problem of naval waste has been
largely one sided. Though willing to accept aid, the Russians have been
extremely secretive about the problem. Jorgen Kosmo, the Norwegian
defense minister, has repeatedly criticized the lack of Russian co-
operation and the veil of secrecy surrounding the issue.'75 Russia has
denied Norwegian and U.S. officials information regarding the situation
in the Lista fjord and has refused to let Norwegian scientists take sam-
ples in the area.76 Naval officials have also denied access to Russian
civil inspectors, thereby violating Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.
Principle 10 requires, at a national level, that "each individual shall
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment
that is held by public officials."
77
The need to maintain a cloak of secrecy has also resulted in the
abuse of human rights. The Russian state security apparatus arrested
a retired naval captain named Alexandr Nikitin for treason, due to his
involvement in a report detailing the environmental problems of the
Northern Fleet. 1 8 This occurred despite the fact that the report is based
on public sources. 79 The issue of the arrest was raised by Norwegian
Prime Minister Jagland at the Second Council of Europe Summit, but
this failed to produce any change in Russian policy.' It has been ar-
171. BAKLANOV ETAL., supra note 3, at 198.
172. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 66.
173. Olav Schram Stokke, Subregional Cooperation and Protection of the Arctic Ma-
rine Environment: The Barents Sea, in PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT
supra note 164, at 176.
174. Id. at 152.
175. Bond, supra note 1, at 22.
176. Nilsen, supra note 38.
177. Rio Declaration, supra note 128, at princ. 10.
178. Russia's Dangerous Game, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 3.
179. MacKenzie, supra note 77, at 4.
180. Russian Secret and Retroactive Decrees Violate Human Rights (visited Nov. 8,
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gued that this type of action by the Russian government deters Western




Co-operation is hampered further by Russia's diffusion of responsi-
bility for the handling of nuclear waste within its own domestic gov-
ernment bureaucracy. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy is
gradually taking over the management of naval radioactive waste. '82
However, involved at a subordinate level are the Ministry of Defense,
the Committee of Defense Branches of Industry, the Ministry of Trans-
port and the Ministry of Construction. 183 The large number of subordi-
nate agencies does not enhance the ease at which bilateral and regional
co-operation may occur.
Russia becoming a party to the Spent Fuel Convention would not
solve the contradictory nature of the principles of responsibility and co-
operation surrounding nuclear waste. Section (vi) of the preamble reaf-
firms that the state is ultimately responsible for spent fuel, yet in sec-
tion (ix) it affirms the importance of international co-operation in the
matter."M The Convention merely serves as a legal articulation of these
two contradictory principles.
As this section has demonstrated, responsibility can ultimately be
undermined by regional and bilateral co-operation. The initiatives of
countries like Norway and organizations such as BEAR do have the
positive effect of cleaning up the problem, but they do so at the expense
of watering down state responsibility.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The problem of nuclear waste from Russian naval sources is a
pressing problem that requires immediate attention. It is not possible
for other countries to impose state responsibility on the Russians for
their nuclear waste habit through the use of treaty law. The Russians
have vigorously avoided conventions that impose any form of liability
and those conventions that do apply, such as the London Convention,
either exempt ships or are not applicable to the military.1  Any future
1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/press/9710.htm>. Nikitin was acquitted of all charges by
a St. Petersburg City Court on December 29, 1999. However, prosecutors have appealed
the case to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Russian Security Police
have blocked his attempts to obtain a travel passport. See Igor Kudrik, Nikitin Denied
Travelling Abroad (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http'i/www.bellona.no/imaker?id+
15508$sub=l>.
181. Russia's Dangerous Game, supra note 178, at 3.
182. Igor Kudrik, Minatom Takes Over Naval Radwaste (visited Nov. 8, 1998)
<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news80930.htm>.
183. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 10.
184. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at pmbl.
185. See generally Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention or Marine Pollution
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treaty law will have to confront the problem of imposing state responsi-
bility for military based pollution and not simply avoid the matter, as
AEPS has tended to do.1" There should be no differentiation between
civil and military sources of pollution in terms of the issue of state re-
sponsibility.
Reliance on customary principles to produce a duty of state respon-
sibility has become more difficult in light of the Sandoz and Chernobyl
precedents.187 Though much academic discussion is dedicated to this
supposedly expanding concept, the practical realities of imposing re-
sponsibility by customary means are very difficult. In fact, it can be ar-
gued that the international assistance provided to deal with the North-
ern Fleet's waste problem serves as another counter precedent to the
principle of state responsibility.
There is a definite need for regional and international cooperation
in dealing with Russia's problem, but this should not come at the cost of
ignoring the normative values of international environmental law. The
focus of organizations such as BEAR on producing cooperation rather
than a corresponding regulatory scheme has allowed Russia to continue
to produce nuclear waste and further exacerbate the problem. Future
cooperation should bear in mind the complementary principle of state
responsibility. Though it may be unrealistic to expect Russia to make a
substantial contribution to the cost of the clean up, it should at least be
required to cease its harmful behavior. A failure to do so results in
other states providing a military subsidy under the guise of environ-
mental cooperation. States must be forced to confront the environ-
mental consequences of their own militarization.
Future arms control agreements must also take into account the
principles of international environmental law. In the case of the
START agreements, no thought was given to the environmental conse-
quences of disarmament. These concerns were secondary to the issues
surrounding safeguarding and the proliferation of weapons as a result
of arms reduction. Any future treaty law should specifically recognize
the values of the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration, and
frame the agreement within the values of these two conventions. States
should not be forced to choose between the conflicting responsibilities of
arms reduction agreements and international environmental law.
by Dumping Waste and Other Matter, supra note 83.
186. Vidas, supra note 164, at 111. Vidas notes, "[sitrict separation from military se-
curity issues has pervaded this approach [AEPS], and may be seen by some as an impor-
tant precondition for success thus far. On the other hand, it might also be a valid reason
for others to fear a stalemate in particular segments of current Arctic cooperation." Id.
187. McClatchey, supra note 135, at 670.
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WILLIAM J. KOVATCH, JR.*
In 1993, major developments occurred in the field of United States
international trade law. That year saw the conclusion of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the passage by Con-
gress of the NAFTA implementing legislation.' This legislation accom-
plished more than just a free trade zone among Canada, Mexico, and
the United States. The NAFTA implementation legislation radically
altered the distribution of responsibilities between the United States
Customs Service (Customs) and the importing community.
Included in the NAFTA implementation legislation is Chapter VI,
the Customs Modernization Act (Modernization Act).2 This Act impacts
all transactions involving the importation of merchandise into the
United States, not just importations from Canada and Mexico.
The Modernization Act stemmed from the perception that Customs
procedures were inefficient, and unable to manage the expected in-
crease in the flow of international trade. Specifically, Customs' reliance
on paper documentation was viewed as cumbersome. The Moderniza-
tion Act was intended to create a statutory framework to allow elec-
tronic filing of documents.
While the Modernization Act was intended to create a more conven-
ient system for both Customs and importers, the act effectively placed
greater responsibility on importers. Specifically, the Modernization Act
imposed the duty of "reasonable care" on importers in declaring the
proper classification and value of goods imported.3 Further, the Mod-
ernization Act granted Customs a greater ability to ensure compliance
with this duty.
* William Kovach is a graduate of the University of Miami (B.A. 1992) and The American
University (M.A., Comparative Politics, 1994). Mr. Kovatch received both his J.D. and
L.L.M. from Temple University School of Law (J.D. 1998, L.L.M. 2000). Mr. Kovatch spe-
cializes in International Trade and Customs Law.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3301,
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
2. Id. § 631.
3. Id. § 637.
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The concept of reasonable care, as applied to an importer when
making a declaration upon entry of merchandise, is in its infant stages
as the United States Court of International Trade has yet to address
the issue. Nonetheless, guidance on how to interpret reasonable care
can be found from other areas of the law that impose a duty of reason-
ableness. Indeed, the legislative history of the Modernization Act, as
well as subsequent Customs publications, indicate that reasonable care
should be interpreted consistently with the duty of reasonableness as
applied, generally, in other legal fields.
This article analyzes the duty of reasonable care as created by the
Customs Modernization Act. Part I explains the legislative history of
the Act by examining the importation process prior to the Moderniza-
tion Act, and the perceived need for change. Part II discusses the provi-
sions of the Modernization Act. Part III examines how Congress and
Customs have interpreted the duty of reasonable care. Part IV ana-
lyzes the duty of reasonableness in other areas of the law, and con-
cludes that reasonable care under the Modernization Act appears to be
following a consistent path.
The Modernization Act changed the way that importers and Cus-
toms operate. It has imposed greater responsibilities on the importing
community. Like all changes, it has been met with some resistance. By
following Customs' published guidelines and becoming familiar with the
general duty of reasonableness, importers can discern what is required
under this new system, and take steps to ensure compliance with the
duty of reasonable care.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Prior to the Modernization Act, the process of importing merchan-
dise could be very cumbersome and paper intensive." An importer had
to submit a form to Customs summarizing information relevant to the
determination of the classification, value, and origin of the goods.5 In
addition, the importer would have to submit various supporting docu-
ments.6 Customs had the responsibility of determining the proper clas-
sification, value, and origin.7 Customs would not release the goods
without proper documentation.8 Further, the entry forms and documen-
tation had to be filed at the port where the goods entered the United
4. See 137 CONG. REC.. E2118 (extension of remarks June 7, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Crane).
5. See UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES 6-7
(1994) [hereinafter IMPORTING].
6. See Arthur W. Bodek & Steven S. Weiser, Many Responsibilities, Too Little Time
for Importers Doing Customs' Work, J. COMMERCE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 7A.
7. See id.
8. See IMPORTING, supra note 6, at 6.
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States.9
This process strained the resources of Customs. To relieve the
problem, Customs implemented various automation programs during
the 1980s and 1990s that provided for electronic transmission of the re-
quired information.' However, Customs had no statutory authority to
establish these programs. Rather, the statutes continued to require the
submission of paper documents."
A concern arose due to the expectation that international trade
would increase dramatically. During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the United States was involved in the negotiation of two major interna-
tional trade agreements: the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, and NAFTA. Senator Orin Hatch observed that
trade was growing "at an unprecedented rate, one that will accelerate
still faster with the adoption of the North American Free-Trade Agree-
ment.' 2 Government officials strove to ensure Customs had "the ade-
quate capacity to process the expected increase in import and export ac-
tivity," 3 and to "greatly enhance the efficient operation of our import
and export system.""
On June 7, 1991, Representative Philip Crane introduced a bill to
the House of Representatives in the 102nd Congress titled the "Cus-
toms Modernization Act of 1991."' 5 This bill aimed, in part, to eliminate
much of the paperwork involved in importing goods by providing for
electronic processing of customs transactions. 6 The Customs Moderni-
zation Act of 1991, along with a bill titled the "Customs Informed Com-
pliance and Automation Act of 1991",7 was submitted to the House
Ways and Means Committee. No further official action was taken on
either bill.
The push to modernize the Customs Service was renewed in No-
vember 1991, when Representative Sam Gibbons 8 introduced a bill ti-
9. See id.
10. See 137 CONG. REC. E2118 (extension of remarks June 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane); Paul L. Green, New Entry Processing System Remains Controversial Issue Cus-
toms Brokers Express Concern, J. COMMERCE, Mar. 15, 1991, at 4A.
11. See 137 CONG. REC. E2118 (extension of remarks June 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane).
12. 138 CONG. REC. S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
13. 137 CONG. REC. E2118 (extension of remarks June 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane).
14. 138 CONG. REC. S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
15. H.R. 2589, 102d Cong. (1991).
16. See 137 CONG. REC. E2118 (extension of remarks June 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane).
17. H.R. 2512, 102d Cong. (1991).
18. See Tim Shorrock, Compromise Bill to Reform Customs Introduced, J. COMMERCE,
Dec. 2, 1991, at 5A.
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tied the "Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act." 9 Af-
ter being submitted to the Ways and Means Committee, the bill was in-
corporated into another bill, titled the 'Trade Expansion Act of 1992,"20
introduced by Representative Dan Rostenkowski.2' Like the Customs
Modernization Act of 1991, this bill was meant to provide for full elec-
tronic processing of all customs transactions.' Representative Ros-
tenkowski stated that the bill "improves and clarifies Customs enforce-
ment authority with respect to submission of documentation,
recordkeeping and examination procedures and penalty and seizure
provisions."2 The House of Representatives voted to approve the Trade
Expansion Act of 1992 on July 8, 1992.2 The bill was then introduced
to the Senate.' However, no further official action was taken on the
bill.
The Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act did not
completely die at that point in the 102nd Congress. Rather, it was in-
corporated into another bill, entitled the "Revenue Act of 1992".26 The
Revenue Act of 1992 mainly sought to provide tax incentives for the es-
tablishment of enterprise zones.27 This bill passed in both houses of
Congress? but President George Bush vetoed the legislation.
29
In 1993, both houses renewed their push to pass legislation to re-
form Customs. Representative Gibbons' and Senator Hatch3 intro-
duced identical legislation in their respective houses. However, the leg-
islation met with opposition from portions of the customs brokers
community. The National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Associa-
tion of America, which had supported Customs modernization legisla-
tion in 1992, announced its opposition to the Customs Modernization
Act of 1993.3 Specifically, the organization opposed the enactment of
remote filing, fearing that this change would be harmful to the small
customs brokerage firms.' This organization believed that the cost of
19. H.R. 3935, 102d Cong. (1991).
20. H.R. 5100, 102d Cong. (1992).




24. See 138 CONG. REC. 6038 (daily ed. July 8, 1992) (statements of Sen. Hatch).
25. See S. 3249, 102d Cong. (1992).
26. H.R. 11, 102d Cong. (1992).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 102-1034 (1992).
28. See Richard Lawrence, Setting the 1993 Trade Agenda, J. COMMERCE, Jan. 7,
1993, at 6A.
29. See id.
30. See generally H.R. 700, 103d Cong. (1993).
31. See generally S. 106, 103d Cong. (1993).
32. See Tim Shorrock & Peter Tirschwell, Brokers Group Now Opposes Customs Re-
form, J. COMMERCE, Jan. 20, 1993, at 1A.
33. See id.
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modernizing would be prohibitive to small brokerage firms, giving the
advantage to larger firms.' These fears were echoed by the San Fran-
cisco Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association, who also
opposed the legislation. Thus, the support for Customs modernization
began to erode in 1993.
In 1993, however, the Clinton Administration finished negotiating
NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. The President still possessed Fast-
Track authority for trade agreements,' therefore, the President could
submit legislation to implement NAFTA to Congress, and Congress
could only vote to accept or reject the legislation as submitted . Con-
gress could not amend the implementing legislation.'
With this authority, the President included the Customs Moderni-
zation Act of 1993 in NAFTA implementation legislation. Congress ap-
proved the NAFTA legislation, thereby passing Customs reform.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT
The Customs Modernization Act of 1993 significantly altered the
process of merchandise entering the United States.9 In essence, the
Modernization Act reduced the amount of documents an importer had
to file. In return, however, the importing community assumed greater
responsibilities in the process. This exchange of duties between Cus-
toms and the importer has been called a "shared responsibility."'0
The Modernization Act established a program of automation by al-
lowing electronic processing of customs related transactions."' This fea-
ture of the Modernization Act is known as the National Customs Auto-
mation Program,42 and allows importers to file their entry of
merchandise electronically.43 In addition, importers may make their
payments of duties, fees and taxes electronically."
The Modernization Act further eliminated the requirement that all
34. See Peter M. Tirschwell, Brokers and Forwarders Meet Amid Upheaval, J.
COMMERCE, Mar. 8, 1993, at 5A_
35. See Brian Johns, SF Brokers Oppose Couriers'Remote Entry Plans, J. COMMERCE,
Apr. 20, 1993, at 2B.
36. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b) (1998).
37. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1998).
38. Id.
39. Customs Modernization Act of 1993, 19 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1998).
40. H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt. 1 (1993); U.S. See also CONGRESS, HOUSE WAYS AND
MEANS COMMITrEE, OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 52 (1997)
[hereinafter U.S. TRADE STATUTES).
41. See 19 U.S.C. § 1411(a); U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 39, at 54.
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 1411.
43. See id § 1411 (a)(1)(A).
44. See id. § 1411 (a)(1)(E).
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entry documentation be filed in the port of entry. Rather, an importer
may utilize "remote location filing." 5 Under this program, a participat-
ing importer "may file electronically an entry of merchandise with the
Customs Service from a location other than the [port] designated in the
entry of examination."46 This program provides importers with greater
convenience.
While the Modernization Act made it easier for an importer to file
entry documentation, Customs required some assurance of the reliabil-
ity of the information provided. To this end, the Modernization Act im-
posed the duty of "reasonable care" on importers in providing certain
information to Customs.47 Upon entry, an importer must use reason-
able care in supplying an accurate classification, declared valuation and
rate of duty of the merchandise. 8
By imposing this duty, Congress intended to allow Customs to rely
more on the accuracy of information provided by the importers.49 To
this end, the importer must furnish "information sufficient to permit
Customs to fix the final classification and appraisal of the merchan-
dise."50 If an importer fails to engage in reasonable care in providing
this information, Customs is authorized to impose penalties.5
The Modernization Act also established procedures allowing Cus-
toms to verify the precision of the information the importers provide.
The person making a declaration of entry "shall make, keep and render
for examination and inspection records" concerning the import transac-
tion.52 The importer is required to maintain these records for five
53
years.
In addition, the Modernization Act strengthened the ability of Cus-
toms to verify the importer's compliance. Prior to the passage of the
Modernization Act, the Secretary of the Treasury could engage in inves-
tigation and inquiry in order to ascertain the correctness of the entry,
and determine the importer's liability for duties, fees, and taxes.' The
Modernization Act amended the law to allow the Secretary to "examine
or cause to be examined, upon reasonable notice, any record ... which
may be relevant to such investigation or inquiry." ' Any importer who
45. See id. § 1414 (a)(1).
46. Id. Since the passage of the Customs Modernization Act, districts and regions
have been eliminated from Customs' organization. Restructuring resulted in a greater
emphasis on ports. 29 Cust. B. & Dec. 25 (1995).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1).
48. See id. § 1484(a)(1)(B).
49. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 41, at 52.
50. H.R. REP. 103-361, pt. I, at 136 (1993).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1592.
52. Id. § 1508 (a)(3).
53. Id. § 1508 (c); 19 C.F.R. § 143.37 (1998).
54. See id. § 1509 (a).
55. Id. § 1509 (a)(1).
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fails to comply with this request is subject to penalties.56 In addition,
Customs has the power to conduct an audit of the importer."
The Customs Modernization Act of 1993 established a new rela-
tionship between Customs and the importer. The Modernization Act
made it more convenient for the importer to file entry documents.
However, in return, the importing community assumed greater respon-
sibility. Further, the Modernization Act provided Customs with more
tools to ensure that the importers observe their responsibilities.
III. REASONABLE CARE IN CUSTOMS TRANSACTIONS
Customs admits "that a 'black and white' definition of reasonable
care is impossible, inasmuch as the concept of acting with reasonable
care depends on individual circumstances."8 To assist importers, Cus-
toms published a "Reasonable Care Checklist" in 1997.59 The checklist
is actually a series of questions organized into such subjects as Classifi-
cation, Valuation, Origin, Intellectual Property, and Textiles and Ap-
parel.' These questions reveal several themes that run throughout
Customs laws, including: providing for adequate internal procedures to
ensure accurate information is provided to Customs, the use of experts,
and obtaining advance rulings."' Additionally, the legislative history of
the Customs Modernization Act, Customs' publications, and Customs'
rulings serve as a guide in defining the standard of reasonable care.
A. Informed Compliance
As an initial matter, reasonable care involves adequate knowledge
and familiarity with Customs laws and regulations. Customs refers to
this concept as "informed compliance." ' Customs emphasized what this
concept involves by stating:
At the heart of informed compliance is a strategy called reasonable
care, in which the trade community demonstrates its exercise of due
diligence by following the suggestions and protocols promulgated by
the Customs Service in its publications, which include not only the
various informed compliance publications available in Customs Web
site (www.customs.ustreas.gov), but also include Customs rulings, Cus-
56. Id. § 1509 (a)(1)(B).
57. Id. § 1509 (b) (1998).
58. Reasonable Care Checklist, 31 Cust. B. & Dec., available at 1997 CUSBUL




62. See U.S. Customs Service, What Every Member of the Trade Community Should
Know About U.S. Customs Service's Informed Compliance Publications, (visited Feb. 22,
1999) <http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/imp-expl/comply/icpframe.htm>.
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toms Regulations, Court decisions and the law.6
Customs indicates that an importer should "establish reliable pro-
cedures to ensure [the importer] provide[s] a correct tariff classifica-
tion.'
When "using in-house employees such as counsel, a Customs ad-
ministrator, or a corporate controller," the House Report states such
personnel should "have experience and knowledge of customs laws,
regulations and procedures.' The Reasonable Care Checklist further
asks whether an importer has "access to Customs Regulations (Title 19
of the Code of Federal Regulations), the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States,6 and the GPO publication, Customs Bulletin and
Decisions. "67
The first requirement of "reasonable care," then, is sufficient
knowledge of the law. Importers should ensure that the proper legal
materials are available, and are regularly reviewed in order to apply
the law properly to the imported goods.
B. Information About the Goods
As an essential part of reasonable care, an importer should provide
Customs with enough information concerning the goods to be imported.
An importer should furnish "information sufficient to permit Customs
to fix the final classification and appraisal of merchandise," and provide
"sufficient pricing and financial information to permit proper valuation
of merchandise."" Customs has stated that the importer should provide
"a complete and accurate description of [the] merchandise," 9 and its
"proper declared value."70
C. Proper Application of the Law
Knowledge of Customs laws and regulations may not be sufficient
to satisfy the duty of reasonable care. Rather, reasonable care may re-
quire the proper application of the law. Under the Modernization Act,
the importer is responsible for the assessment of the proper classifica-
tion and value of the merchandise. An importer should be prepared to
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. HQ 962007 (Nov. 23, 1998), available at 1998 U.S. CUSTOM HQ
LEXIS 604 at *4.
64. Id. at *12.
65. H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt. I, at 120 (1993).
66. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States was adopted by Congress
through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1998. 19 U.S.C. § 3001 (1998).
67. Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *6.
68. H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt. I, at 136 (1993).
69. Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *6.
70. Id. at *7.
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apply complicated rules regarding classification and valuation.
1. Classification
The first step toward determining the tariff on merchandise im-
ported into the United States is to identify the proper classification of
the merchandise. Classification is the process of applying the proper
heading and subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States ("HTSUS)."' Once the proper heading or subheading is
found, the duty on the merchandise is based on the rate of duty listed
under that heading or subheading.'
One Customs ruling demonstrates the requirement that the im-
porter provide proper classification of each individual item imported.
British Airways requested an advance ruling concerning a proposed
practice of storing spare parts and other supplies in a bonded ware-
house."3 The airline wanted permission to store the parts in the ware-
house without declaring a Customs classification, or by classifying all
items stored in the warehouse under 8803.90.9050 of the HTSUS.74
Upon withdrawal of the parts for consumption, the part would be as-
signed the proper tariff classification.75
Customs denied permission. Specifically, Customs noted the duty
of the importer to "show the value, classification, and rate of duty as
approved by the port director at the time the entry summary is
filed... ."7  Customs asserted that it had no authority to approve of a
request to use subheading 8803.90.9050, unless the goods actually fit
under that subheading." Customs further stated its belief that such a
procedure would run afoul of the duty of reasonable care."
The British Airways ruling demonstrates that an importer cannot
be indifferent to the correct classification of goods. Thus, goods cannot
be imported under a tariff classification merely for the convenience of
the importer if the subheading does not describe those goods. The rul-
ing reflects the proposition that reasonable care requires an importer to
71. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 41, at 5 (discussing the application of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule).
72. See id.
73. Priv. Ltr. Rul. HQ 226319 (July 23, 1996), available in 1996 U.S. CUSTOM HQ
LEXIS 1170, at *2. Goods may be stored in a bonded warehouse duty free for up to five
years. See 19 U.S.C. § 1557 (a) (1998). While goods are stored in a bonded warehouse,
they may also be free from state taxes as well. See Xerox Corp. v. Harris County, 459 U.S.
145, 153-54 (1982).
74. Priv. Ltr. Rul. HQ 226319 (July 23, 1996), available in 1996 U.S. CUSTOM HQ
LEXIS 1170, at *4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *19 (quoting 19 C.F.R. 144.12 (1998)).
77. Id. at *19-20.
78. Id.
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make an effort to provide the proper classification of all goods individu-
ally, not in the aggregate, even when they are to be stored in a bonded
warehouse.
2. Valuation
Once merchandise has been classified, the tariff must be deter-
mined. There are three types of tariffs: specific, ad valorem, or com-
pound."9 A specific tariff is based on a stated value for merchandise
while an ad valorem tariff is based on a percentage value of the mer-
chandise.' Compound tariffs combine specific and ad valorem rates.
Thus, in order to determine an ad valorem tariff, it is essential to de-
termine the proper value of the merchandise. Additionally, all goods
imported into the United States must be valued for the purpose of keep-
ing trade statistics.81
Generally, the Customs value is based on the transaction value,
where feasible.82 This is the price actually paid or payable for the mer-
chandise, plus statutory additions.' The complexity involved in valua-
tion stems, first, from determining whether the transaction value can
be applied, and second, for determining whether an additional amount
should be added to the price actually paid or payable to determine the
transaction value.
a. Related Parties Transactions and Valuation
Where the parties to a transaction are related, the parties may not
apply the transaction value, unless certain conditions are present."
First, the parties must be able to show "that the relationship between
such buyer and seller did not influence the price actually paid or pay-
able."' However, even where the relationship between the parties did
influence the price, the transaction value may still be acceptable under
79. The House Ways and Means Committee defined these terms:
An ad valorem rate of duty is expressed in terms of a percentage to be as-
sessed upon the customs value of the goods in question. A specific rate is ex-
pressed in terms of a stated amount payable on some quantity of the im-
ported goods, such as 17 cents per kilogram. Compound duty rates combine
both ad valorem and specific components (such as 5 percent ad valorem plus
17 cents per kilogram).
U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 41, at 5.
80. Id.
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1484 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (1998).
82. See id. § 1401a (a). Where the transaction value is either inappropriate or can-
not be calculated, the statute provides for other methods that should be used, and the or-
der of preference of those methods.
83. See id. § 1401a (b)(1).
84. See id. § 1401a (b)(2)(A)(iv).
85. Id. § 1401a (b)(2)(B).
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two circumstances. The transaction value will be acceptable when it
"closely approximates... the transaction value of identical merchan-
dise or similar merchandise, in sales to unrelated buyers in the United
States.' Secondly, the transaction value will be acceptable when it
"closely approximates... the deductive value or computed value for
identical merchandise or similar merchandise."8 7
Consequently, related parties must be cautious in a transaction
with each other involving the importation of goods. The related parties
should carefully consider the price paid or payable for the merchandise.
By pricing the merchandise in the same range as identical or similar
goods imported into the United States, related parties can help to en-
sure that the transaction value will be acceptable as the Customs value.
However, the parties should take measures to provide documentation
supporting their price.
b. Assists and Valuation
Even when parties to an import transaction are not related, how-
ever, complexity may exist in determining the proper transaction value.
The price actually paid or payable may require some adjustments under
the statute. One such adjustment is called an assist.88 To arrive at the
transaction value, an importer must add the assist amount to the price
actually paid or payable.89
Assists are defined as certain items which the buyer supplies to the
seller, free of cost or at a reduced charge, used in connection with the
item imported.9 These items include components and parts to the mer-
chandise, 9' items used in the production of the merchandise such as
tools," items consumed in the production of the merchandise,93 and cer-
tain services performed outside of the United States such as engineer-
ing, development and artwork.9 The value of an assist should be added
to the price actually paid or payable, regardless of whether it was pro-
vided to the buyer directly or indirectly.'
The importer should be aware of the fact that the transaction value
includes certain additions to the price actually paid or payable. By un-
86. Id. § 1401a (b)(1)(B)(i).
87. Id. § 1401a (b)(1)(B)(ii).
88. See id. § 1401a (b)(1)(C).
89. See id.
90. See id. § 1401a (h)(1)(A).
91. See id. § 1401a (h)(1)(A)(i).
92. See id. § 1401a (h)(1)(A)(ii).
93. See id. § 1401a (h)(1)(A)(iii).
94. See id. § 1401a (h)(1)(A)(iv).
95. See id. § 1401a (h). See also Generra Sportswear v. United States, 905 F.2d 377
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that an assist exists where buyer agrees to pay for export license
through a buying agent).
1999
DENV. J. INTL L. & POLY
derstanding the application of the law, the importer can ensure to pro-
vide Customs with the proper valuation. An importer who fails to in-
clude the value of such items as an assist will have understated the
value of the merchandise. Therefore, reasonable care in the entry of
merchandise would seem to require an understanding of the concept of
an assist.
D. Use of Experts
Customs recognizes that the law concerning classification and
valuation can be complex. Accordingly, Customs encourages the use of
experts when providing the required information upon entry.9 This is
consistent with the legislative history of the Customs Modernization
Act. The House Ways and Means Committee, for example, expressed
its expectation "that an importer [would] consult with an attorney or an
in-house employee having technical expertise about the particular mer-
chandise in question."9 Similarly, in its Reasonable Care Checklist,
Customs asks whether the importer has "retained an expert to assist
[it] in complying with Customs requirements."9 It is clear that both
Congress and Customs have expressed their view that reasonable care
involves the use of an expert under the appropriate circumstances.
The employment of an expert alone, however, will not satisfy the
importer's duty of reasonable care. Rather, it is evident from the House
Report that when an importer utilizes the services of an expert, that
importer must provide the expert with adequate information to allow
the expert to analyze the transaction." Customs echoes this concern,
encouraging importers to ensure that they have "discussed... importa-
tions in advance" with their experts, and provided "full complete and
accurate information about the import transactions."1" Thus, an im-
porter cannot rely on an expert's advice if that importer has not dis-
closed all of the relevant information concerning the good to be im-
ported to the expert. The failure to provide this information to the
expert, therefore, would constitute a breach of the duty of reasonable
care.
In addition, an importer must take care in choosing its expert.
Customs noted the concern "that unlicensed and unregulated individu-
als are regularly advising importers in the Customs matters-i.e., hold-
96. See generally Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *3 (discussing the use
of experts in complying with Customs requirements).
97. H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt 1, at 120 (1993).
98. Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *10.
99. "In using a qualified expert, the importer is also responsible for providing such
expert with full and complete information sufficient for the expert to make entry or to
provide advice as to how to make an entry." H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt. 1, at 120.
100. Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *11.
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ing themselves out as 'Customs experts' or Customs consultants, in vio-
lation of section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930. "'0' To these concerns,
Customs replies:
A party's selection of an expert, and the expert's qualifications are part
and parcel of the review of all of the facts and circumstances in the
agency's determination whether the party has exercised reasonable
care. In Customs' view, the importer who retains the service of an "ex-
pert" bears some responsibility in ensuring that the party is qualified
to render advice on the Customs matter at issue. In Customs' view, it
is not unreasonable to expect that a party selecting an expert will in-
quire about the Customs experience and credentials of an expert.'02
Consequently, the importer's reliance on the advice of an expert,
and that the expert was mistaken on an issue of Customs law will not
serve as a defense to the importer. Rather, it is clear from Customs'
publications that Customs expects an importer to use reasonable care in
considering the qualifications of the expert before hiring the expert's
services.
E. Advance Rulings
In addition to the use of experts, both Congress"° and Customs"°
encourage importers to avail themselves of the advance ruling proce-
dures in order to ensure proper classification and valuation upon entry.
To this end, an interested partyo may request a ruling from Customs
concerning prospective transactions."6 "Each request for a ruling must
contain a complete statement of all relevant facts relating to the trans-
action."' 7 "The Customs transaction to which the ruling request relates
must be described in sufficient detail to permit the proper application of
relevant Customs and related laws. " " Such information includes a de-
scription of the merchandise,'0 its "chief use," "° "commercial, common,or technical description,""' and its purchase price."' In order to deter-
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 103-361, pt. 1, at 120.
104. See Reasonable Care Checklist, supra note 59, at *12 & *14.
105. "[A] ruling may be requested under this part by any person who, as an importer
or exporter of merchandise, or otherwise has a direct and demonstrable interest in the
question or questions presented in the ruling request, or by the authorized agent of such
person." General Ruling Procedure 19 C.F.R. § 177.1 (c) (1998).
106. 19 C.F.R. § 177.1 (a)(1).
107. Id. § 177.2 (b)(1).
108. Id. § 177.2 (b)(2)(i).
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mine the proper value of the merchandise, the information should in-
clude "the nature of the transaction... the relationship (if any) of the
parties, whether the transaction was at arm's length," and if "the same
or similar merchandise" has been sold in the exporting country."' Addi-
tionally, the party requesting the ruling should provide samples"4 and
related documentation.15
By requesting an advance ruling, the importer can ensure that it
provides proper classification and valuation prior to entry of the goods.
The regulations provide that the rulings are binding between Customs
and the importer:
A ruling letter issued by the Customs Service under the provisions of
this part represents the official position of the Customs Service with
respect to the particular transaction or issue described therein and is
binding on all Customs Service personnel in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section until modified or revoked.1
16
In addition to the ruling being binding on the specific transaction
for which the ruling was requested, the ruling "may be cited as author-
ity in the disposition of transactions involving the same circum-
stances.""7 Indeed, the ruling "may be applied to all entries which are
unliquidated, or other transactions with respect to which the Customs
Service has not taken final action on that date.""8
Federal regulations provide a procedure through which Customs
may evaluate an import transaction, and supply its interpretation of
the proper classification and valuation of the merchandise. Because
Customs is bound by this interpretation, reasonable care would appear
to involve the utilization of the advance ruling procedure when the im-
porter possesses any doubt concerning the proper classification and
valuation of the merchandise to be imported.
IV. REASONABLENESS IN OTHER LEGAL FIELDS
Reasonableness is a concept utilized in many different areas of the
law. It is a concept used to create an objective standard by which to as-
sess a person's conduct. Prior to the enactment of the Modernization
Act, Customs utilized the common law concept of reasonableness in de-
113. Id. § 177.2 (b)(2)(iii).
114. See id. § 177.2 (b)(3).
115. See id. § 177.2 (b)(4).
116. Id. § 177.9 (a). The rulings, however, are only binding between the person re-
questing the ruling, and Customs. "Accordingly, no other person should rely on the ruling
letter or assume that the principles of that ruling will be applied in connection with any
transaction other than the one described in the letter." Id. § 177.9 (c).
117. Id. § 177.9 (a).
118. Id.
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fining when to assess penalties for submitting false documents upon en-
try.
19
Guidance for what is reasonable can be found in such legal areas as
torts, corporations, trusts and estates, and income tax. An examination
of these topics reveals that reasonableness entails an adequate level of
knowledge, proper application of legal principles, remaining up to date
on information, and the use of experts when necessary.
A. Adequate Knowledge
Generally speaking, reasonableness requires a minimum level of
knowledge. In the field of torts, reasonableness is used to create an ob-
jective standard to determine whether negligence has occurred. For ex-
ample, in the case of Vaughan v. Menlove,"' a bail of hay that was piled
too close to the boundary of the defendant's property, caught fire and
burned a barn located on the plaintiff's land. The defendant claimed
that he was unsophisticated and should be held liable solely if he failed
to exercise his best judgment. 2' The defendant's subjective lack of req-
uisite knowledge was not accepted as a defense.1" Chief Judge Tindal
stated that such a standard "would leave so vague a line as to afford no
rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being
infinitely various. " " Only the objective standard of reasonableness has
been accepted by the courts as the proper measure of reasonableness.
1. Minimum Level of Professional Knowledge
Reasonableness requires professionals dealing with complex mat-
ters to possess a minimum level of knowledge.'?' "[A] professional must
use reasonable care to obtain the information needed to exercise his or
her professional judgment." '25 Attorneys, for example, who face allega-
119. In 1984, Customs defined negligence stating, "A violation is determined to be neg-
ligent if it results from an act or acts (of commission or omission) done through... failure
to exercise the degree of reasonable care and competence expected from a person in the
same circumstances." Penalties and Penalties Procedure 49 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1681 (1984)
(to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 171). Customs stated that this definition was meant to im-
pose "a reasonable standard of care," and "not... make the importer a guarantor of the
interpretation or understanding of the information presented." Id. at 1673. This defini-
tion was based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. b (1977), which defines
negligence in supplying false information to others in business transactions. Id.
120. 3 Bingham's New Cases 468, 469-70, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 491 (C.P. 1837).
121. Id. at 472, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492.
122. Id. at 474, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493.
123. Id. at 475, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493.
124. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the
physician must have adequate knowledge in a medical malpractice case).
125. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1992) (applying the
standard to attorney malpractice case).
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tions of malpractice' or disciplinary proceedings" must show that they
possess adequate knowledge of the law. In order to provide quality ser-
vices, a professional must know about the subject with which he or she
is dealing. When a professional does not have the minimum level of
knowledge needed to perform those services, then it is unreasonable
behavior to perform those services.
In corporate law, a member of the Board of Directors has a duty to
be reasonably informed about certain matters involving the corpora-
tion." In the case of Francis v. United Jersey Bank,m9 a director who
was also the largest single shareholder of the corporation inherited her
shares from her husband.'" She was not active in the affairs of the cor-
poration 13' and left most of the corporation's management to her two
sons, who were also directors. 32 However, her sons engaged in "fraudu-
lent conveyances."" The issue in the case was whether a director could
be held personally liable for failing to prevent the misappropriation of
funds by other directors." The court held that a director of a corpora-
tion had a duty to become reasonably informed:
126. See, e.g., Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 635-36 (Miss. 1987) (holding attor-
ney may have committed malpractice where attorney failed to check appropriate statute
of limitations before filing case for clients).
127. See, e.g., Lewis v. State Bar of California, 621 P.2d 258, 258 (Cal. 1981) (disciplin-
ing inexperienced probate attorney for failing to apply complex procedure properly); At-
torney Grievance Comm'n v. Brown, 517 A.2d 1111, 1118-19 (Md. 1986) (disciplining at-
torney in estate planning matter for failing to know the law adequately); State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 75 (Neb. 1975) (holding attorney is re-
quired to ascertain the law to represent client adequately).
128. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding lack of knowledge
is not a defense when directors allow a fellow director to make major decision concerning
the corporation without oversight); Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding bank chairman breached duty by failing to be informed about bank's invest-
ments); Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (holding board of directors
liable for failing to reach an informed decision when voting to approve merger); Brane v.
Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding directors breached their duty
by failing to become informed on the essentials of hedging, and the corporation's financial
condition).
129. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
130. Id. at 818.
131. The court described her participation, stating:
Mrs. Pritchard was not active in the business of Pritchard & Baird and knew
nothing of its corporate affairs. She briefly visited the corporate offices in
Morristown on only one occasion, and she never read or obtained the annual
financial statements. She was unfamiliar with the rudiments of reinsurance
and made no effort to assure that the policies and practices of the corpora-
tion, particularly pertaining to the withdrawal of funds, complied with cus-
tom or relevant law.
Id. at 819.
132. Id. at 818.
133. Id. at 816.
134. Id.
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As a general rule, a director should acquire at least a rudimentary un-
derstanding of the business of the corporation. Accordingly, a director
should become familiar with the fundamentals of the business in which
the corporation is engaged. Because directors are bound to exercise or-
dinary care, they cannot set up as a defense lack of knowledge needed
to exercise the requisite degree of care. If one feels that he has not had
sufficient business experience to qualify him to perform the duties of a
director, he should either acquire the knowledge by inquiry, or refuse
to act."
Consequently, the court found that the director had breached her
duty of care." In order for a corporate director to make a decision, the
director requires facts. The exercise of reasonable care would necessi-
tate enough factual information upon which to make a decision. With-
out such a factual foundation, corporate directors may be held person-
ally liable for their decisions.
The very foundation of reasonableness is the acquisition of knowl-
edge. A person must become familiar with the subject matter in that
person's care. A person who fails to become informed will not be judged
by his or her subjective level of knowledge, but by the minimum level of
knowledge that the person should have obtained.
Therefore, a person involved in international trade, should be fa-
miliar with the importing and exporting business. That person must
understand the factors that affect international trade. Such factors in-
clude Customs laws and regulations as they pertain to imports. A per-
son engaged in an international transaction should also know the basic
facts pertaining to that transaction. Whether an importer complied
with the duty of reasonable care should be assessed objectively by de-
termining the minimum level of knowledge of an international trade
professional.
2. Knowledge of the Law
Under some circumstances, the duty of reasonable care will require
a person to be familiar with the law applicable to that particular behav-
ior. For example, such a requirement can be ascertained from publica-
tions of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, the IRS is authorized to impose penalties of up to twenty
percent when a taxpayer understates his or her income due to negli-
gence or disregard for rules or regulations.'37 The IRS defines negli-
gence as "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the
provisions of the internal revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and rea-
135. Id. at 821-22 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
136. Id. at 826.
137. I.R.C. § 6662 (b)(1) (1998).
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sonable care in the preparation of a tax return."" An example of the
failure to exercise reasonable care is when "[a] taxpayer fails to make a
reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit or
exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent
person to be 'too good to be true' under the circumstances."'39 Other ex-
amples given by the IRS include instances where the taxpayer fails to
comply with specific sections of the Internal Revenue Code."
In order to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit or exclu-
sion, a taxpayer must know the relevant portions of Internal Revenue
Code. Thus, the IRS defines reasonable care to include an adequate
level of knowledge of income tax laws. Failure to file a return based on
such knowledge may result in the assessment of penalties.
For Customs law, the foundation of reasonableness is knowledge of
Customs law and regulations. An importer cannot begin to complete
Customs documents, such as entry forms, without understanding the
rules regarding classification and valuation. Therefore, an importer
should be held to an objective standard of a person who has knowledge
of the relevant Customs laws and regulations.
3. Proper Application of the Law
However, knowledge of the law alone will not satisfy the duty of
reasonable care where a person misapplies the law. For example, n
Hardy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,"" the Tax Court affirmed
the imposition of penalties pursuant to Section 6651(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code where a taxpayer failed to exercise reasonable care in as-
certaining that no tax return was necessary. The taxpayer filed no tax
returns between 1977 and 1982, and claimed he was exempt as a reli-
gious organization, but failed to produce any documentation to support
that claim. 4 2 Indeed, it was shown that during these years, the tax-
payer earned income from selling real estate and working with a con-
sulting firm. In arguing against penalties, the taxpayer claimed that
he briefly spoke to an accountant who told him that churches were tax
138. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3 (b)(1) (1998).
139. Id. § 1.6662-3 (b)(1)(ii)).
140. These are: (1) a failure to comply with I.R.C. § 6222 (a), (b) (1998), "which re-
quires that a partner treat a partnership items on its return in a manner that is consis-
tent with the treatment of such item on the partnership return (or notify the Secretary of
the inconsistency)," 26 C.F.R. § 16662-3 (b)(1)(iii) (1998), and (2) failure to comply with 26
C.F.R. § 1662-3 (b)(iv) (1998), "which requires that an S corporation shareholder threat
subchapter S items on its return in a manner consistent with the treatment of such items
on the corporation's return (or notify the Secretary of the inconsistency)."
141. Hardy v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1110 (1990), citing Shomaker v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C. 192, 202 (1962).
142. Hardy, 60 T.C.M. at 1112-13.
143. Id. at 1111-12.
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exempt.'" The taxpayer made further references to IRS publications
claiming they had led him to believe that he qualified for tax exempt
status as an individual.1
45
The Tax Court found that while the taxpayer received advice show-
ing that religious organizations were tax exempt, he received no advice
that he, individually, could claim tax exempt status.'" Specifically, the
Tax Court found that the IRS publications could not be reasonably in-
terpreted as allowing an individual, whose primary activities were sell-
ing real estate and working for a consulting firm, to claim tax exempt
status.
147
Hardy shows that while a taxpayer may be aware of the law, the
taxpayer may fail to exercise reasonable care in applying the law. The
taxpayer's belief was based on a misreading of the IRS publications dis-
cussing the tax law, and a misunderstanding of a conversation with an
accountant. Therefore, simple knowledge of the law was not sufficient
to qualify as reasonable care.
With respect to Customs law, it would appear to be insufficient for
an importer to read various publications, such as the Customs Bulletin
or the Federal Register, if the importer is ignorant on how those publi-
cations actually impact his or her business. An abstract knowledge of
rules and regulations would not be enough where the importer does not
understand the practical application of those rules to his or her busi-
ness.
4. Adequacy of Information
Knowledge of the law, and knowledge of the proper application of
the law constitute only part of the exercise of reasonable care. In order
to apply the law properly, there must be a proper factual basis. Thus,
reasonable care would require enough factual information to ascertain
if the law has been applied properly.
An examination of the publications of the Internal Revenue Service
shows that the IRS interprets reasonable care to include having enough
factual information.1 4 9 With respect to filing income tax returns, the
IRS considers it negligent to "fail to keep proper books and records or to
substantiate items properly.""s Thus, in order to avoid penalties, tax-
payers must have enough information to support claims made in their




148. See generally id.
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income tax returns. Taxpayers must maintain records that contain
enough information to show that they are entitled to the deduction,
credit or exclusion claimed.
An adequate system of record-keeping appears to be a requirement
for the exercise of reasonable care as defined by the IRS in implement-
ing other aspects of the Internal Revenue Code as well. For example,
when a person (the payor) pays interest or dividends to another person
(the payee), under certain circumstances, the payor will be required to
withhold thirty-one percent of the payment as tax.151 One such circum-
stance is where the Secretary of the Treasury informs the payor that
the payee has furnished the wrong taxpayer identification number.'52
In that circumstance, the IRS requires the payor to use reasonable care
in identifying all accounts that the payee has with the payor, in order to
ensure compliance with the withholding requirement.'5 In order to sat-
isfy the duty of reasonable care, the payor must have a computer or
other record-keeping system that it can search in order to identify the
payee's accounts using the information provided by the IRS."M
The IRS, consistently defines reasonable care as requiring a system
of record keeping. Those who are under the duty of reasonable care
must have enough information to comply with IRS regulations. An
adequate level of factual information is assured when sufficient records
are kept.
The view of the IRS is consistent with the new requirements of the
Modernization Act. Under the Modernization Act, importers are re-
quired to maintain records pertaining to imports for five years.'" These
records are open for inspection by Customs officials." The records
would assist importers in proving claims made on entry documents,
such as the value of the merchandise imported. Therefore, much like
reasonable care would entail maintaining records to substantiate claims
on income tax returns, Customs law would require reasonable care in
the keeping of records in accordance with the requirements of the Mod-
ernization Act.
5. Changes in Information
One problem that arises in determining whether a person has exer-
cised reasonable care is the situation where the information upon which
the person relied has changed. Such was the case in Sicari v. Commis-
151. I.R.C. § 3406(a)(1) (1998).
152. Id. § 3406(a)(1)(B).
153. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3406(d)-5 (c)(3)(i) (1998).
154. See id. § 31.3406(d)-5 (c)(3)(ii)(B).
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1508 (c) (1998); 19 C.F.R. § 143.37 (a) (1998).
156. See id. § 1508 (a)(3) (1998).
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sioner of Internal Revenue."7 When the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has determined that a deficiency in income tax exists, a tax-
payer must file a petition for redetermination within ninety days of the
mailing of the notice of deficiency.'58 When the IRS has failed to exer-
cise reasonable care in determining the last known address of the tax-
payer, however, the ninety day period does not begin to run.159
In 1991, the taxpayers in Sicari had been assigned a new address
designation by the United States Post Office.'6 The taxpayers used this
address in their correspondence with the IRS when filing for extensions
in 1991 and 1992, and in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding in
1992.61 Indeed, the Special Procedures Unit of the IRS had notice of
the new address, and used it when corresponding with the taxpayers in
June 1992.82 However, an agent from the Quality Measurement Staff
of the IRS was responsible for sending the notice of deficiency to the
taxpayers, and sent the notice to the old address designation in October
1992.' 6
The court held that it was unreasonable for the Commissioner to
rely on the old address.' Specifically, the court stated, "[niormally,
reasonable diligence will require the Service to consult its own files, at
least those maintained in computer databases in the same district initi-
ating the disputed notices."1'
The Sicari case raises some concern for those importers who main-
tain separate units, or different offices, within its business organization.
Reasonable care would seem to require that these units create some
mechanism to share and update information. Where one unit of a busi-
ness organization fails to provide new information to other units within
the same organization, Customs may find a violation of the duty of rea-
sonable care, and choose to impose penalties if the outdated information
is used upon entry of goods.
157. See Sicari v. Commissioner, 136 P.3d 925 (2d Cir. 1998).
158. 26 U.S.C. § 6213 (a) (1994).
159. Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1985).
160. Sicari, 136 F.3d at 926. The old address was "Route 208." The new address be-
came "Route 208, Box 1370." The designation was changed to assist in implementing a
new 911 emergency system. Id.
161. Id. at 927.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 929.
165. Id. (citing United States v. Bell, 183 B.R. 650, 653 (S.D. Fla. 1995)); Russel J. Ku-
tell, Note, The Current Trend in Interpreting the Internal Revenue Service's Standard of
Reasonable Diligence in Mailing Notices of Deficiency to a Taxpayer's "Last Known Ad-
dress" and the Due Process Implications: Ward v. Commissioner, 44 TAX LAW. 625, 630
(1991).
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B. Use of Experts
Complicated matters, at times, require the employment of those
who possess specialized knowledge or expertise. Thus, reasonableness
in those situations may entail the use of an expert.
In California, an attorney who admittedly "had no knowledge of tax
matters"'" drafted a trust instrument for his clients without consulting
a tax law specialist. The IRS assessed a penalty on the clients for a tax
deficiency. '  The clients sued the attorney for malpractice. Because
the attorney recognized his own deficiency, the court held that he could
be held liable for failing to consult with a tax specialist in this matter.
'6
Other states have imposed discipline on attorneys for failing to con-
sult with another attorney with more expertise when involved in a com-
plicated matter.1 6 ' Thus, reasonableness requires one to recognize his or
her own inability to address complex matters. Under those circum-
stances, the engagement of a professional with greater expertise would
seem necessary.
Merely committing a complicated matter to the care of an expert,
however, will not always satisfy the duty of reasonableness. In the case
of In re Goldstick,7 ° trust property was managed by two trustees. One
trustee had no knowledge of real estate investment, while the second
possessed expertise in this area. The first trustee delegated power to
the more knowledgeable trustee over real estate matters. The second
trustee, however, engaged in self-dealing.' 7 ' That the first trustee did
not engage in self-dealing did not necessarily relieve that trustee of li-
ability:
A trustee may delegate the exercise of trust power to a fellow trustee,
especially where the latter has an expertise in some particular aspect
of the trust management... but that does not give a trustee the right
to abdicate his function to be personally "active in the administration
of the trust" with regard to those functions which call for consistency
with usual prudent business practice.'
7 2
Thus, the first trustee had to show that his inactivity did not
166. Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). This case also
involved an issue of the statute of limitations in attorney malpractice cases. The rule
Home established concerning the statute of limitations was overruled by the California
Supreme Court in ITT Small Business Finance Corp. v. Niles, 885 P.2d 965, 971 (Cal.
1994).
167. Horne, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
168. Id. at 720.
169. See, e.g., Lewis, 621 P.2d at 258; Brown, 517 A.2d at 1118-19.
170. In re Goldstick, 177 A..2d 225, 581 N.Y.S.2d 165 (NY Sup. Ct.), modified on other
grounds, 183 A..2d 684 (NY. App. Div. 1992).
171. Id. at 238, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
172. Id.
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amount to negligence, "even where he had no direct knowledge of
wrongdoing."'7 3
Similarly, while the board of directors of a corporation may utilize
information and opinions of those with greater expertise when the
board makes its decisions, reliance on such experts must be reasonable.
In Smith v. Van Gorkamy 4 the board of directors approved a merger re-
lying, in part, on a report generated by an officer of the corporation.
Under Delaware law, the board of directors was "fully protected in rely-
ing in good faith on reports made by officers."'75 However, the officer in
this case was uninformed on the matter that he was presenting to the
board."6 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors "were
duty bound to make reasonable inquiry" of the officer presenting the in-
formation.' The board was held liable for failing to observe this duty."'8
Reliance on an expert must itself be reasonable. Reasonableness
would appear to include the supervision over the work of the expert, as
well as taking care to select the expert properly. The expert should pos-
sess some degree of knowledge on the matter for which the expert has
been employed. Therefore, failing to ensure that the expert possesses
this knowledge would seem to be a breach of the duty of reasonableness.
These cases can provide guidance for determining when an im-
porter has exercised reasonable care in selecting and relying upon the
advice of an expert. First, as discussed previously, the importer must
be able to recognize that he or she is in need of an expert. Such a situa-
tion arises when the transaction involves a complex subject. Second,
the importer would appear to be required to take care to examine the
qualifications of the experts carefully. Third, the importer should take
care to see that the expert performs his or her function in a proper
manner.
CONCLUSION
From its initial publications, it appears as though Customs inter-
prets the duty of reasonable care in a manner consistent with reason-
ableness as applied in other legal fields. The very foundation of reason-
ableness is the possession of an adequate level of knowledge. Just as
doctors and lawyers must possess a basic knowledge of the fundamen-
tals of their trade, importers must be aware of and familiar with the
laws and regulations concerning international trade. In addition, im-
porters should take care to see that these laws and regulations are
173. Id. at 238-39, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 173 (citations omitted).
174. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del. 1985).
175. Id. at 874-75 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 875.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 881.
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properly applied.
Like many professions, importers encounter complex laws and
transactions. When an importer is confronted with a situation beyond
his or her competence, reasonableness would seem to require that the
importer recognize his or her limits. In such a situation, the importer
should consult with one who possesses greater expertise and experi-
ence.
Reliance on an expert, however, will not automatically relieve an
importer of the duty of reasonable care. Rather, it would appear as
though the choice of expert must itself be reasonable.
The importer has an option available prior to the importation of
goods to assist in complying with the duty of reasonable care. These are
the procedures through which an importer can obtain an advance ruling
from Customs. By providing Customs with all relevant information
concerning the transaction prior to importation, the importer can re-
ceive a binding ruling on the proper classification and valuation of
goods. An importer who possesses any doubts about the proposed
transaction should utilize this procedure and ensure that the merchan-
dise will be properly classified and valued upon entry.
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ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS TO
GUARANTEE HONG KONG'S HUMAN




On July 1, 1997 the British handed Hong Kong back to the Chi-
nese. As I walked through Sheung Wan, Hong Kong on that day, I
wondered what impact the transition would have on Hong Kong resi-
dents. Had they heard of China's promises?' Were they concerned that
China would not uphold these promises? 2 I witnessed the fanfare and
festivities of the transition. I spoke with many people who had different
views on its effects. One taxi driver expressed his fear that over the
next fifty years, based on China's governmental influence, he would
have to live in fear of every word he spoke and the possibility that he
could be snatched up and detained as a prisoner. Contrarily, a member
of the legal community shrugged his shoulders and expressed passing
interest in the effects of the transition. What are the reasons for the
public's uncertainty? My curiosity was provoked. Were there any sort
of legal mechanisms to guarantee that the promises made in the inter-
national agreements pertinent to the transition, the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law, would be kept?
China committed itself to the Joint Declaration: Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration)3 and the Basic Law of the
University of Denver, College of Law, J.D. 1993; Wellesley College, B.A. 1993. I
would like to thank Garret Chan, Julian Ha, Robert Huss, Maria Mitchell, Thomas
Mitchell, Celia Taylor, and Richard Wong for their support and guidance.
1. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
2. See The Committee on International Human Rights, Preserving the Rule of Law
in Hong Kong After July 1, 1997. A Report of a Mission of Inquiry, RECORD, May, 1996, at
357, 359 [hereinafter RECORD]. "The advent of Chinese rule has raised concern beyond
Hong Kong's borders about future rights of people to be free of government arbitrariness
in Hong Kong; and that concern, in turn, focuses sharply on preservation and modification
of its system of justice, the rule of law and independence of its judges and lawyers." Id.
3. Joint Declaration: Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, P.R.C.-
U.K., 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. See infra notes 58-73 and accompa-
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China (Basic Law)4 to appease the rest of the world and to provide as-
surance for a smooth transition for Hong Kong back to Chinese rule.5
Pursuant to these agreements, China promised that Hong Kong will be
basically autonomous and that the rule of law in Hong Kong will re-
main virtually unchanged for fifty years after the transition.6 This
would mean that those laws in place prior to the transition would re-
main applicable for fifty years after the transition, thereby assuring
certain protections to the citizens of Hong Kong.7 It is difficult to pre-
dict, however, whether China will actually uphold these agreements.
8
Some argue that, at the very least, China has dubious intentions
towards upholding these legal agreements. China's scarred reputation
of not upholding agreements strengthens this argument.9 Furthermore,
nying text.
4. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People's
Republic of China (April 4, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. See infra notes 74-87 and ac-
companying text.
5. See generally RECORD, supra note 2. Basic Law, supra note 4, at preamble; Mi-
chael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM, J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 304 (1996) (stating
that the intent was to provide a "seamless transition where ... people would wake up on
July 1, 1997 and the only visible change would be the flag..."). But see id. at 304 (stating
that "[d]reams of a smooth transition have evaporated."). The reasons for the evaporation
started with Tiananmen massacre and continued into the 1992 proposals by Chris Patten
for democratic reform. Id.
6. See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 1. See also Basic Law, supra note 4, at
ch. I, art. 8; Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law
Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Laws in
China, 5 DuKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 294 (1995).
7. See generally Robert C. Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LOY. L.A. IN'TL & COMP.
L.J. 431 (1997) (discussing the difference between the Chinese legal system and the Hong
Kong rule of law).
8. The implication is that if China does not uphold these agreements, the human
rights of the Hong Kong people are at stake. Interview with Gladys Li, Former Chairman
of the Hong Kong Bar Association, in Hong Kong, SAR (July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Gladys
Li Interview]; Angela Young, Hong Kong: CD Products Market, Industry Sector Analysis,
August 20, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 9850761 (indicating that although it
is impossible to predict the future of Hong Kong, there are reasons for optimism to believe
that China will uphold its agreements). See generally Berring, supra note 7 (discussing
how superficially the agreement seems to clearly indicate China's positive intention but at
a closer look, Berring contends that not only will the current system probably not survive,
it won't survive).
9. See Donna Deese Skeen, Can Capitalism Survive Under Communist Rule? The
Effect of Hong Kong's Reversion to the People's Republic of China in 1997, 29 INT'L LAW
175, 178-79 (1995). The Joint Declaration for Hong Kong is compared to China's agree-
ment with Tibet. The Tibet agreement guaranteed regional autonomy for Tibet as a
method to securing the "peaceful liberation of Tibet." Despite this agreement, Tibet has,
instead, been subject to Chinese rule and has been severely oppressed. Similarly, China
violated its agreement to import wheat from the United States. See Patricia Homan
Palumbo, Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of
Hong Kong: What Do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997? 6 CONN. J.
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the legal policies of China do not favor ensuring international agree-
ments;1 0 and China's human rights' tradition towards its citizens is re-
plete with violations." Other people argue that China has already vio-
lated parts of these agreements. 12 Possible violations range from
abolishment of the Legislative Council' 3 to cancellation of a series of
laws that ensured civil and political rights in Hong Kong.
14
In light of this, the international community will likely act to en-
sure China's compliance. What mechanisms are available to do this? If
such mechanisms fail and China violates the terms of the agreements,
are there mechanisms for punishment?
INT'L. L. 667, 687, 695 (1991).
10. See Paul Vitrano, Hong Kong 1997: Can the People's Republic of China Be Com-
pelled to Abide by the Joint Declaration, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 445, 452
(1995). "[The PRC adheres to the international legal doctrine of rebus sic stantibus... if a
'fundamental change of circumstances' occurs, a state can unilaterally terminate its obli-
gations under an agreement. The PRC's 1956 suspension of part of the Sin-Soviet Agree-
ment on Cultural Cooperation is an example of China's application of rebus sic stantibus."
Id. See also Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 309, 318-20, 323 (1992) (discussing the Chinese concept of unequal
treaties and the Five Principals of Peaceful Co-existence and how China may view the
treaties signed between Great Britain and the Quing Dynasty from the 1800s as unequal
and therefore invalid).
11. See Davis, supra note 5, at 317-18 (indicating that "those searching for evidence
of respect for human rights, especially civil and political rights, in mainland Chinese offi-
cial practices search in vain."). In China human rights are given second rate status to the
duties to which they are associated. If the duties are fulfilled by the citizens, then the
state grants the human rights as it deems necessary and appropriate. Id. Accord Alice H.
Amsden et al., China, The United States and Human Rights, DISSENT, Spring 1997, at 7;
Robin Reichman-Coad, Human Rights Violations in China: A United States Response, 15
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163 (1994) (discussing the human rights abuses in China
and what the United States' response should be). See generally Kelly M. Brown, Execu-
tion for Profit? A Constitutional Analysis of China's Practice of Harvesting Executed Pris-
oner's Organs, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1029 (1996) (providing a brief discussion of the
policies of China and their impact on human rights). See also U.S. Department of State,
China Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) < http:
//www.usis.usemb.se/human/humanl998/china.html>.
12. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. See also infra, notes 45-48 and accompanying
text. See generally U.S. Department of State, Hong Kong Report on Human Rights Prac-
tice for 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/humanl998/
hongkong.html>. Originally, Hong Kong law maintained a provision that allowed for the
government to refuse to register an organization that was "incompatible with peace, wel-
fare, or good order." However, the freedom of peaceful assembly and association in Hong
Kong was "practiced without significant interference". So in 1992, the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment repealed the provision. This allowed for demonstrations without government
interference. However, the PRC has negated that action by including language similar to
the repealed provision in the Basic Law.
13. See infra notes 90-100, and accompanying text.
14. Christopher Patten, Governor of Hong Kong, Our Next Five Years: The Agenda
for Hong Kong, Address at the Opening of the 1992-93 Session of the Legislative Council
(Oct. 7, 1992).
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Many international actors might have a role to play.15 However,
the focus of this piece is the United Nations and its ability to encourage
China to fulfill its human rights promises through the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 16 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).17 These
covenants are made applicable to Hong Kong through provisions of the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
This article is structured as follows: Part II introduces the general
history of relations between China and Great Britain including a brief
synopsis of the interplay of relevant agreements. Part III provides a
more detailed analysis of the agreements pertinent to the Hong Kong
transition; the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Part IV identifies
the need for this analysis. Part V analyzes the relevant U.N. covenants.
II. HISTORY OF CHINA AND GREAT BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP
The history of relations between the United Kingdom and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong is critical to an under-
standing of the potential problems the world community faces in trying
to make China comply with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.' 8
At the beginning of the 19th century, Hong Kong was a small par-
cel of rocky land.19 It was undeveloped
20 and had a small population. 2'
15. In 1995, the Executive Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York sent a mission of inquiry to Hong Kong. The purpose of this mission was to answer
questions regarding the July 1, 1997 transfer. Beyond obtaining answers for their ques-
tions, the members of the mission determined that the "rule of law in Hong Kong will re-
quire careful world-wide monitoring," RECORD, supra note 2, at 358-59, 387. Resulting
from their conclusions, the mission developed a "proposal for an on-going relationship be-
tween the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Hong Kong Legal Com-
munity. Id at 388. Through joint conferences and other reporting methods, the joint
Hong Kong and New York committee would channel important information regarding the
status of the law in Hong Kong. See id. at 388-89; see also Robert J. Guttman, Etienne
Reuter: Head of the European Commission Delegation to Hong Kong, EUROPE, July 17,
1997, at 22 (discussing the European Commissions role in securing Hong Kong post tran-
sition). Other possible international actors are Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch: Asia Watch, and other non-governmental organizations.
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), art 6, §
1 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See infra, notes 124-167 and accompanying text.
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967) [hereinafter ICESCR]. See infra, notes 201-232 and accompanying text.
18. See Davis, supra note 5, at 303.
19. See Keith M. Harris, The Hong Kong Accord as a Model For Dealing With Other
Disputed Territories, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 349 (1986); Kristen Choo, Zero
Hour for Hong Kong, 83 ABA J. 70, 70 (1997).
20. Harris, supra note 19, at 349. But see Choo, supra note 19, at 71 (stating that
Hong Kong is the "planet's eighth-largest trading economy").
21. See John H. Henderson, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's Repub-
lic of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
503, 506 n.4 (1995) (stating that Hong Kong's population in 1851 was about 30,000);
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Trading conflicts between western nations and China provoked the
Opium War of 1840, the First Anglo-Chinese War.22 China's attempt to
halt the British import of opium into China, further aggravated the con-
flicts between China and Great Britain.23 After much wrangling, the
Convention in the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 expanded the rights of the
British to provide imports to China, compensated the British for the de-
stroyed opium, and established Great Britain's possession of Hong Kong
"in perpetuity."24 On June 26, 1843, Hong Kong formally came into
British possession following the conclusion of the Opium War. 25
The Second Anglo Chinese War occurred in 1860 and Great Britain
acquired the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters
Island.26 At the end of that century, China, greatly weakened by the
Sino-Japanese War, was forced to make additional concessions to Great
Britain.27 Great Britain leased the remainder of Kowloon from China in
1898 with a ninety-nine year lease of the "New Territories" designated
to end on July 1, 1997.28
Through the years, China has continued to nurse the open wound
created by Britain's acquisition of the Hong Kong territories. 29 None-
theless, since 1898 Hong Kong has been a British colony and the laws
and policies of the United Kingdom have governed Hong Kong.30 Laws
Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 301 n.80 (providing statistics that "Hong Kong covers ap-
proximately 412 square miles... with a population in 1985 of 5.4 million"); Choo, supra
note 19, at 71 (indicating that Hong Kong's population in 1997 was 6.3 million).
22. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77 (discussing the politics behind Britain's opium
trade and Britain's acquisition of Hong Kong).
23. Id.
24. Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 30 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP. 389, 93
CONSOL. T.S. 465; Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77 (quoting Jan Morris, Hong Kong, at 18).
25. See Elizabeth G. Bynum, Hong and China: The 1997 Transition, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 299 (1996); RECORD, supra note 2, at 357, 362; Henderson, supra note
21, at 349-350
26. Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, China- Gr. Brit., 50 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP.
10, 123 CONSOL. T.S. 71; See Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77.
27. See Henderson, supra note 21, at 509.
28. Convention of Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898,
China-Gr. Brit., 90 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP. 17, 186 CONSOL. T.S. 310. See also Vitrano, supra
note 10, at 446.
29. See Henderson, supra note 21, at 510-11 (discussing China's strong desire to re-
unite all of China and China's belief that Hong Kong was acquired by Britain through
.unequal treaties"); Kieron Flynn, HK Says Nothing Changed After 100 Days, But Doubt-
ers Remain, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL
13409085; Berring, supra note 7, at 433.
30. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 357, 362. Consequently, Hong Kong's legal system
is identical to the English legal system. Hong Kong's body of law, prior to the reversion,
included statutory provisions and common law doctrines, for example, letter patent, royal
instructions, & colonial regulations. See Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 296-97. After
July 1, 1997, the effect of the enactment of laws in Parliament on Hong Kong became ob-
solete. See Denis G. Brock, Hong Kong, in ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 39
(Charles Platte & William G. Horton, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Platto & Horton].
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enacted in Parliament in England either directly affected Hong Kong
law or indirectly affected Hong Kong law via statutory implementa-
tion.
31
In 1949, communism was established in China with the success of
the Chinese Communist Revolution.3 2 China established a civil law
system, but this system was unable to replace the traditional beliefs of
Confucianism.33 A communist Shanghai became less attractive as the
primary trade port into China.34 Instead, Hong Kong rapidly became
the center of trade with China. 35 The 1950s were significant years for
Hong Kong as it increased its importance in the international commu-
nity. 36
Hong Kong's vulnerability to the influences of China became obvi-
ous when, as a result of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo-
lution in China, Hong Kong experienced societal upheavals. 37 Since
Hong Kong had become an integral part of international trade and the
31. Since the Hong Kong legal system was derived from the British legal system, the
Letters Patent are the core constitutional documents. Within the Letters Patent are the
Royal Instructions to the Governor and the power for the legislature. Hong Kong law is
constituted by [1)] "statutes made by the Governor by and with the consent of the Legisla-
ture, 2) the common law of England and rules of equity except insofar as they are oppres-
sive; 3) Act of Parliament specifically incorporated by reference in local legislation; 4) Act
of Parliament which either expressly or by necessary implication applies to Hong Kong;
and 5) Orders-in-Council made by the Queen on the advice of her Privy Council." Neoh,
supra note 10, at 339. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 306 (discussing British Colonial
Rule, which was characterized by authoritarian colonialism with acknowledged strength
in economic success, laisez faire policies, a free press, the rule of law, etc.); Hong Kong:
New IP Regime In Hong Kong, BUS. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10293455 (discussing whether intellectual property regulations will continue after the
transition); Ann Jordan, Lost in the Translation: Two Legal Cultures, The Common Law
Judiciary and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 30
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 335, 337 (1997) (stating that this common law system applied by
Britain "sets out objective procedures that, under a rule of law system, are applied equally
to everyone... [and] has been accepted by the majority of Hong Kong people...").
32. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 363; see also Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289
(indicating that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 and it has
been a "unitary socialist legal system with a single legal district").
33. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 338. Confucianism is based on complicated rituals
and codes of conduct based on etiquette. Id.
34. See Elizabeth Yee, Hong Kong and China in 1997: An Examination of Possible
Legal and Economic Implications for United States Business, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
595, 595-96 (1996).
35. See generally id. Currently, Hong Kong "is an important international financial
center, second only to Tokyo in the Pacific region... Hong Kong is among the top twelve
traders in the world. Its Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in 1989 was H.K. $85, 325
(U.S. $11,000).. ." Neoh, supra note 10, at 310.
36. See Yee, supra note 34, at 595 (discussing Hong Kong's role as "the Pearl of the
Orient"). See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 363.
37. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 364; see also Skeen, supra note 9, at 192 (stating
that Hong Kong is presently the "best gateway to China', however, Hong Kong's stock
market is "vulnerable to internal Chinese politics.").
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date for Hong Kong's transition back to China loomed closer, Hong
Kong residents and international onlookers became concerned about the
ground rules for the transition. 38
This concern provided the push to Great Britain and China to sign
the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 39 the reversion agreement, on De-
cember 19, 1984.40 The Joint Declaration is the precursor to the Basic
Law, 41 the final plan of law and government for post-transition Hong
Kong. Requirements for the Basic Law stem from the Joint Declara-
tion's demands that the Basic Law must enumerate and ensure all the
guarantees provided in the Joint Declaration. 42 Between the time that
the Joint Declaration took effect on December 19, 1984 and the last day
of British rule on June 30, 1997, the Government of the United King-
dom was responsible for the "administration of Hong Kong with the ob-
ject of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social
stability."43 The government of China was to cooperate towards this
end.
4 4
38. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350 (indicating that one of the primary concerns was
the future of property transactions which were dictated by a 15 years lease plan, until the
end of the United Kingdom's lease of part of the Hong Kong territory); Davis, supra note
5, at 310-11.
39. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 3. Not every article of the Joint Dec-
laration will be discussed since certain aspects of the agreement are more relevant to this
discussion than others; therefore not every article of the Declaration will be itemized.
40. See Vitrano supra note 10, at 446. See also Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
41. The Basic Law, supra note 4. The Basic Law was designed to take effect on July
1, 1997 and to last for 50 years.
42. See Yee, supra note 34 at 600; Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447, 455-56. The Joint
Declaration was the original agreement between the United Kingdom and China. The
two countries agreed, in the Joint Declaration, to the content of the Basic Law. The Joint
Declaration provides that the Basic Law will be established after the Joint Declaration
but will contain all of the parameters agreed to in the Joint Declaration. Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 3, at arts. III, XII. The Basic Law was created by the Basic Law Drafting
Commission, comprised of 59 people, all of whom were appointed by the government of
China and less than 50% of whom were from Hong Kong. See Harris, supra note 19, at
352. This deserves skepticism because a group of people hand picked by China and not
adequately representative of the Hong Kong people created a document for Hong Kong to
preserve Hong Kong's current system. It is difficult to imagine that this group would not
be biased in favor of granting more power to China than originally assumed in the Joint
Declaration, to take away Hong Kong's rights. Pursuant to this view, the group created
the Basic Law, which is unclear and leaves flexibility for multiple interpretations in favor
of granting more authority to China. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
43. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. IV. See generally, Vitrano, supra note 10,
at 449 (discussing the reforms attempted by Governor Chris Patten in Hong Kong follow-
ing 1992 and prior to July 1, 1997).
44. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. IV (stating: IT]he govern-
ment of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with
the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and
that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its cooperation in this
connection."). See generally, RECORD, supra note 2, at 367, 369 (discussing Annex I); Har-
ris, supra note 19, at 351 (indicating that before June 30, 1997 "the British Government
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The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China created a tremen-
dous scare in Hong Kong. The British colonial government responded
by passing the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BRO) and amending their cur-
rent laws to comply with the BRO. 45 The Hong Kong BRO incorporated
the ICCPR into Hong Kong rule of law. 46 To avoid protest from China
that the BRO violated the Joint Declaration, Great Britain copied the
ICCPR almost identically. 47 China was nonetheless agitated and indi-
cated that the BRO was unnecessary because the Basic Law already
provided adequate protection of rights.48
In 1994, Governor Patten established limited economic and political
reforms, including electoral reforms.49 The reforms were to "safeguard
Hong Kong's way of life, the way of life set out in page after page of the
Joint Declaration.. ." and to provide for more democracy post-1997. 50
On July 1, 1997 Hong Kong transitioned from British colonial rule
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (SAR).51 No
[was] responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and
preserving its economic prosperity and social stability, and China will cooperate in that
effort.") This provision is the counter argument to China's claim that the political and
economic reforms instituted by Patten in 1992 were contrary to the Joint Declaration.
The United Kingdom maintained that movement towards democracy was necessary for
the administration of Hong Kong, and that China should cooperate. In fact, China is vio-
lating the Joint Declaration by denying the legitimacy of the United Kingdom's actions to
administer to Hong Kong's needs.
45. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 378; Choo, supra note 19, at 72.
46. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 199-200; Jordan, supra note 31, at 368. The Bill of
Rights Ordinance (BRO) was Hong Kong's first written bill of rights. See RECORD, supra
note 2, at 378.
47. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 365. The Joint Declaration may be violated by a
fundamental change in the Hong Kong rule of law. Since the ICCPR remained applicable
to Hong Kong, according to Article 39 of the Basic Law, China should not have had any
qualms. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 379. China, nonetheless, was troubled by the BRO.
See id. at 379-80 (indicating China's fundamental issue was with Article 3(a) of the BRO
because it nullified any previous laws that contradicted the BRO).
48. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 367-68.
49. See Choo, supra note 19, at 72. Prior to 1994, the Governor of Hong Kong was
always nominated by London and 39 out of 60 members of LegCo were elected. Vitrano,
supra note 10, at 449.
50. Vitrano, supra note 10, at 449 (quoting a speech given by Governor Patten and
discussing the impact of the reforms).
51. See Harris, supra note 19, at 351-52 (stating that Hong Kong is to be restored to
Chinese sovereignty effective July 1, 1997 and will become a special administrative region
(SAR)). Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution provides for the establishment of a special
administrative region. See also Daniel R. Fung, Foundation for the Survival of the Rule of
Law in Hong Kong - The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty, 1 UCLA. J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 283, 288 (1996). See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 367, n.14. See also infra
note 55 and accompanying test (indicating that part of the motivation for the establish-
ment of Special Administrative Region is the "one country, two systems" policy); Jordan,
supra note 31, at 351-52 (stating that an "SAR is not just an economic unit distinct from
the rest of the country. It is a localized political-legal entity and a socio-economic reality
differentiated from the general socialist system but forming part of a unitary state...").
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longer subject to the administration of Great Britain, Hong Kong law
became administered by China based on Deng Xiaoping's "one country,
two systems" policy.5 2 This policy was guaranteed in the Sino-British
Joint Declaration and promulgated in the Basic Law.5 3 In the past,
when the British have ceded a territory, they have established a clear
and detailed plan for the change.5 4 The usual and most ideal procedure
would have been for the existing legislature in Hong Kong, the Legisla-
tive Council (LegCo),5 5 to provide rules for the new incoming legisla-
ture. However, China would not allow this type of conversion.56 In-
stead, the new government of Hong Kong started with a new plan of
law, the Basic Law.
57
III. AGREEMENTS PERTINENT TO THE HONG KONG TRANSITION
A. The Joint Declaration: An International Agreement
The Sino-British Joint Declaration is a treaty expressing the gen-
eral agreement that the common goal of the government of the United
Kingdom and the government of the People's Republic of China is for
China to resume authority over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.58 Ratified
52. Deng Xiaoping established the "one country, two systems" policy in 1978 in re-
sponse to China's controversy with Taiwan. See Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289. The
Joint Declaration, supra note 6, art. III, para. 5. Under this policy Hong Kong will main-
tain its capitalist system despite the fact that China, its sovereign power, is a socialist
system. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600.
53. The "one country, two systems" policy is guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration and promulgated in the Basic Law. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600. The Joint
Declaration was the original agreement between the United Kingdom and China. The
two countries agreed, in the Joint Declaration, to the content of the Basic Law. The Joint
Declaration provides that the Basic Law will be established after the Joint Declaration
but will contain all of the parameters agreed to in the Joint Declaration.
54. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. See, e.g., Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of
Successful Treason: Coup D'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 49, 60 (1994)
(discussing the extensive legal provisions made by the British government for the transi-
tion of Southern Rhodesia from a British colony to an independent nation); see also id. at
90-91 (discussing the legal mechanisms provided by the British government for establish-
ing the government and laws of Lesotho when it gained independence from Britain).
55. The Legislative Council was the legislative body existing in Hong Kong prior to
July 1, 1997.
56. Glayds Li Interview, supra note 8. See also Davis, supra note 5, at 305 n.7 and
accompanying text (discussing that although China's original intent was to keep negotia-
tions between itself and Great Britain, Hong Kong had an un-severable interest in the
process and therefore this tripartite relationship was termed the three legged stool).
57. Id. I believe that China's motivation was to ensure that they had the maximum
opportunity to interpret and configure the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to their
advantage. Since the Basic Law is open to varied interpretation and interpretation by
China alone (following the transition Great Britain no longer has any influence), much of
the autonomy and guarantee of basic rights for Hong Kong citizens could vanish.
58. Joint Declaration, supra note 3. The issues that developed during these discus-
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in 1985,59 the Joint Declaration provides the framework for the transi-
tion of control agreed to by China and the United Kingdom, 60 for the in-
teractions between Hong Kong and China after the transition occurs
(committing the "one country, two systems" polity to writing),6' and for
the establishment of the Basic Law.
62
The Joint Declaration institutes the general framework agreed to
by China, 63 in which China guarantees a high degree of autonomy and
basic human rights for Hong Kong and its citizens, except with regard
to foreign affairs and defense affairs.6 4 According to the Joint Declara-
tion, "the laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically
unchanged"65 and "[tihe current social and economic systems in Hong
Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style."6 6 The Joint
Declaration guarantees basic human rights such as freedom of person,
sions related to the differences between the capitalist Hong Kong society, which provides
a high degree of personal and economic freedoms, and the communist government of
China and its socialist society. See Harris, supra note 19, at 349 (indicating that the as-
surance that the "one country-two systems" concept would be available helped to mitigate
controversies that developed during the discussions that led to the Joint Declaration and
helped ensure adoption of the Joint Declaration).
59. Subsequent to being signed, the Joint Declaration was registered with the United
Nations. See Fung, supra note 51, at 289-90. Some scholars argue that registration with
the U.N. was "merely a symbolic gesture" by China to the people of Hong Kong. As an
enforcement mechanism, it is insubstantial. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 458-59.
60. See generally Harris, supra note 19, at 351-52 (stating that the Joint Declaration
features Britain's agreement to "restore' Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty effective July
1, 1997.. .and during the transitional period prior to June 30, 1997, the British govern-
ment is responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining
and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability, and China will cooperate in
this effort.. .upon China's resumption of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong becomes a spe-
cial administrative region (SAR), as provided in [A]rticle 31 of the Chinese Constitution."
For fifty years Hong Kong will be a "quasi-autonomous entity of a semi-capitalist nature
within the framework of a Socialist polity", in other words, the "one country, two systems"
idea.
61. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600. See also Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289.
62. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600; see also Vitrano, supra note 10, at 445 (indicating
that the "one country-two systems" policy has been promoted by China for the conversion
of both Hong Kong and Macau back to the PRC).
63. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
64. See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. III, para. 2 (stating that
foreign and defense affairs are the PRC's responsibility). See generally Fung, supra note
51, at 290-91 (elaborating that Hong Kong "will maintain her present freedoms and life-
styles as well as her own political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and judicial systems
which are fundamentally different and separate from those of the rest of China. Capital-
ism will continue to be the prevailing economic system. Socialism, as state policy, will not
be applied.").
65. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. III, para. 3. "[tlhe Hong Kong SAR will be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication." Id. In other words, the current legal system in Hong Kong, which is de-
rived from the English legal system, will remain basically unchanged. See also Basic
Law, supra note 4, at art. 8 (discussing the laws in force).
66. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. III, para. 5.
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speech, assembly, correspondence, academic research, and association. 67
In theory, the "one country, two systems" policy provides a means to
this end.
The Annexes of the Joint Declaration elaborate on the basic points
outlined in the main body of the Joint Declaration. 68 Annex I, part 1
provides in part, that China will enact a Basic Law that ensures that
the capitalist system of Hong Kong will remain unchanged for fifty
years after the transition69 and provides guidelines for achieving.
70
Annex I, part II provides the laws to be enforced in Hong Kong.
They include the Basic Law and the laws "previously in force in Hong
Kong and law enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
legislature.. ." provided they do not contradict the Basic Law. Any laws
enacted by the legislature of Hong Kong that are not in accordance with
the Basic Law are not valid.71 Part III discusses the judicial system for
the Hong Kong SAR.
Part XIII protects basic rights and freedoms that existed in Hong
Kong prior to the transition and these rights include "freedom of per-
son, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join
trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike of
demonstration..." 72 Part XIII further stipulates that the "International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall
67. Id. at para. 3. "Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike,
of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law
in the Hong Kong SAR. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of
inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law."
68. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
69. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 1 ('Except for foreign and de-
fense affairs... the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with execu-
tive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.").
See generally RECORD, supra note 2, at 368-69 (discussing Annex I).
70. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 1. The chief executive of the
Hong Kong SAR is to be "selected by election or through consultations held locally and be
appointed by the Central People's Government." The legislature of Hong Kong will be
established through elections and the chief executive will be accountable to the legislature
to certify that transactions are legal. See also Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
71. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 2; RECORD, supra note 2, at 370.
Annex I, part 3 provides for the judicial processes in the Hong Kong SAR. The judges for
Hong Kong will be appointed by the chief executive of Hong Kong who will act "in accor-
dance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges,
persons from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Annex I part 3 further pro-
vides that the power of final judgment is to be vested in the court of final appeal in Hong
Kong. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 3.
72. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. XIII. "The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided
for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong..."
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remain in force."73
B. The Basic Law
As indicated by the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law was adopted
by the PRC's National People's Congress and is considered by Hong
Kong citizens to be the mini-constitution for the Hong Kong SAR.74 The
Basic Law reiterates the promises made in the Joint Declaration but
elaborates further on the actual law to uphold the promises made in the
Joint Declaration.
75
First, the Basic Law stipulates the rights of the Hong Kong peo-
ple.7 6 The Basic Law provides for the fundamental rights and duties of
the residents. These rights include a right to life, equality before the
law, freedom from torture, personal liberty, liberty of movement, pri-
vacy of communications, freedom of expression, religion, freedom of as-
sociation, and the right of peaceful assembly.
77
Second, the Basic Law establishes the plan of government for Hong
Kong.78 Continuing the theme of the Joint Declaration, the Preamble of
the Basic Law indicates "that under the principle of 'one country, two
systems" the socialist system and policies will not be practiced in HK."
9
Chapter IV details the political structure. Article 45, while discussing
the method for selection of the Chief Executive, stipulates that the ul-
timate goal is to elect the Chief Executive through universal suffrage.
80
Article 68 stipulates that another ultimate goal for change in Hong
Kong is to have a legislature that is elected by universal suffrage.81
73. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. XIII.
74. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335, 350. See also
RECORD, supra note 2, at 370 (discussing that the Basic Law "will become the Hong Kong
SAR's "constitution", replacing the Letters Patent, the document issued under the
Queen's hand that establishes the basic framework of the colonial government.") But see
Jordan, supra note 31, at 350-52 (indicating that China differs with Hong Kong as to the
perception that the Basic Law is a mini-constitution. China perceives the Basic Law as a
"non-enforceable statement of policy").
75. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447. See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 370.
76. See Harris, supra note 19, at 352; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335.
77. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. 3, arts. 24-42. Annex III to the Basic Law pro-
vides exceptions to the general rule that the national law of the PRC will not be applied to
Hong Kong. These exceptions include: 1) recognition of Beijing as the capital of the PRC;
2) "The March of Volunteers" as the National Anthem; 3) the Five-star red Flag as the
National Flag; 4) National Day falls on Oct. 1; 5) PRC's government's Declaration of the
Territorial Sea; 6) the PRC nationality law; and 7) PRC regulations concerning Diplo-
matic Privileges and Immunities.
78. See Harris, supra note 19, at 352; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335.
79. Basic Law, supra note 4, at pmbl (emphasis added). The assumption that Chi-
nese and English are interchangeable is flawed and causes much difficulty for interpreta-
tion. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 339.
80. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 45.
81. Id. at art. 68. Provisions in the Basic Law that indicate that the ultimate goal is
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However, the way the Basic Law was written allows China to ma-
nipulate Hong Kong's autonomy.8 2 Chapter I, Article 8 of the Basic Law
proscribes that the laws previously operable in Hong Kong will apply
only if they do not contravene with the Basic Law.8 3 If the Hong Kong
courts need to interpret a provision of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong
courts need to seek the relevant interpretation from the PRC Standing
Committee. Article 15884 dictates that it is the PRC Standing Commit-
tee's power to interpret the Basic Law. 85
universal suffrage imply that the political movement in Hong Kong SAR should be to-
wards democracy. Members of the democratic movement firmly believe that the Basic
Law stipulates that the path is to be towards democracy. See Martin Lee, The Slow
Squeeze on Hong Kong, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A25.
82. See Davis, supra note 5, at 308 (discussing that early in the drafting of the Basic
Law, China seemed willing to incorporate varying political viewpoints including those of
liberals like Marline Lee, but following direct confrontation with these liberals, China re-
formed its policies and refused to incorporate liberals whose views opposed China's). The
Basic Law creates a huge gateway for China to influence the laws of Hong Kong. Gladys
Li Interview, supra note 8.
83. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. I, art. 8. See Bryan A. Gregory, Envisioning Fu-
tures, The Battle Over Democracy in Hong Kong, N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 175, 193
(1993) (indicating that "it is possible that the Standing Committee could legally imple-
ment or rescind procedures almost at will."). The Basic Law, Chapter I, Article 11 indi-
cates that "[t]he systems and policies practiced in the Hong Kong SAR, including the so-
cial and economic systems, the system for safeguarding the fundamental rights and
freedoms of its residents, the executive, legislative and judicial systems, and relevant
policies, shall be based on the provisions of this Law." The Basic Law, Chapter I, Article
11 further provides that "[t]he courts of the Hong Kong SAR shall have jurisdiction over
all cases in the Region, except.. .shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as de-
fense and foreign affairs .... But see Jordan, supra note 31, at 336 (stating that the
"ambiguity errs in favor of the common law interpretation", in other words the common
law of Hong Kong).
84. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 354 (stating that "Articles 17, 158, and
160... transfer considerable judicial powers of interpretation to the Standing Commit-
tee."). Since Article 158 gives complete power to the Standing Committee of the PRC to
interpret the Basic Law, by implication it gives the Standing Committee the power to dic-
tate which parts of the Basic Law are enforceable. Id. at 355. See Fung, supra note 51, at
301.
85. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. VIII, art 158. See also RECORD, supra note 2, at
370-71. See Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. Article 158 of the Basic Law does not al-
low Hong Kong to have the "final say in the interpretation of the Basic Law" and it is un-
derstood that it is "undesirable" to make amendments to the Basic Law. The Standing
Committee delegates to the SAR courts the power to interpret the Basic Law if issues con-
cerning the Basic Law should arise in the course of litigation. If an issue should arise
which falls within the autonomy of the SAR, the SAR courts may interpret relevant provi-
sions of the Basic Law in the normal course of litigation up to the Court of Final Appeal.
Before the Court of Final Appeal delivers final judgment however, it must seek the review
of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The Standing Committee is then obliged to con-
sult a committee of constitutional experts know as the Committee for the Basic Law. It
consists of six mainland members and six Hong Kong members, including persons from
the legal profession, who will render an advisory opinion to the Standing Committee. The
Standing Committee will then make its interpretation, which will be binding on the Court
of Final Appeal. No interpretation of the Standing Committee affects judicial decisions
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Since no clear procedure indicates when a law contravenes with the
Basic Law, there is tremendous latitude for China to influence the laws
that will be allowed to continue to apply to Hong Kong. Additionally,
review by the National People's Congress of all of Hong Kong's laws to
determine if they violate the Basic Law undermines the autonomy of
Hong Kong and the ability for final adjudication.86 In further deroga-
tion of Hong Kong's autonomy, Article 17 maintains a similar procedure
for new law enacted by the Hong Kong legislature. Ultimately, when
Article 158 is read with Article 19, it gives the Standing Committee the
unreviewable power to determine what cases fall within the definition
of "acts of state" and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the SAR's
courts.
8 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST-TRANSITION HONG KONG
Within months of the transition, problems confronted the Hong
Kong people and challenged the efficacy of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law.8 8 Current issues are multi faceted. One issue that de-
veloped immediately concerns the validity of the new governing legisla-
tive body.
8 9
Originally, the members of the former Hong Kong legislature, the
LegCo, were elected by more than one million people.90 However, after
the transition, LegCo was abolished by the Preparatory Committee 91
and replaced with the Provisional Council.92 The first startling element
of this action is that China threatened to take this drastic action in
1995. China had threatened to abolish the LegCo and established a leg-
already reached. In other words, such interpretations carry no retroactive effect.
86. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
87. See generally RECORD, supra note 2.
88. Since China refused to allow the Legislative Counsel to pass laws that would be
effective after July 1, 1997 and since the Basic Law has not been in effect long, there is no
clear body of law. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. Over arching all of these considera-
tions, if China determines that the Standing Committee has the complete power to de-
termine which provisions of the Basic Law will be enforceable, this would be a breach of
China's guarantee that Hong Kong will be permitted to retain a great deal of autonomy.
See Jordan, supra note 31, at 355.
89. There are "grey" areas in terms of the recent "scrapping" of the Legislative Coun-
cil, which shed an uncertain shadow on the new legislature. Gladys Li Interview; supra
note 8; Jordan, supra note 31, at 336. But see H.K. Changes Little One Month After Han-
dover, BERNAMA (Malaysia), July 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12110903.
90. Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
91. The Preparatory Committee is body appointed entirely by China. It seems
unlikely that a group appointed entirely by China and not Hong Kong, will be able to ade-
quately represent the interests and needs of the Hong Kong people. In fact, the group will
more likely favor China's position on issues pertaining to basic rights. Huang & Qian,
supra note 6, at 292 n.9.
92. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
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islative body of its own appointment 93 in retaliation for the passage of
Hong Kong's Bill of Rights and the 1995 elections which resulted in ma-
jor victories for the pro-democracy party.94 China adamantly refused to
acknowledge the validity of the democratic reforms because, according
to China, they were directly contrary to the Joint Declaration.95
The second alarming issue related to this action is that the Provi-
sional Council members were appointed by China.96 As discussed ear-
lier, the Basic Law indicates that one goal for the Hong Kong SAR is
that Hong Kong should have a chief executive and legislature elected by
universal suffrage.97 The Basic Law provides for the establishment of
the new legislative body. 98 However, Annex II stipulates that the first
legislative body will be an exception to the rule, "formed in accordance
with the 'Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for
the Formation of the First Government' and the First Legislative Coun-
cl.... ." This process takes a step backward from the goal expressed in
Article 68 of the Basic Law to have a legislature elected by universal
suffrage. 99 It also contravenes the Article 5 provision that the capitalist
93. Choo, supra note 19, at 72. See The Department of State, Hong Kong Report on
Human Rights Practice for 1996 (visited June 15, 1997)
<http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/hongkong.html>. This report indicates that the status
of human rights abuses in Hong Kong is included in the report for the United Kingdom.
The report acknowledges that the 60 LegCo. seats were filled in 1995 either through di-
rect or indirect balloting. They were contested by the PRC. The report indicates that the
PRC's intent for post-transition was to declare as null and void the 1995 LegCo, district
boards, and municipal counsels because it was not consistent with the electoral rules
adopted by the Hong Kong Government in 1994 for election to these bodies. The report
also indicates that China's design was to install a PRC appointed preparatory committee
to decide how to establish the first legislative counsel post July 1, 1997. The report issued
no statement as to these indications. See also Vitrano, supra, note 10, at 453-55 (indicat-
ing that if the PRC's discontinued the democratic reforms implemented by Governor
Patten, it would be a violation of the Joint Declaration).
94. See Choo, supra note 19, at 72.
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. China believed that the status quo in
Hong Kong at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration should not be radically
changed by the United Kingdom.
96. Editorial Writer's Desk, Beijing-Style Democracy Hong Kong Will Have to Endure
a Convoluted Voting Scheme, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at B6 [hereinafter Beijing Style];
The cut in the number of office holding Democratic Party members such that they will not
hold the majority as they did before the reversion. This will result in more distance be-
tween the public and the government officials of Hong Kong, decreasing democracy.
When the Outline of Hong Kong's Electoral Arrangements was First, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 14,1997, at 18 [hereinafter Outline]. A decrease in democracy will mean that
the Hong Kong people will not be able to influence the administration of the laws pertain-
ing to their basic rights and increase the chances that China will abuse the loopholes in
the Basic Law.
97. Peter Montagnon, Legal Eagles Remain Wary, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at VII.
See also Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
98. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 68, Annex II.
99. But see Keith B. Richburg, 100 Days of Chinese Rule; Hong Kong's People Seem
Content as New Leader Promises Prosperity, Not Democracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at
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system will remain in place and practiced for the next fifty years. Since
this seems to violate the Basic Law's provisions, it is unclear whether
the new legislative body, the Provisional Legislature, is legally in
place.10o
Furthermore, it is also doubtful whether the legislative body will be
able to comply with the procedures laid out in the Basic Law. 0 1 Part of
the plan for the Provisional Legislative Council was to confirm the
judges appointed to the Court of Final Appeals. l0 2 Since the judges
were approved by the Provisional Legislature, whose legal existence is
in doubt, this creates doubt as to the legal validity of the judges on the
Court of Final Appeals.
103
Second, Tung Chee-Hwa, the new chief executive, canceled the laws
created by Governor Patten prior to July 1, 1997 that ensured basic
civil and political rights of Hong Kong residents.10 4 "As incrementally
and inevitably as pages being ripped from a daily calendar, Hong
Kong's new administration stripped away the fledgling rights and de-
mocratic reforms enacted during the last days of British rule."'105 As
contemplated by the Joint Declaration, these rights pertained to free-
dom of the press, public expression in government, right to peaceful
demonstration, and the movement towards democracy in Hong Kong.
A third possible violation is the new laws introduced by Tung fol-
lowing the reversion. These new laws limit the right to demonstration
and institute controls on political and other organizations. 106 The laws
have also weakened trade union rights by freezing labor laws, 0 7 limited
the right to protest, and limited the right to form political parties.
0 8
In August 1997, new election laws withdrew voting power from
A25 (construing Chief Executive Tung as having promised that a new legislature will be
established on May 24, 1998 but that more democracy will not occur for another 10 years).
100. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
101. Id.
102. Article 88 of the Basic Law indicates that the Chief Executive appoints the
judges. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 88. Article 73, paragraph 7 indicates that the
legislative council endorses appointments and removals. Id. at art. 73(7).
103. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
104. Tung was appointed by China and therefore, would presumably have China's best
interests in mind. Maggie Farley, A Hundred Days in Hong Kong: A Matter of Haves,
Have-Nots, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A4.
105. Id. These election laws were drawn up by the China-appointed Preparatory
Committee with the same motivations that lead the Committee to abolish LegCo and
make it more difficult for the pro-democracy candidates to obtain seats in the legislature.
See Lee, supra note 81, at A25; Eric Bjornlund, Hong Kong Election Law Fair?, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR, Oct. 8, 1997, at 20.
106. See Flynn, supra note 29. Although no one has felt repercussions from these
laws, there is no guarantee that they won't tomorrow. Lee, supra note 82, at A25.
107. See Farley, supra note 104, at A4..
108. Id.
VOL. 28:1112
HONG KONG'S 1997 TRANSITION
close to 2 million Hong Kong citizens 09 and greatly crippled the democ-
ratic movement in China. 110 There are sixty seats in the legislature.
Now the electorate for thirty of those seats has been cut from 2.7 mil-
lion to 186,000111 and "corporate voting". 1 2 Furthermore, Tung is try-
ing to introduce further legislation that will additionally weaken the
democratic representation. 113 These new laws are directly in confronta-
tion to the Basic Law's guarantee to move towards democratic elec-
tions.
1 4
Fourth, Tung also called for a "watering down"'115 of the U.N. Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 116 His reasoning was that the
U.N. Declaration was not representative of the beliefs of developing
countries. Instead, it represented the views of the West.1 7 Fifth, the
Human Rights Report of the State Department discussed the continu-
ing problem of self-censorship by the media. 118
However, before July 1, 1997, Great Britain and Hong Kong en-
deavored to insulate Hong Kong from China's lower standard of human
rights.11 9 According to the Joint Declaration 120 and the Basic Law, 121
the ICCPR and ICESC will remain applicable to Hong Kong following
109. See id.
110. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
111. See Outline, supra note 96, at 18.
112. See Beijing-Style, supra note 96, at B6 (indicating that "[alccording to the new
rules, Hong Kong will use a complex proportional representation system to prevent any
one party from dominating the 60-seat legislature. Under Beijing's scheme, 20 seats will
be filled at large by all voters and 30 seats will go to business representatives elected by a
smaller number, 180,000 people. The remaining 10 seats will be filled by an 800-member
electoral committee of pro-Beijing and business interests."); Lee, supra note 81.
113. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
114. Bjornlund, supra note 105, at 20.
115. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
116. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, Resns., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
117. Lee, supra note 81, at A25. But see Michael Chugani, Washington Urges More
Democracy, H.K. STANDARD, Sept. 10, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 14153419
(quoting Wang Yusheng, consul general of San Francisco, "Hong Kong's democracy, hu-
man rights, and freedom of the press have been increased and will be more extensive in
the future...")
118. See The Department of State, Hong Kong Report on Human Rights Practice for
1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/human1998
/hongkong.html>. But see Richburg, supra note 99, at A25 (construing Chief Executive
Tung's speech as reassuring the Hong Kong people the freedom of the press and media).
A notorious issue was the release of cartoonist Larry Feign from the South China Morn-
ing Post in quick succession to his publication of cartoons that criticized PRC leaders. The
report indicates that although the South China Morning Post management vowed the car-
toonist's release was due to staff cuts, reports in Hong Kong remain convinced that his
release was politically motivated. Id.
119. Id.
120. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I.
121. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 39
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the transition. 122 Article 39 of the Basic Law contains a policing
mechanism for checking the actions of China as pertaining to Hong
Kong. Article 39 of the Basic Law guarantees that the United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Na-
tions International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the UN's international labor conventions shall remain applicable to
Hong Kong through the laws of the Hong Kong SAR. Any rights of the
Hong Kong citizens will not be restricted unless sanctioned by law and
those restrictions will not contravene the previously mentioned U.N.
conventions. 123
V. U.N. COVENANTS
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol, December 16, 1966
1. Description of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
Although similar in content to the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, 124 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)125 goes further and requires State Parties to provide remedies
in the case of a Covenant violation. 126 "The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is one of the fundamental instruments created
by the international community for the global promotion and protection
of human rights."'127 The Covenant is binding on each State Party to
the Covenant, subject to reservations. 128
Part III of the Covenant enumerates the rights protected by the
ICCPR. Among these rights are the right to life, 129 freedom from forced
122. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 199-200.
123. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 39.
124. See generally B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FORTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION (1989) (discussing the Universal Declaration, its impact, and subsequent
actions).
125. The United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) was ratified on December 16, 1966 and went in to force on March 23, 1976.
ICCPR, supra note 16.
126. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
125 (1996).
127. UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, (1992), 31 ILM 645 [herein-
after SENATE REPORT].
128. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 123. There are disputes between
States as to the interpretation of terms of the Covenant. Id.
129. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 6, sec. 1.
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servitude and slavery, 130 liberty and security of persons, 131 liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence, 132 freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion,133 to hold opinions without interference,134 to
freedom of expression, 135 peaceful assembly, 136 to take part in the con-
duct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives, 137 to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret bal-
lot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors, 138 and to
have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his coun-
try. 3 9 It is the responsibility of each State to ensure that all of the
Covenant measures are implemented appropriately. 40
The ICCPR provides three means to guarantee that the Covenant's
provisions are properly respected and ensured by State Parties. As Ar-
ticle 40 provides, State Parties must periodically provide reports to the
Human Rights Commission (HRC)14' illustrating the progress made to
enhance those rights and the measures taken by the State to ensure the
provisions of the Covenant. 142 The reports must be submitted within
one year of becoming a party to the Covenant. 143
HRC members dispute over the uncertain role of specialized agen-
cies and non-government organizations (NGOs) in this reporting proce-
dure. The Covenant does not contain any provision for consideration of
this type of outside information. 44 The specialized agencies may only
130. Id. at art 8, sec. 1
131. Id. at art 9, sec. 1
132. Id. at art 12, sec. 1
133. Id. at art 18, sec. 1
134. Id. at art 19, sec. 1
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at art 25, sec. a
138. Id. at art 25, sec. b.
139. Id. at art 25, sec. c.
140. UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 149 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, eds., 1993) [hereinafter Hannum &
Fischer].
141. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations was created entirely for the
purpose of being the administrator of the ICCPR. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: IT'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 126 (1991); Hannum & Fischer, supra note
140, at 149. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126.
142. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 40. According to Article 40, the State Party reports
must be periodically filed with the HRC and must indicate "(1) measures [the State] ha[s]
adopted, including legislative or judicial action, which give effect to the rights recognized
within the Covenant; (2) the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights; and (3) the
factors and difficulties encountered in giving them effect." See Hannum & Fischer, supra
note 140, at 151.
143. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 40
144. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 153. A purely textual analysis would
indicate that specialized agencies have no opportunity to comment on reports provided by
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provide comment when it is requested by the HRC. However, past
practice has indicated that although formal reports are not permitted,
work produced by specialized agencies of the U.N. has influenced HRC
decisions. 145 Likewise, since there is no specific Covenant provision
that prohibits or permits formal reporting by NGOs, NGOs are not pre-
vented from providing information and statistics to individual members
of the Committee. Recently, the HRC has frequently relied on the in-
formation provided by NGOs such as Amnesty International.
146
After all of this information is assimilated, the HRC is able to pro-
vide only "general comments" to the parties on the reports filed by each
State Party.147 More importantly, however, the HRC fies an annual
report148 on its activities for publication with the General Assembly.
149
In this manner, it is available to inform the rest of the international
community.
A second method of ensuring that the Covenant is respected is
through Article 41 of the Covenant, which provides an optional inter-
State complaint procedure. 150 This procedure permits one State Party
to execute a communication to the HRC that another State Party is not
ensuring the provisions of the Covenant.' 5 ' This process under is not
automatically available. 152 A State Party to the ICCPR must file a
separate declaration that it "recognizes the competence of the HRC to
receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
present Covenant."153 Furthermore, only a State Party that has ac-
cepted Article 41 can report a violation by another State Party of the
Covenant. 154 The accusing State Party must have exhausted all domes-
tic remedies; and both parties must first try to settle the dispute
amongst themselves. 155 If these conditions are met, then a State Party
may file a communication alleging that the accused State is not fulfill-
the State Parties. The content of the report is a description and evaluation, consistent
with the ICCPR terms, of the protections measures for civil and political rights enumer-
ated in the Covenant in the State Party under scrutiny. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at
9.
145. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 153.
146. See id. at 153-54.
147. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 131 (stating that according to Articles
40 & 45 of the ICCPR, general comments should be submitted to the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral).
148. McGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 131 (indicating that the annual reports not con-
tain information about Optional Protocal reports).
149. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 154.
150. See ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 41.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 155.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 156.
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ing its obligations under the Covenant. 156 Inter-State communications
are rare.
157
If the alleged violation reaches the HRC, the HRC can not opine as
to whether there has been a violation of the Covenant. The HRC's pur-
pose is to be a fact-finder and to assist in friendly settlement between
the accused and the accused state. I5 8 If a settlement is not reached, the
State Parties may agree to the appointment of an ad hoc conciliation
commission, which will also assist towards a friendly settlement. 159 If a
settlement still is not reached, the HRC submits a report with its posi-
tion on the likelihood and means toward a friendly settlement.
Third, the Optional Protocol (OP)160 provides an opportunity for an
individual citizen or an individual subject to the control of a State to file
a communication with the HRC against his or her State Party. 161 Even-
tually, the General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to provide
for individual petition, 162 but NGOs were still denied the right of peti-
tion.163 The OP is a separate agreement from the ICCPR, requiring the
State Party to assent to the OP and the ICCPR separately. Therefore,
the Human Rights Commission is only allowed to consider petitions
from individuals alleging an ICCPR violation by a State Party if the
State Party is a signatory to the ICCPR and the OP.164
156. Id. at 155.
157. Id. at 156-57.
158. Id. at 156.
159. Id. (indicating this is done according to procedure laid out in Article 42).
160. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL (Vol. 1: U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2, 1985; Vol. 2: U.N. Sales No. E.89-XIV.1,
1990). Originally, the final draft of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Commission con-
tained no provisions for petitions by individuals or organizations. However, many argued
that States were not the only actors affected by international law. International persons
and organizations were affected as well. "[Under the very terms of the Covenant the in-
dividual was plainly a subject of international law and the purpose of the Covenant was to
protect him against abuses of power by the State." McGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 122.
161. HuMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note 160, at 9-10. STEINER & ALSTON, supra
note 126, at 776. "[A] failure to allow individual complaints to be brought to the Commit-
tee under the first Optional Protocol, all the essential elements of the Covenant guaran-
tees have been removed." Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 149. The UN Secretary
General determines whether communications pursuant to the OP are submitted to the
HRC. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 128.
162. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 124.
163. See id. at 125. The Human Rights Commission is the administrator for the
ICCPR and Optional Protocol; although, it is important to clarify that they are separate
agreements. Id. at 126. There are no explicit rules as to which submissions the Secretary
General may or may not determine are submissable to the HRC. However, there is an
explicit rule that stipulates that any communications against a State that is not a party to
the OP will not be determined reviewable by the HRC because the HRC would not have
jurisdiction. Id. at 128.
164. Id. at 124. "The OP is open for signature by any State that has signed the ICCPR
(Article 8(1) OP). It can only be ratified or acceded to by a State which has ratified by or
acceded to the ICCPR (article 8(2)(3) OP)... For States subsequently ratifying or acceding
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As dictated by Article 4(1), following submission, the individual
communication is brought to the attention of the State Party against
which it was brought. The State Party must reply within six months by
providing a submission to the HRC.165 It is also the State Party's bur-
den to prove, in detail, that the individual did not exhaust the remedies
available to settle the issue. 166 Once the HRC has considered the com-
munication, the HRC states its "views on the matter", which includes
the HRC legal analysis of the issue and a determination whether a vio-
lation of the Covenant occurred.
167
2. Application
"An important part of Hong Kong's [pre-transition] legal system de-
rives from international treaties."168 In the past, international treaties
were applicable to Hong Kong either through the terms of the treaties
or through the British legislative process. 169 However, Hong Kong's re-
version to China rendered this process obsolete170 and a fledgling sys-
tem has been established in its place. In order for a State Party, like
China, to adhere to the terms of the ICCPR, the State's laws might have
to be revised to meet these standards. 171 China might have to establish
enforcement mechanisms if none exist.17 2 The principal means to
achieve implementation of the ICCPR is through legislation or judicial
remedies.1
73
Based on China's approval of the ICCPR in Article 39 of the Basic
to the OP, the OP enters into force three months after the date of the deposit of the in-
strument of ratification or accession (article 9(2) OP)." Id. at 126-27. In order for an indi-
vidual to provide a communication to the Human Rights Commission regarding a viola-
tion of the ICCPR, it must be submitted in written form according to Article 2 of the
Optional Protocol. Article 2 and 5 (2)(b) of the Optional Protocol indicate that all domestic
remedies must have been attempted and not achieved the proper result before an individ-
ual petition would be considered. According to Article 3, any communications to the HRC
that are anonymous, or that the HRC considers to be an abuse of the communication or
inconsistent with the purpose of the Covenant, will not be considered by the HRC. Id. at
125.
165. Id.
166. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 159. Article 4 (2) further explains that
the State Party's submission can be "[w]ritten explanations or statements clarifying the
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State".
167. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 160.
168. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 188.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. STEINER & AISTON, supra note 126, at 775.
172. Id. Reservations by the State Party to terms of the Covenant would reduce the
requirement for domestic legal changes. Compliance would be rendered obsolete as to re-
served terms. Id. at 775.
173. Id. at 269. As we have seen before, the validity of the legislature and judiciary in
Hong Kong is already in question.
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Law, the following four examples are current violations which could be
determined to violate the ICCPR. First, Article I of the ICCPR estab-
lishes that all "peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pur-
sue their economic, social, and cultural development." 17 4 Hong Kong's
right to self-determination was quashed by China, when the UN Special
Committee accepted China's request to remove Hong Kong from the list
of colonies covered by Article I of the ICCPR.
175
Second, the ICCPR's guarantee that people have a right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives, 176 would challenge China's actions regarding the recent
alteration in election laws that took Hong Kong one step further away
from democracy. 77 By reducing the electorate, the ability of the Hong
Kong people to participate in public affairs has been diminished.
Third, the ICCPR ensures the right to vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expres-
sion of the will of the electors. 178 Members of the democratic party in
Hong Kong would be among the first people to claim China's violation of
the terms of election and the guarantee to move toward universal suf-
frage.
Fourth, the ICCPR upholds the civil and political rights guaranteed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1 79 The rights protected
in the ICCPR are the key composites of a democratic society. 80 Tung's
weakening of the force of the Declaration is counter to the ICCPR.
In response to these derogations of the ICCPR, there are four pos-
sible scenarios to ensure or attempt to ensure compliance with the
ICCPR. First, if everything was ideal, the ICCPR would be applied to
the Hong Kong SAR as it was applicable under United Kingdom's ad-
ministration. Article 39 of the Basic Law and Annex I, part XIII of the
Joint Declaration stipulate China's approval of the ICCPR as it applied
to Hong Kong at the time those agreements were ratified. Originally,
Great Britain adopted the ICCPR and extended its application to Hong
Kong.' 8 ' The tradition would continue and China would provide reports
to the HRC once a year following the first year after July 1, 1997. If
174. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. I.
175. See Neoh, supra note 10, at 323-23.
176. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 25, sec. a.
177. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
178. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 25, sec. b.
179. SENATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 649.
180. Id.
181. LIESBETH LUNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY OR
RUIN? 275 (1995). There are reservations made by the United Kingdom for Hong Kong as
to Articles 13 and 25.
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this were the most likely situation, this research would be unnecessary.
A second scenario is imaginable if China does not comply with the
reporting requirement, and the ICCPR is applied to the Hong Kong
SAR as it was applied under the United Kingdom's rule. Great Britain
made a declaration as to its acceptance of the "competence of the Hu-
man Rights Committee under Article 41" of the ICCPR. 182 If the
United Kingdom's declarations carried forward past the reversion, an-
other State Party to the Covenant, with similar acceptance of Article
41, could bring a communication to the Human Rights committee claim-
ing that China was not fulfilling the terms of the ICCPR. For example,
as part of the United States consideration for ratification of the ICCPR,
it considered the resulting influence the U.S. would have upon shaping
human rights development in other countries.1 8 3 Therefore, under Arti-
cle 41 the United States would be able to provide reports if it had ac-
cepted Article 41 as well.
The Optional Protocol would not be applicable to the Hong Kong
SAR because the United Kingdom was not a party nor a signatory to
the Optional Protocol and therefore, an individual could not file com-
plaints against the United Kingdom.
18 4
A third scenario would be if China insisted that its acceptance of
the ICCPR did not include Article 41, and China refused to comply with
the reporting requirements. The chief executive of Hong Kong might be
able to provide reports on behalf of the Hong Kong SAR to the HRC.
Additionally, NGOs could effectively protect rights such as freedom of
speech, association and participation.18 5 To draw a parallel, in 1995
Amnesty International submitted a report to the Human Rights Com-
mission concerning the abuses of human rights in Kashmir.186 Prior to
this report, the Indian government had denied the truth of allegations
of human rights abuses. 187 However, this report angered the Indian
government and spurred the government to provide its own reports and
take action to enforce these rights.188
However, China included Article 23 in the Basic Law, which limits
the "foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political
activities in the Region" or those same organizations from establishing
ties with similar organizations in the Region.18 9 It remains unclear
182. ICCPR, supra note 16, at Declarations
183. SENATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 659.
184. See supra notes160-64 and accompanying text.
185. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 463.
186. Abuse of Human Rights Commission, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 4, 1995, at 30.
187. Id.
188. Id. However, the article further indicates that although Amnesty International
got this reaction from India, the UN Commission on Human Rights did not assume the
influential role it could have.
189. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 23.
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whether China intended for this article to apply to NGOs. 190
Fourth, the worst and most likely scenario, China will refuse to
comply with the reporting procedure for the ICCPR or acknowledge its
application to Hong Kong. China would insist that Article 39 of the Ba-
sic Law was merely a recognition of the ICCPR as an international con-
vention but that Article 39 in no way bound China. Already, China
adamantly refuses to acknowledge an intergovernmental organization's,
like the U.N., authority over human right issues that are specifically
State concerns.1 91 The Government of China maintains a doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity192 and emphatically denies that the
ICCPR is enforceable through Article 39 of the Basic Law. 193 "It seems
pretty clear, that a suit against the PRC, or against its top officials,
would be regarded as violating the basic principles of the laws of the
PRC."'194 According to Chinese law, the PRC court could reject a matter
issued by a foreign court because it was incompatible with the sover-
eignty or security of the People's Republic of China. 95 Furthermore,
the Basic Law indicates that China will determine whether interna-
tional agreements to which it is a party will apply to Hong Kong. 196
Overarching all of these concerns is the questionable competency of
the HRC to address human rights violations. If China does not comply,
the HRC does not have recourse. Even if China does file a report with
the Committee, there is no guarantee that it will be accurate. 197 The
petition mechanism, 9 8 whereby another State Party or individual may
submit reports, may increase the accuracy of the reports.
Finally, and most importantly, the HRC can only provide reports
and appropriate general comments to the Parties. The Committee has
no police power. 199 The matter may be further referred, with prior con-
190. See Davis, supra note 5, at 315.
191. Vitrano, supra note 10, at 458. Great Britain is a party to the Joint Declaration
which was registered with the U.N. Britain could submit a complaint to the U.N. con-
cerning a violation by China. As an additional measure, the United States, even as a
third State Party, could submit a complaint to the U.N. on the behalf of Hong Kong or de-
fending its own, the United States', interests.
192. Platto & Horton, supra note 30, at 20.
193. Jordan supra note 31, at 367-68. China is inconsistent in its approach to human
rights in Hong Kong. It insists that the BRO is unnecessary because the Basic Law pro-
vides all of the necessary safeguards for human rights so this "implies that Article 39 of
the Basic Law and other rights provisions in the Basic Law are directly enforceable." Id.
194. Platto & Horton, supra note 30, at 20.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. MATHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS 31 (1995) (stating that "[r]eporting systems are dependent, to a large
extent, upon the good faith of the States concerned.")
198. See id at 32 (stating that a petition mechanism is "generally considered the most
effective means for the protection of human rights.").
199. Timothy Jones, Fundamental Rights in Australia and Britain, in
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sent by the Parties, to an appointed ad hoc Conciliation Commission.
The Commission, also, does not have policing powers, instead, they en-
deavor to reach an "amicable solution".
200
The ICCPR, like its counterpart the ICESCR, does not have any po-
lice mechanism but it does serve as a gatherer and conveyor of informa-
tion. This will be an important function to notify the rest of the com-
munity that China is not upholding its promises.
B. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1. Description of the ICESCR
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) entered into force on January 3, 1976.201 The
ICESCR's obligations are primarily listed in Article 2 as well as other
provisions of Part I and Part 111.202 Among the rights included in the
ICESCR are the right to work,20 3 to "just and favourable" work condi-
tions,204 to form trade unions and strike,205 to the greatest protection for
the family unit, 20 6 to education, 20 7 and to participate in cultural life. 20 8
While the ICCPR requires State Parties to "respect and ensure"20 9
rights, the ICESCR necessitates that States should "take steps, indi-
vidually and through international assistance and cooperation.... to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realisation of the rights."210 This principle in Article
2 is generally called the principle of progressive implementation. 211
Most of the rights set forth in the ICESCR, as opposed to the ICCPR,
are positive rights that require affirmative government action to ensure
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 104 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins, eds., 1996)
(stating that "[t]he Committee is not a judicial body; it is not a Supreme Court of Human
Rights. Nor are the views expressed by the Committee legally binding. Nor are there any
means of enforcement, apart from the Committee's moral authority and the potential
pressure of public opinion.").
200. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art 7(a)
201. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 410 (1995).
202. See Id. at pt. I, pt. III, & art 2.
203. Id. at art 6
204. Id. at art 7
205. Id. at art 8.
206. Id. at art 10.
207. Id. at art 13.
208. Id. at art 15.
209. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 2(1).
210. ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 2. See Geraldine Van Bueren, International Hu-
man Rights Law, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 596, 598 (Conor Gearty & Adam
Tomkins, eds., 1996).
211. Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 598.
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these rights.2 12 These government actions will require the use of scarce
resources, and the availability of these resources directly determines
the ability of the State Party to comply with the terms of the
ICESCR.
213
The ICESCR has a mandatory reporting procedure for State Par-
ties that ratified the Covenant. 21 4 Similar to the ICCPR State reports,
these State reports are designed to indicate the measures instituted by
the State Party to uphold the Covenant rights and the progress made
towards achieving the standards. If a State has difficulty meeting the
standards, it should indicate this in the report with the reasons for its
noncompliance. 21 5 Within two years of ratification of the ICESCR, a
State Party must submit an initial report. These reports are submitted
to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).216 An additional
report is required every five years thereafter. 217 When a State does not
submit a report or is tardy in its submission, the ECOSOC includes this
in its report to the Secretary-General. 218 If there is no State report and
no one has been identified that should have compiled the report, an in-
dividual from the Committee is delegated to develop a report of the im-
portant and relevant issues.
219
No specific committee or review group was established to evaluate
the ICESCR reports.220 According to Articles 16 through 22, enforce-
ment of the Covenant is to be administered by ECOSOC.221 In 1985,
the ECOSOC established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ESCC) to review the Covenant Reports.222 The ESCC car-
ries forth three primary objectives for the ICESCR: (1) development of
standards for evaluation of the rights recognized in the Covenant; (2)
catalyzing State Parties' ability to uphold the rights and to confront
212. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 163-64. Civil and political rights are nega-
tive rights because the state must only refrain from committing a violation of those rights.
Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 599. "The Human Rights Committee has, however,
pointed to the positive duties involved in protecting the right to life . I..." d
213. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 164-65.
214. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 316 (reports must be consistent with the
"reporting guidelines").
215. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 38.
216. See infra note 214; CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 38 (indicating that the Commis-
sion on Human Rights may also review these reports).
217. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 264.
218. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 59.
219. Id. at 59-60 (indicating that in some situations this technique has proven success-
ful)
220. The ICCPR established the Human Rights Commission to review the ICCPR re-
ports. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 262.
221. Id.
222. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 264 (indicating that "[i]ts principal activi-
ties are the adoption of 'general comments' and the examination of states parties' reports
leading to the adoption by the Committee of 'concluding observations' thereon.").
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those State Parties that do not comply; and (3) ensuring that State Par-
ties comply with the standards.
223
Since the 1990s, however, there has been a pile up of State reports
to be reviewed, so specialized agencies of the U.N. have also become in-
volved in the review process. 224 These review bodies have the ability to
make recommendations according to the State reports. Article 22 per-
mits the ECOSOC to apprise other U.N. bodies of the status of a State's
report in order to more effectively guarantee that the Covenant provi-
sions are upheld.
225
As a part of the reporting procedure, the Covenant has a mecha-
nism for input from NGOs and specialized agencies. 226 "State Parties
and specialized agencies may comment to ECOSOC on any such rec-
ommendations." 227 Article 18 provides that specialized agencies may
provide updates on progress made by the States towards achieving the
standards. 228 The Covenant does not include any other provisions for
outside contributions such as specialized agencies participating in the
evaluation of the reports or other groups providing reports. 229 However,
the Committee has invited all parties concerned with the issues to sub-
mit information. 2
30
Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not have an Optional Protocol
allowing for individuals to communicate a violation by a State Party of
the ICESCR.231 Over the years since its adoption, there have been mo-
tions to provide for a similar method of individual petition. Thus far
there has been no success. 232
2. Application
Unlike the ICCPR, any violation by China of the ICESCR will not
be immediately perceptible. The ICESCR mandates progressive pro-
grams that do not necessitate immediate results. Thus, the ICESCR
will require compliance from China over time. China's obligation is to
reach an end result. This will require that China implement programs
that assure economic, societal and cultural rights will be preserved.
223. CRAVEN, supra note 197. See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 316.
224. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 263.
225. See id. at 264.
226. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 355.
227. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 264.
228. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 76.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 76-77 (indicating that the Committee's Rules of Procedure clearly include
the specialized agencies as part of the evaluative process of State reports). The Commit-
tee also passed a resolution that allows for NGOs to submit written reports and make oral
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Over time, if this does not occur, then there are grounds for complaint
and action. Here are two examples of areas where China might be re-
miss in the future.
First, according to Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, there is a provision
against discrimination based on national origin.233 China might aggra-
vate this provision, if, while hiring people for Hong Kong government
jobs, China discriminates against Hong Kong-born Chinese versus Chi-
nese mainland born Chinese. China would not have as much leeway for
non-compliance compared to other ICESCR provisions. The elimination
of discrimination does not require as many resources as other ICESCR
provisions do for compliance. 234 In fact, compliance can be attained
with barely any resources at all. A history of certain types of discrimi-
nation may actually justify or necessitate the implementation of af-
firmative action programs. 235
A second compliance issue could be equality of opportunity for all,
according to Article 7(c) and 1(2)(c) of the ICESCR.236 If the trend con-
tinues that democrats are stymied from obtaining public office positions
due to the new election laws, this may be actionable inequality of oppor-
tunity. When the UN Committee evaluates China's compliance with
the ICESCR, it will consider measures taken by the legislature to de-
termine whether china is adequately using its resources to reach its ul-
timate goal. On the contrary, Hong Kong legislative action has, in fact,
cut back the electorate with the effect of legislating against election of
democrats. China is currently not directing its resources to reach an
ultimate goal of equal opportunity.
In the years to come, the prediction of China's violations of the
ICESCR may become reality. However, the applicability of the ICESCR
to the Hong Kong situation may be bogged down by peripheral issues.
The ICESCR will probably be second-in-line to the ICCPR as a UN en-
forcement mechanism alternative because the trend in international fa-
vors the importance of civil and political rights over economic, social
and cultural rights.237 For this reason, often the rights in the ICESCR
have been termed "non-justiciable" or "programmatic" 238 and the great-
est challenge facing the ICESCR is ensuring enforcement of its provi-
sions. 239
233. ICESCR, supra note 17, at art 2(2).
234. See generally id (discussing various rights protected by the ICESCR and the re-
source issues pursuant to compliance).
235. Id.
236. See ICESCR, supra note 17, at arts. 7 & 1(2).
237. Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 599; CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 9 (indicating that
in reality these rights are "ignored").
238. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 353.
239. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 268-69 (indicating that one of the greatest
difficulties to ensure compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Ini-
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Another difficulty relates to the ICESCR's insufficient reporting
mechanisms. Although the reporting procedure is the best method for
monitoring a particular human rights record,240 in general, the history
of reporting by State Parties to the Covenant has been poor.24' This
begs the question, then why should China submit reports? State Par-
ties that do not contest the applicability of the Covenant are negligent
to comply with the reporting requirement. China, who is loath to accept
the applicability of the Covenant, therefore, will have no compunction
ignoring the reporting requirement.
Under the ICCPR, if the State Party did not provide reports, there
were alternatives. However, the ICESCR does not offer solutions like
the Optional Protocol or Article 41. The ICESCR does provide for par-
ticipation by NGOs. However, NGOs may not be as effective advocating
economic, social and cultural rights as they are for advocating civil and
political rights.242 First, the NGOs, in practice, are reluctant to advo-
cate economic, social, and cultural rights alone. 243 Second, even if a
NGO may pursue upholding these rights, the actual enforcement of the
terms of the ICESCR requires a state to have available resources.244
The availability of resources is not controllable by the NGO.
A third deficiency of the effectiveness of the ICESCR is the impre-
cise language of the Covenant. Although the Covenant indicates that
"appropriate means" must be used to protect the rights in the ICESCR,
the Covenant does not identify those means.245 The legislative and ju-
dicial methods recommended for enforcement of the ICCPR may not
suffice for the ICESCR.246 Once again, the lack of development of en-
forcement mechanisms for economic, social and cultural rights, as com-
pared to civil and political rights, can be attributed to the relative lack
of concern in the international arena.
247
tially one of the greatest challenges to the ICESCR was whether economic rights were
really rights. This issue has been settled. Id.
240. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 33.
241. Id. at 57 (indicating that 14 States have not produced one report in 10 years).
242. But see id. at 32. The means of petition are considered among the most effective
ways to protect human rights.
243. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 269-70. A tug of war exists over whether
or not economic, social, and cultural rights are really rights. Thus, NGOs are often not
apt to pursue something that might not be a right.
244. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in
the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Theodore Meron, et. al,
1984).
245. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 268-69.
246. Id. at 269.
247. Id. (indicating the reasons are "1) the ambivalence of most governments, but par-
ticularly those from the Third World; 2) the demonstrated reluctance of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to focus specifically on economic and social rights; and 3) the lack of
innovative legal and other approaches to implementation by those governments that
clearly do support the concept.")
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VI. CONCLUSION
The ICCPR and IECSCR are both applicable to the Hong Kong
SAR. The Joint Declaration, an international agreement that has been
registered with the U.N., is proof of this intent by both the United
Kingdom and China.248 Furthermore, the Basic Law, written by China,
characterizes this provision as a promise to the- Hong Kong people.
The Joint Declaration establishes China's international legal duty
to administer Hong Kong pursuant to the provisions of the Declara-
tion.249 The primary purpose of an international treaty is that it serves
as reliable proof that each party to the treaty is bound to its provisions
and must fulfill them in good faith.250 If China does not uphold its
promises in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to maintain the
capitalist system in Hong Kong for the next fifty years and to pursue a
plan for greater democracy, the international community could resort to
the UN Covenants.
The primary obstacle, as we have seen is that these Covenants can
do little more than serve as conduits for protest and dialogue. The
Committees to the Covenants have very little judgment power and no
police power. However, this is not as ineffective as it may seem. It is
important that the international community is aware that China is not
upholding its promises, that there are human rights violations. Reports
that the Committees provide to the Secretary-General of the UN will
provide notice that collective action needs to be taken. Collective ac-
tion, countries working in concert, will be the ideal means through
which Hong Kong's human rights will be secured.
25 1
248. See Neoh, supra note 10, at 327 n.78 (quoting The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at art. 2(1)(a). Article 2(1)(a) defines
a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.").
249. Skeen, supra note 9, at 178.
250. Vienna Convention, supra note 248, at art. 26. An international treaty takes
precedence over internal law. "Primary responsibility for carrying out treaty obligations
rests with States Parties." Id.
251. Maleiha Malik, Communal Goods as Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
RIGHTS, 138, 141 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins, eds. 1996).
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